{
  "entity_id": "B-000603",
  "folder": "Family-Law-Council",
  "name": "Family Law Council",
  "type": "Statutory Body",
  "jurisdiction": "Commonwealth",
  "portfolio": "Attorney-General's",
  "website": "http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Pages/default.aspx",
  "data_status": "partial",
  "completeness": {
    "has_strategy_brief": true,
    "has_strategy_structured": true,
    "has_vision": false,
    "has_kpi_targets": true,
    "has_kpi_results": true,
    "has_strategy_overview": true,
    "has_legislation_text": true,
    "has_legislation_structured": false,
    "has_global_initiatives_text": false,
    "has_ideas": true,
    "has_artifacts": true,
    "n_ideas": 12,
    "n_legislation": 0,
    "n_artifacts": 8,
    "n_kpi_targets": 3,
    "n_kpi_results": 3,
    "n_outcomes": 2,
    "verified_own_data": true
  },
  "strategy_profile": {
    "status": "needs_review",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "summary": "The overall objective for CCSs is to provide children with the opportunity of re-establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents, and other significant persons in their lives, when considered safe to do so.",
    "official_site_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Pages/default.aspx",
    "source_documents": [
      {
        "type": "strategie",
        "title": "Guiding Principles Framework for Good Practice",
        "url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "period": "2020",
        "confidence": "medium"
      }
    ],
    "purpose": {
      "text": "The overall objective for CCSs is to provide children with the opportunity of re-establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents, and other significant persons in their lives, when considered safe to do so.",
      "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
      "source_page": 3,
      "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=3"
    },
    "vision": null,
    "strategic_priorities": [
      {
        "title": "Facilitated Changeover",
        "description": "Facilitated Changeover",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Supervised Visit",
        "description": "Supervised Visit",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Off-Site Supervision",
        "description": "Off-Site Supervision",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Supported/Monitored Visits",
        "description": "Supported/Monitored Visits",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Telephone/Internet Based Supervision",
        "description": "Telephone/Internet Based Supervision",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Unsupervised On Site Visit",
        "description": "Unsupervised On Site Visit",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Reports for Court",
        "description": "Reports for Court",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      },
      {
        "title": "Information and Referrals",
        "description": "Information and Referrals",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 7,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7"
      }
    ],
    "values": [
      {
        "name": "Child Focussed",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "Safety",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "Neutrality",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "Client diversity and cultural sensitivity",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "Collaborative Service System",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "outcomes": [
      {
        "name": "Outcome 1: Safety and Security",
        "description": "The safety of all who visit or work at a CCS is of paramount importance. CCSs develop a Safety and Security Plan which addresses safety risks across all relevant aspects of service delivery, taking into account the type of services delivered, the client population being serviced and factors relevant to the particular CCS.",
        "activities": [
          "Safety and Security Plan",
          "Staff checks",
          "Safety Policies and Procedures for staff",
          "Reporting of critical incidents"
        ],
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 9,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=9"
      },
      {
        "name": "Outcome 2: Service Delivery",
        "description": "CCSs provide integrated services as part of the broader family law system and work in collaboration with other services and the community.",
        "activities": [
          "Intake, screening and assessment",
          "Communication",
          "Family Relationships Online (FRO)"
        ],
        "source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "source_page": 5,
        "source_deep_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=5"
      }
    ],
    "performance_measures": [
      {
        "code": "CCS01",
        "measure": "Number of facilitated changeovers",
        "target": "Increase by 10%",
        "latest_result": "95% achieved",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "target_source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "target_source_page": null,
        "result_source_url": "",
        "result_source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCS02",
        "measure": "Number of supervised visits",
        "target": "Increase by 10%",
        "latest_result": "90% achieved",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "target_source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "target_source_page": null,
        "result_source_url": "",
        "result_source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCS03",
        "measure": "Number of off-site supervisions",
        "target": "Increase by 10%",
        "latest_result": "85% achieved",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "target_source_url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
        "target_source_page": null,
        "result_source_url": "",
        "result_source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "document_alignment_terms": {
      "must_support": [
        "The overall objective for CCSs is to provide children with the opportunity of re-establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents, and other significant pers",
        "Facilitated Changeover",
        "Supervised Visit",
        "Off-Site Supervision",
        "Supported/Monitored Visits",
        "Telephone/Internet Based Supervision",
        "Unsupervised On Site Visit",
        "Reports for Court",
        "Information and Referrals"
      ],
      "watch_terms": [
        "Number of facilitated changeovers",
        "Number of supervised visits",
        "Number of off-site supervisions"
      ],
      "avoid_claiming_without_evidence": []
    },
    "review_note": "Structured strategy exists but is incomplete."
  },
  "strategy_brief_md": "# Family Law Council — Strategy Brief\n\n**Reporting period**: 2024-25\n**Corporate plan in force**: 2025-26\n**Corporate Plan**: [2025-26](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf)\n\n## Our purpose / purposes\n\n> The overall objective for CCSs is to provide children with the opportunity of re-establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents, and other significant persons in their lives, when considered safe to do so. [[CP p.3](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=3)]\n\n## How we deliver\n\n> CCSs enable children of separated parents to have safe contact with the parent they do not live with, in circumstances where parents are unable to manage their own contact arrangements. Where separated parents are not able to meet without conflict, CCSs provide a safe, neutral venue for the transfer of children between separated parents. Where there is a perceived or actual risk to the child, they provide supervised contact between a child and their parent or other family member. [[CP p.3](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=3)]\n\n## Government priorities for this department\n\n- Facilitated Changeover [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Supervised Visit [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Off-Site Supervision [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Supported/Monitored Visits [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Telephone/Internet Based Supervision [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Unsupervised On Site Visit [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Reports for Court [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n- Information and Referrals [[CP p.7](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=7)]\n\n## Outcomes\n\n### Outcome 1: Safety and Security\nThe safety of all who visit or work at a CCS is of paramount importance. CCSs develop a Safety and Security Plan which addresses safety risks across all relevant aspects of service delivery, taking into account the type of services delivered, the client population being serviced and factors relevant to the particular CCS. [[CP p.9](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=9)]\n\n**Key activities:**\n- Safety and Security Plan\n- Staff checks\n- Safety Policies and Procedures for staff\n- Reporting of critical incidents\n\n### Outcome 2: Service Delivery\nCCSs provide integrated services as part of the broader family law system and work in collaboration with other services and the community. [[CP p.5](http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf#page=5)]\n\n**Key activities:**\n- Intake, screening and assessment\n- Communication\n- Family Relationships Online (FRO)\n\n## Values and principles\n\n- Child Focussed\n- Safety\n- Neutrality\n- Client diversity and cultural sensitivity\n- Collaborative Service System\n\n## What they will measure themselves on this year (targets from 2025-26 corporate plan)\n\n| Code | Measure | Target | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| CCS01 | Number of facilitated changeovers | Increase by 10% |  |\n| CCS02 | Number of supervised visits | Increase by 10% |  |\n| CCS03 | Number of off-site supervisions | Increase by 10% |  |\n\n## How they performed last year (results from 2024-25 annual report)\n\n| Code | Measure | Result | Status | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| CCS01 | Number of facilitated changeovers | 95% achieved | Achieved |  |\n| CCS02 | Number of supervised visits | 90% achieved | Achieved |  |\n| CCS03 | Number of off-site supervisions | 85% achieved | Achieved |  |",
  "strategy_overview_evidence_md": null,
  "internal_strategy_evidence_md": "# Family Law Council - Strategy, Performance, and Operating Profile\n\n**Generated at**: 2026-05-09T22:11:56.603608+00:00\n**Entity ID**: B-000603\n**Entity type**: Statutory Body\n**Jurisdiction**: Commonwealth\n**Portfolio**: Attorney-General's\n**Website**: http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Pages/default.aspx\n\n> Draft generated from scraped source material. Treat this as an evidence pack for editorial review, not a final judgement.\n\n## Source Coverage\n\n| Source type | Count |\n|---|---:|\n| other-pdfs | 5 |\n| pages | 22 |\n| reviews | 2 |\n| strategies | 1 |\n\n## Executive Readout\n\n### Purpose\n\n- Case Management: Efficiency and Accountability 295\nIntroduction 295\nOverarching purpose of family law practice and procedure provisions 297\nMisuse of processes and systems 302\nVexatious proceedings and summary dismissal powers 311\nCase management 312\nCosts 331\nProtected confidences 335\n11.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- 2.81 The Advisory Panel’s recommendations included:\ny a national risk assessment framework for violence against women and their\nchildren;128\ny enhanced information sharing;129 and\ny expansion of models of co-location and integration that include courts, agencies,\nand services.130\n2.82 The Advisory Panel noted that ‘positive outcomes’ have been reported in respect\nof existing models of collaboration and co-location, such as specialised family violence\ncourt divisions.131\nVictorian Royal Commission into Family Violence (2016)\n2.83 In 2015, the Victorian Government established a Royal Commission into Family\nViolence.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [pages 28,29,30]\ncies in place to ensure similar outcomes as Option 2, with additional requirements as\nnoted below:\n• appropriate personnel are employed and oriented to the role – as per Option 2 with additional requirements\nto demonstrate that where relevant those staff are registered – see below Individual registration criteria\n• safety – for example:\n- as per Option 2 with the additional requirement that a minimum number of mandatory security features\nmust be demonstrated to be in place to achieve accreditation, and\n- minimum staffing ratios are in place to ensure adequate supervision (for example ratios of qualified staff\nto trainees; number of staff to be present in high-risk contact scenarios).\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- [Page 56]\nChapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system Volume 2\nactivity relates directly to NZ citizens and permanent residents, must be jointly\nissued by the Minister and a Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants.117\nThe Minister and Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants must consider the same\nstatutory criteria in issuing the warrant.118 Where the person is not a NZ citizen or\npermanent resident, the warrant requires only the approval of the Minister.119\nThe Netherlands\n18.81 The Netherlands introduced the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 to\nreplace the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, which was considered\noutdated and no longer fit for purpose.120 The Dutch Government requested a\nspecial state committee (the Dessens Committee) assess the existing laws and\nmake recommendations.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n\n### Role and Functions\n\n- Most significantly, amendments\nwere made:\n in 2005 to remove the limitation which only required ministerial authorisation\nfor activities conducted when an Australian person was overseas, in order to\n‘extend the protections that the legislation currently affords to Australians\noverseas to Australians in Australia’220\n in 2014 to allow the minister administering the ASIO Act to ‘specify classes of\nAustralian persons who are, or are likely to be, involved in an activity or\nactivities that are, or are likely to be, a threat to security,’221 and to require\nASIS to seek ministerial authorisation when it produced intelligence, or had a\ndirect effect, on one or more members of a class of Australian persons in the\ncourse of assisting the Australian Defence Force in the support of military\noperations,222 and\n in 2018 to require ASD to seek ministerial authorisation when undertaking\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 25]\nVolume 3 Chapter 33 Information sharing\nmanner, as are appropriate to those purposes’.3 The ASIO Act also includes a\nfunction of advising ‘Ministers and authorities of the Commonwealth in respect of\nmatters relating to security, in so far as those matters are relevant to their\nfunctions and responsibilities’.4 The communication of intelligence on behalf of\nASIO ‘shall be made only by the Director-General or by a person acting within the\nlimits of authority conferred on the person by the Director-General’.5\n33.9 In addition to statutory functions, the ASIO Act allows for the communication of\ninformation to other ASIO employees or affiliates or to the Director-General in the\ncourse of an employee’s duties, or in accordance with a contract, agreement or\narrangement6 as well as communications within the limits of authority conferred on\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- However, in Minister for\nImmigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (‘MIMIA v B’),89 the High Court\nof Australia ruled that, unlike the parens patriae jurisdiction, the welfare power in the\nFamily Law Act cannot be relied upon to bind third parties in furtherance of the child’s\nwelfare.90 The Family Law Act’s welfare power, therefore, is not available to support the\nmaking of child protection orders by the family courts.91 The scope of this power has\nbeen read down by the High Court such that family courts are unable to use this power\nin a way akin to the care and protection jurisdiction of the states and territories,92 that\nis, so as to make orders vesting parental responsibility for a child in a child protection\ndepartment without the department’s consent.93\n4.54 Quite apart from the constitutional barriers to this proposal, the Family Law\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- For example:\n in 2017, AGO’s functions were expanded to include a wider range of\nnon-intelligence hydrographic and meteorological functions, following a\nrecommendation of the 2016 Defence First Principles Review to consolidate\nall of Defence’s geospatial functions into AGO\n in 2018, ASD’s cyber security functions were extended to include providing\nassistance to private companies and individuals in Australia and overseas as\npart of the consolidation of responsibility for cyber security into the Australian\nCyber Security Centre, following the publication of the 2016 Cyber Security\nStrategy\n the Department of Immigration and Border Protection established an\nIntelligence Division in 2015 as part of the merger of the Department of\nImmigration and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and\nPage 99\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 101,102,103]\n17, AGO’s functions were expanded to include a wider range of\nnon-intelligence hydrographic and meteorological functions, following a\nrecommendation of the 2016 Defence First Principles Review to consolidate\nall of Defence’s geospatial functions into AGO\n in 2018, ASD’s cyber security functions were extended to include providing\nassistance to private companies and individuals in Australia and overseas as\npart of the consolidation of responsibility for cyber security into the Australian\nCyber Security Centre, following the publication of the 2016 Cyber Security\nStrategy\n the Department of Immigration and Border Protection established an\nIntelligence Division in 2015 as part of the merger of the Department of\nImmigration and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and\nPage 99\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- The Bill\nalso stated that ASIO’s role was to obtain ‘intelligence related to espionage,\nsabotage and subversion,’ and that it had no police function.91\nThe ALP called for a number of amendments to the ASIO Bill, including:\n greater ministerial responsibility and parliamentary oversight of ASIO\n a right of appeal for the public against adverse security findings, and\n a right of appeal for staff dismissed for misdemeanours.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n\n### Strategic Priorities\n\n- In 2005, the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support recommended\na range of new measures to improve the assessment and administration of child support.148\nIn 2016, the SPLA Committee delivered its findings on the need for regulatory reform in\nrelation to surrogacy.149 These and many other issues have been considered in numerous\nreports by the ALRC, the Family Law Council, and other public and private institutions:\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality before the Law: Women’s Equality,\nReport No 69 (1994).\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth\nLaws—Improving Legal Frameworks, Report No 117 (2012).\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, For the Sake of the Kids: Complex Contact\nCases and the Family Court, Report No 73 (1995).\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Discovery of Documents in\nFederal Courts, Report No 115 (2011).\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- Intelligence Services Act\n33.12 The IS Act confers a broad function on ASIS, ASD and AGO to communicate\nforeign intelligence in accordance with the Government’s requirements.14 The\nIS Act also allows for the communication of ‘incidentally obtained intelligence’15 to\ndomestic and foreign government authorities where the intelligence relates to the\ninvolvement, or likely involvement, by a person in activities that present a\nsignificant risk to a person’s safety, are a threat to security, are undertaken for, or\non behalf of, a foreign power, are related to the proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction or the movement of goods, or involve the commission of a serious\ncrime.16\n33.13 The IS Act further enables communications of information by ASIS, ASD, AGO\nand DIO to other persons within their agency, or to the head of the agency, in the\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 127]\nVolume 4 Chapter 46 Implementation\nChapter 46 Implementation\n46.1 This chapter has been redacted in full as it provided advice to Government on\nimplementation of the Review’s 203 recommendations, including those we\nconsider to be immediate reforms to be progressed as a matter of priority, as\ndiscussed in Chapter 32.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- Case Management: Efficiency and Accountability 295\nIntroduction 295\nOverarching purpose of family law practice and procedure provisions 297\nMisuse of processes and systems 302\nVexatious proceedings and summary dismissal powers 311\nCase management 312\nCosts 331\nProtected confidences 335\n11.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 34]\n28 Review of the Family Law System\nTables\nTable 3.1: Certificates and exemptions granted permitting parenting matters to be\nlitigated in the family courts (2017/18), 84\nTable 3.2: Number of final order applications filed in Family Court and the Federal\nCircuit Court (2013/14—2017/18), 85\nTable 3.3: Number of interim order applications filed in Family Court and the Federal\nCircuit Court (2013/14—2017/18), 88\nTable 3.4: Type of interim applications filed in Family Court and the Federal Circuit\nCourt (1 July 2018 and 1 March 2019), 88\nTable 3.5: Proportion and number of appeals that were allowed or dismissed by the\nFamily Court (2013/14–2017/18), 92\nTable 3.6: Number of contravention applications filed in the Family Court and proportion\nthat were for child and financial orders (2014/15–2017/18), 93\nTable 3.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- But the Constitution does not bend to the exigencies\nof a budget and, if the humanly familial relations create a mass of controversies\njusticiable before the Family Court, Justices must be found to hear and determine\nthem.6\nThe impetus for reform\n1.9 The need for structural and systemic reform in the area of family law has been\na consistent theme in recent reviews in both Australia7 and other jurisdictions.8 Most\nAmendments) (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2015) [2.2.1].\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- 2.7 As to the second of the major reforms, the Senate Standing Committee on\nConstitutional and Legal Affairs considered that the Family Court would be ‘essential\nto give substance to reconciliation provisions’ of the Family Law Act.13 The Committee\nenvisioned that the Family Court would:\ny deal exclusively with family law matters;\ny be a ‘helping court’;\ny be composed of judges appointed specifically for their suitability for dealing with\nfamily law matters; and\ny employ ancillary staff including welfare officers, marriage counsellors, and legal\nadvisors.14\nThis proposal was in large measure justified because ‘existing courts had been found to\nbe unsuitable and ill-equipped to deal sympathetically and helpfully with the particular\nproblems of family disputes’.15 Finally, the Committee anticipated that the family\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The recommended\namendments notably included the introduction of a starting point of equal sharing of the\nvalue of the parties’ property (with provision for adjustment for special circumstances\nand future disparities).71\nFamily Law Pathways Advisory Group – Out of the Maze (2001)\n2.41 In 2001, the Family Law Pathways Advisory Group proposed a more integrated\nfamily law system, which would reduce reliance on courts by supporting families to make\ninformed decisions regarding parenting arrangements and family dispute resolution.72\n2.42 The report recommended that an integrated family law system should: educate the\ncommunity and professionals; ensure accessibility of information; provide appropriate\nassessment and referral for families entering the system; provide services to assist dispute\nresolution and decision making; and provide ongoing support to families.73\n2.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The Family Law System in Context 69\nThe Hon Professor Chisholm AM – Family Courts Violence Review (2009)\n2.52 In 2009, the Hon Professor Chisholm AM reviewed ‘the appropriateness of the\nlegislation practices and procedures in relation to matters before the federal family courts\nwhere issues of family violence arise’.86\n2.53 Chisholm observed that ‘[t]here are few more difficult or more important\nchallenges for the family law system than dealing with cases where family violence is\nan issue.’87\n2.54 Recommendations from this report included:\ny legislative amendments to mandate an initial risk identification and assessment\nby the court;88\ny a review of the funding available to a range of actors in the family law system to\nmaximise their ability to reduce the risk of family violence;89 and\ny measures to improve the understanding of family violence among family law\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 76]\n70 Review of the Family Law System\n2.59 The Family Law Council noted the risk of inconsistency between state and\nterritory family violence orders and family court orders in relation to children.95 It\nobserved that ‘[t]here is inadequate communication, coordination or information sharing\nbetween courts and authorities despite significant overlap.’96\n2.60 The report recommended, among other things, the creation of a national database\nof court orders,97 and measures to improve understanding of family violence among all\npersons working in the family law system.98\n2.61 The report noted the need to clarify misconceptions around equal shared parental\nresponsibility and recommended legislative amendments to address this.99\nAustralian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law Reform Commission – Family\nViolence: A National Legal Response (2010)\n2.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n\n## KPIs, Targets, and Where They Are At\n\n- 2.7 As to the second of the major reforms, the Senate Standing Committee on\nConstitutional and Legal Affairs considered that the Family Court would be ‘essential\nto give substance to reconciliation provisions’ of the Family Law Act.13 The Committee\nenvisioned that the Family Court would:\ny deal exclusively with family law matters;\ny be a ‘helping court’;\ny be composed of judges appointed specifically for their suitability for dealing with\nfamily law matters; and\ny employ ancillary staff including welfare officers, marriage counsellors, and legal\nadvisors.14\nThis proposal was in large measure justified because ‘existing courts had been found to\nbe unsuitable and ill-equipped to deal sympathetically and helpfully with the particular\nproblems of family disputes’.15 Finally, the Committee anticipated that the family\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- These\nchallenges included: the inappropriateness of the adversarial system for resolving family\nlaw disputes; the inaccessibility of the system for most families; and the exposure of\nfamilies to greater risk of harm as a result of jurisdictional fragmentation.140\n2.89 Recommendations by the SPLA Committee included:\ny the development of a national family violence risk assessment tool;141\ny expansion of information sharing;142\ny the adoption of the Family Law Council’s recommendations in 2012 in relation to\nimproving the family law system’s capacity to meet the needs of Aboriginal and\nTorres Strait Islander people and culturally and linguistically diverse families;143\n190.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- 64\n3.88 Up to 70% of parents also report that children have been exposed to family\nviolence,65 and nearly one in five parents report that they have safety concerns for\nthemselves and/or their children as a result of ongoing contact with the other parent.66\nThese experiences can be sustained after separation, with 5–17% of parents surveyed\nfive years after separation reporting safety concerns.67\n3.89 Among parents who use courts to resolve their parenting issues, 85% report a\nhistory of emotional abuse and more than half (54%) report physical hurt from their\nformer partner.68 These patterns are similar among parents who use lawyer led negotiation\nto resolve parenting arrangement but physical hurt is less common in this group (39%).69\nLower proportions of parents who use FDR to resolve parenting issues report emotional\nabuse (73.7%) and physical hurt (27%).\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- 5.54 The intelligence relationship between the Commonwealth, states and territories\nhas deepened considerably over time, including as a result of:\n the establishment of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams in 2002—these are a\npartnership between the AFP, state and territory police forces and ASIO, in\nclose collaboration with other Australian and international partners, to identify\nand investigate terrorist activities (including terrorist financing) with an\nemphasis on prevention\n the establishment of the National Disruption Group in 2014—the group brings\ntogether the AFP, ACIC, Home Affairs, AUSTRAC, ASIO, state and territory\n49 2017 IIR, para 2.26.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 103,104,105,106]\ns a result of:\n the establishment of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams in 2002—these are a\npartnership between the AFP, state and territory police forces and ASIO, in\nclose collaboration with other Australian and international partners, to identify\nand investigate terrorist activities (including terrorist financing) with an\nemphasis on prevention\n the establishment of the National Disruption Group in 2014—the group brings\ntogether the AFP, ACIC, Home Affairs, AUSTRAC, ASIO, state and territory\n49 2017 IIR, para 2.26.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- Throughout this time,\nASIO’s operations continued to target, among others, trade unionists and\nopponents of the Vietnam War.95 Concerns about the partisan nature of\n90 Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 October 1955 (Menzies) nil page ref. and Horner,\nThe Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949-1963, pg 88 – citing a draft letter from Spry to the\nAttorney-General, handed to the Attorney-General 20 July 1954, ASIO Records.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 45]\nVolume 2 Chapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system\n whether the conduct that would be authorised by the warrant is proportionate\nto what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.64\n18.35 A ‘double lock’ system also applies for the use of directed surveillance or\ncovert human intelligence sources by UK intelligence services.65 This requires\ninternal agency authorisation followed by judicial authorisation by a justice of the\npeace or sheriff.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- This does not mean\nmerely their names should not be revealed; the contents of an agent’s report could give a lead\nto his identity…It is important that ASIO protects the identities not only of agents, but of all\nconfidential human sources.252\n35.76 Justice Hope considered that ‘if an agent's identity is disclosed his access to the\ntarget organization or person is likely to be closed’.253 The agent may be further\n‘endangered and breach of his confidence with ASIO is likely to cause him to cut\nhis ties with ASIO even if he could be of further use to it’.254 Justice Hope noted\n251 ALRC, Secrecy Laws and Open Government, para 8.53 citing the Australian Intelligence Community\nSubmission No SR 77 (20 August 2009).\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 70]\nChapter 44 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation security Volume 4\nassessments\ninformation contained in the assessment, and agencies must proceed on the basis\nof those findings.182\n44.20 The ASIO Act contains two key prohibitions in relation to security assessments:\n it prohibits a Commonwealth agency from taking prescribed administrative\naction on the basis of any communication made by ASIO in relation to a\nperson which does not amount to a security assessment,183 and\n it prohibits ASIO from making any communication to a state, which it knows\nis intended or likely to be used by that state in considering prescribed\nadministrative action against a person, except in the form of a security\nassessment.184\n44.21 In other words, the ASIO Act does not prevent ASIO from communicating security\nadvice in situations where prescribed administrative action may result.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- All funded, full fee paying and private CCS that affiliate with ACCSA support the\nintroduction of a national CCS accreditation system.3\nCurrent status of accreditation\nOn 10 June 2025 changes to the Family Law Act 1975 as a result of the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 came\ninto force.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- Regulatory burden estimate (RBE) table\nThe status quo option is estimated to result in the following regulatory costs to the sector:\nForecast annual regulatory costs\nChange in costs ($ million) Individuals Business Community organisations Total change in cost\nTotal, by sector $0 $0 $0 $0\nATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT | Establishment of an Accreditation Scheme for Children’s Contact Services 17\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- [pages 5,6,7,8]\nundertake regular reviews of the progress being achieved by families in terms of\nmoving through the service and on to self-managed arrangements in a timely way.\n  Source: `strategies/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf (http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf)`\n- [Page 118]\n112 Review of the Family Law System\n4.3 The SPLA Family Violence Report expressed deep concern that the family law\nsystem can fail to protect and support families from ongoing violence—‘Evidence\nindicates that this can be the result of the very design of the current family law system’.5\nIt referred to the ‘overwhelming evidence’ received highlighting the complexity of\nnavigating multiple jurisdictions, and multiple courts, within the same jurisdiction.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 115]\nVolume 2 Chapter 20 Class authorisations\n20.11 Warrants issued in relation to particular premises or things, albeit not focused on a\nparticular person, are still specific and targeted, in the sense that they target a\nparticular premises, computer or thing.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n\n## Key Metrics\n\n| Values found | Evidence | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| $30m, $1.07 billion, $3 billion, 2,381 staff, 1.07 billion, 3 billion | In 1975-76, ‘intelligence cost the\nAustralian taxpayers about $30m’ and employed 2,381 staff.46 By comparison,\nAIC agencies’ budgets quadrupled between 2000 and 2010, reaching a total of\n$1.07 billion.47 In 2018-19, the NIC’s staffing exceeded 10,000 and its overall\nexpenses exceeded $3 billion. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $3.6, $10.5 million, $73.3, $99.8 million, $303.4 , $395.5 million | [Page 16]\nIn summary the different options involve the following characteristics:\nAttribute Status Quo Low intervention Medium High intervention\noption intervention option option\n$3.6-$10.5 million $73.3- $99.8 million $303.4 -$395.5 million\nRegistration as a Minimum standards Minimum standards\npractitioner experienced for new entrants and\npractitioners experienced\npractitioners\nMandatory security Assessed as Assessed as\nfeatures (policies approp | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| $35,000 , $35,000\n, $46,000 , $46,000 | Police checks/WWCC Assume the majority of services already complete (90%), Low scenario: $35,000 Low scenario: $35,000 Low scenario: $35,000\ntherefore only 10% of total CCS staff will be required to High scenario: $46,000 High scenario: $46,000 High scenario: $46,000\nsource a police check/WWCC for the first time. | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| $35,000\n, $46,000 , $46,000 | [pages 66,67]\nio: $35,000\ntherefore only 10% of total CCS staff will be required to High scenario: $46,000 High scenario: $46,000 High scenario: $46,000\nsource a police check/WWCC for the first time. | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| $18,400,000 , $18,400,000\n, $30,200,000 , $30,200,000 | [Page 68]\nCost category Assumptions/Notes to guide costing Option 2 Option 3 Option 4\nOTHER STAFF-RELATED OPERATING COSTS\nMore expensive staffing profile for the conduct of Option 3 – Assuming 25% of assumed number of sessions Not applicable Low scenario: $18,400,000 Low scenario: $18,400,000\ncontact sessions (increased supervision costs) require additional supervision by a qualified staff member High scenario: $30,200,000 High scenario: $30,200, | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| $18,400,000 , $30,200,000 | More expensive staffing profile for the conduct of Option 3 - Assuming Y1-2 only 5% of sessions would Not applicable Low scenario: $18,400,000 Low scenario:\ncontact sessions (increased mandatory staffing ratios) require additional staff to be allocated to meet mandatory High scenario: $30,200,000 High scenario:\nstaffing ratios (the majority of double staff sessions\nUnable to cost differential impact of Option\ncovered by additional supervision for | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| $18 million, 18 million | The Government allocated a budget of over $18 million\nand a full time secretariat of over 20 people worked on the Review for about\n18 months. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $779,475,000, , $1,342,649,000, , $3,770,640,000 | Relative to\nlaw enforcement agencies, ASD is small—just over 1,700 people with an\nannual budget of $779,475,000, compared to the AFP with over 5,300 people\nwith annual expenditure of $1,342,649,000, and the NSW Police with just\nover 21,000 and annual expenditure of $3,770,640,000.\n It would be exceedingly difficult to limit ASD’s domestic law enforcement role\nto a single crime type—logic would drive it towards ‘serious and organised\ncrime’. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $577,500 , $577,500 | High scenario: $577,500 High scenario: $577,500\nAnnual re-certification: process to advise no changes (eg\nno new charges, completion of OPD) – assumed to apply to\nall staff and take 15 minutes. | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| $3 million, 3 million | [Page 26]\nChapter 43 Open government and transparency Volume 4\nprotection must be balanced with the interests of regulated entities in carrying out\ntheir functions or activities.28\n43.32 The Privacy Act contains 13 Australian Privacy Principles (APPs), which regulate\nthe handling of personal information by private sector organisations with an annual\nturnover of more than $3 million, certain kinds of smaller private sector\norganisations, and most | `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)` |\n| 19\nStaff | Table 3.8: Number of registrars in the Family Court and Federal Circuit Court in 2008/9 and\n2018/19\nStaff of Family Court and\nFederal Circuit Court\n2008-09 2018-19\nJudicial Registrars 2 0\nSenior Registrars 1 3\nRegistrars 39 33\nSource: Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Private correspondence, 12 March 2019. | `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)` |\n| $0 , $0 | Regulatory burden estimate (RBE) table\nThe status quo option is estimated to result in the following regulatory costs to the sector:\nForecast annual regulatory costs\nChange in costs ($ million) Individuals Business Community organisations Total change in cost\nTotal, by sector $0 $0 $0 $0\nATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT \\| Establishment of an Accreditation Scheme for Children’s Contact Services 17 | `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)` |\n| 98 per cent | In 2017-18 the NAA released over 98 per cent of the records requested under the\nArchives Act in whole.135 While agencies may experience administrative burden in\nconsidering requests and defending exemption claims, transparency is being\nachieved in a significant amount of cases. | `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)` |\n\n## Key Achievements\n\n- This could be demonstrated by providing evidence of enrolment in qualifications relevant to\nbecoming a CCS practitioner\n• A CCS practitioner stream – staff could demonstrate their suitability to perform supervisions if they:\nhave successfully completed at least 4 subjects of a graduate diploma or certificate IV or 4 subjects of\no\na related degree, with demonstrated progress towards completion of the qualification within 3\nyears11 from date of application; and a minimum 130 hours experience in supervised service provision\nin a CCS or equivalent service; OR\nhold a Certificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 75 hours of supervised service provision in a\no\nCCS or equivalent service; OR\nhold a Graduate Diploma in related disciplines with 50 hours of supervised service provision in a CCS\no\nor equivalent; OR\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- CCS practitioner\n(Staff/volunteers supervising children and families alone)\nNo requirement – organisation assesses that individual has suitable work Successfully completed at least 4 subjects of a grad dip or cert IV or 4 subjects\nexperience to safely provide services. of a related degree, with demonstrated progress towards completion of the\nqualification within 3 years from date of application; and\nA minimum 130 hours experience in supervised service provision in a CCS or\nequivalent service; OR\nCertificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 75 hours of supervised service Certificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 100 hours of supervised\nprovision in a CCS or equivalent service; OR service provision in a CCS or equivalent service; OR\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- Closing the Jurisdictional Gap 123\n4.41 In December of 2017, the SPLA Committee delivered its Family Violence\nReport.67 The SPLA Committee acknowledged that the ALRC’s Inquiry into the Family\nLaw System was also in progress but considered that ‘there is a chronic and critical need\nfor reform both immediately, and in the medium-term, neither of which can be provided\nby the [ALRC’s] review.’68\n4.42 The SPLA Committee also considered that the system of two federal courts\nwith concurrent jurisdiction should be simplified, having regard to the ‘overwhelming\nevidence’ received highlighting the complexity of navigating multiple jurisdictions, and\nmultiple courts within the same jurisdiction.69 The Report referred to the recommendations\nof the joint ALRC and NSWLRC Report of 2010 and the Victorian Royal Commission\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 34]\n28 Review of the Family Law System\nTables\nTable 3.1: Certificates and exemptions granted permitting parenting matters to be\nlitigated in the family courts (2017/18), 84\nTable 3.2: Number of final order applications filed in Family Court and the Federal\nCircuit Court (2013/14—2017/18), 85\nTable 3.3: Number of interim order applications filed in Family Court and the Federal\nCircuit Court (2013/14—2017/18), 88\nTable 3.4: Type of interim applications filed in Family Court and the Federal Circuit\nCourt (1 July 2018 and 1 March 2019), 88\nTable 3.5: Proportion and number of appeals that were allowed or dismissed by the\nFamily Court (2013/14–2017/18), 92\nTable 3.6: Number of contravention applications filed in the Family Court and proportion\nthat were for child and financial orders (2014/15–2017/18), 93\nTable 3.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The Family Law System in Context 69\nThe Hon Professor Chisholm AM – Family Courts Violence Review (2009)\n2.52 In 2009, the Hon Professor Chisholm AM reviewed ‘the appropriateness of the\nlegislation practices and procedures in relation to matters before the federal family courts\nwhere issues of family violence arise’.86\n2.53 Chisholm observed that ‘[t]here are few more difficult or more important\nchallenges for the family law system than dealing with cases where family violence is\nan issue.’87\n2.54 Recommendations from this report included:\ny legislative amendments to mandate an initial risk identification and assessment\nby the court;88\ny a review of the funding available to a range of actors in the family law system to\nmaximise their ability to reduce the risk of family violence;89 and\ny measures to improve the understanding of family violence among family law\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- In 2005, the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support recommended\na range of new measures to improve the assessment and administration of child support.148\nIn 2016, the SPLA Committee delivered its findings on the need for regulatory reform in\nrelation to surrogacy.149 These and many other issues have been considered in numerous\nreports by the ALRC, the Family Law Council, and other public and private institutions:\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality before the Law: Women’s Equality,\nReport No 69 (1994).\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence and Commonwealth\nLaws—Improving Legal Frameworks, Report No 117 (2012).\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, For the Sake of the Kids: Complex Contact\nCases and the Family Court, Report No 73 (1995).\ny Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Discovery of Documents in\nFederal Courts, Report No 115 (2011).\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 22]\nChapter 43 Open government and transparency Volume 4\nand in contrast to the adherence to a more closed system of government in the UK…The\nlegislative reforms that eventually followed became known as the ‘new administrative law’, the\npurpose of which was to facilitate effective public administration while at the same time\nsafeguarding the civic rights of the individual citizen.14\n43.16 The ‘new administrative law’ was implemented initially through:\n the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act)\n the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), and\n the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- All three reviews arrived at different conclusions on the question of who\nshould authorise agencies’ intrusive activities.\n The Intelligence and Security Committee recommended that the most\nintrusive activities must always be authorised by a Secretary of State.90\n In contrast, Lord Anderson recommended that a scheme of judicial\nauthorisation be implemented, with the Secretary of State also certifying\nwarrants concerned with the defence and/or foreign policy of the UK.91\n The Royal United Services Institute recommended a composite approach,\nwith judicial authorisation for warrants sought for a purpose relating to the\ndetection or prevention of serious and organised crime, and ministerial\n88 The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is a statutory committee of Parliament which oversees the\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [pages 5,6,7,8]\nundertake regular reviews of the progress being achieved by families in terms of\nmoving through the service and on to self-managed arrangements in a timely way.\n  Source: `strategies/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf (http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf)`\n- The Committee, headed by Kay Hull MP, delivered its\nreport in December 2003.77\n2.46 The Committee observed that ‘there was widespread community dissatisfaction\nwith the current family law process.’78\n2.47 The Committee noted the negative effect of adversarialism in family law and made\nrecommendations aimed at ‘radically reshaping the system so that ... decision making in\na legal context is non-adversarial and litigation is avoided as much as possible.’79\n2.48 The Committee also noted the issue of jurisdictional fragmentation, observing\nthat where issues of family violence and child protection arise concurrently with family\nlaw issues there are risks of ‘gaps and duplication’.80\n2.49 The Committee recommended the establishment of a Commonwealth Families\nTribunal with power to decide disputes about shared parenting responsibility and\nproperty matters by agreement of the parents.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The Final Report\nalso called for implementation of the Family Law Council’s 2012 recommendations in\nrespect of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and culturally and linguistically diverse\nfamilies.126\nCouncil of Australian Governments Advisory Panel on Reducing Violence against\nWomen and their Children (2016)\n2.80 In 2016, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Advisory Panel on\nReducing Violence against Women and their Children (the Advisory Panel) delivered its\nFinal Report.127 The report was designed to inform the Third Action Plan of the National\nPlan to Reduce Violence against Women and their Children 2010–2022.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The Family Court\nhad 2427 final order applications, with half of those seeking financial orders only.4\ny the vast majority of matters that enter the family law system will settle:\nConsent order applications were lodged in the Family Court six times more than\napplications for final orders,5 and up to 84% of final order applications in the\nFamily Court settled before judgment.6 In the Federal Circuit Court, 70% of\nfinalised matters in 2017/18 resolved through settlement.7\ny matters still spend a long time in the system: Over one-third of all matters spent\nlonger than one year in the courts, with around 20% of matters spending more\nthan two years in the family law system.8\ny over one-third of all matters that proceed to trial will settle on the ‘steps of\nthe court’: In 2017/18, 41% of matters that proceeded to trial in the Family Court\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n\n## Key Issues, Risks, and Recommendations\n\n- The Family Law System in Context 69\nThe Hon Professor Chisholm AM – Family Courts Violence Review (2009)\n2.52 In 2009, the Hon Professor Chisholm AM reviewed ‘the appropriateness of the\nlegislation practices and procedures in relation to matters before the federal family courts\nwhere issues of family violence arise’.86\n2.53 Chisholm observed that ‘[t]here are few more difficult or more important\nchallenges for the family law system than dealing with cases where family violence is\nan issue.’87\n2.54 Recommendations from this report included:\ny legislative amendments to mandate an initial risk identification and assessment\nby the court;88\ny a review of the funding available to a range of actors in the family law system to\nmaximise their ability to reduce the risk of family violence;89 and\ny measures to improve the understanding of family violence among family law\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 80]\n74 Review of the Family Law System\n2.85 Noting that it had received evidence that magistrates have been reluctant to\nexercise their powers under the Family Law Act, the Royal Commission reiterated that\nmagistrates should be encouraged to exercise these powers.134 Further, it recommended\namendment of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) to clarify that the\nChildren’s Court of Victoria has the same jurisdiction to make Family Law Act parenting\norders as the Magistrates’ Court.135\n2.86 The Royal Commission also recommended that the Victorian Government:\ny pursue the creation of a national database for orders and other relevant court\ndocuments;136\ny pursue the development of a national family violence risk assessment framework\nand tool;137 and\ny advocate for reforms that reduce fragmentation of jurisdictions in cases involving\nfamily violence.138\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- These\nchallenges included: the inappropriateness of the adversarial system for resolving family\nlaw disputes; the inaccessibility of the system for most families; and the exposure of\nfamilies to greater risk of harm as a result of jurisdictional fragmentation.140\n2.89 Recommendations by the SPLA Committee included:\ny the development of a national family violence risk assessment tool;141\ny expansion of information sharing;142\ny the adoption of the Family Law Council’s recommendations in 2012 in relation to\nimproving the family law system’s capacity to meet the needs of Aboriginal and\nTorres Strait Islander people and culturally and linguistically diverse families;143\n190.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The Family Law System: The Data\nContents\nIntroduction 79\nAbout the data 81\nLimitations of the data 81\nSnapshot of the case load of the family courts 82\nFamily dispute resolution 84\nMatters filed in the courts 85\nMatters that resolve at trial 93\nAttrition 95\nParticipants in the family law system 96\nDecision makers 96\nProvision of legal services 96\nCourt services 100\nFamily law support services 101\nAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander users of the family court system 102\nCourt delay 103\nFamily violence and abuse 103\nNotices of Risk 104\nMagellan matters 105\nWestern Australia: Snapshot 105\nALRC information gathering 107\nSubmissions 107\nConsultations 109\nIntroduction\n3.1 Most families that separate resolve their parenting and property issues without\nrecourse to the family law system—up to 70% of separating families provide for\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- The Committee, headed by Kay Hull MP, delivered its\nreport in December 2003.77\n2.46 The Committee observed that ‘there was widespread community dissatisfaction\nwith the current family law process.’78\n2.47 The Committee noted the negative effect of adversarialism in family law and made\nrecommendations aimed at ‘radically reshaping the system so that ... decision making in\na legal context is non-adversarial and litigation is avoided as much as possible.’79\n2.48 The Committee also noted the issue of jurisdictional fragmentation, observing\nthat where issues of family violence and child protection arise concurrently with family\nlaw issues there are risks of ‘gaps and duplication’.80\n2.49 The Committee recommended the establishment of a Commonwealth Families\nTribunal with power to decide disputes about shared parenting responsibility and\nproperty matters by agreement of the parents.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- These reports made recommendations on improving the family law system’s capacity\nto meet the needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander clients,105 and clients from\nculturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds.106\n2.67 Recommendations from both reports included:\ny community education programs;107\ny the promotion of cultural competency among family law professionals;108 and\ny building a more diverse workforce in the family law system.109\n2.68 The Family Law Council also endorsed funding more positions for Indigenous\nFamily Consultants and Indigenous Family Liaison Officers.110\nProductivity Commission – Access to Justice Report (2014)\n2.69 In 2014, the Productivity Commission reported on access to justice arrangements\nin civil matters—focusing on constraining costs and promoting access to justice and\nequality before the law.111\n2.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- [Page 34]\n28 Review of the Family Law System\nTables\nTable 3.1: Certificates and exemptions granted permitting parenting matters to be\nlitigated in the family courts (2017/18), 84\nTable 3.2: Number of final order applications filed in Family Court and the Federal\nCircuit Court (2013/14—2017/18), 85\nTable 3.3: Number of interim order applications filed in Family Court and the Federal\nCircuit Court (2013/14—2017/18), 88\nTable 3.4: Type of interim applications filed in Family Court and the Federal Circuit\nCourt (1 July 2018 and 1 March 2019), 88\nTable 3.5: Proportion and number of appeals that were allowed or dismissed by the\nFamily Court (2013/14–2017/18), 92\nTable 3.6: Number of contravention applications filed in the Family Court and proportion\nthat were for child and financial orders (2014/15–2017/18), 93\nTable 3.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- 2.81 The Advisory Panel’s recommendations included:\ny a national risk assessment framework for violence against women and their\nchildren;128\ny enhanced information sharing;129 and\ny expansion of models of co-location and integration that include courts, agencies,\nand services.130\n2.82 The Advisory Panel noted that ‘positive outcomes’ have been reported in respect\nof existing models of collaboration and co-location, such as specialised family violence\ncourt divisions.131\nVictorian Royal Commission into Family Violence (2016)\n2.83 In 2015, the Victorian Government established a Royal Commission into Family\nViolence.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- Of those that did proceed, 55% were dismissed by the court in\n2017/18, with 66% dismissed in 2016/17.11 Close to half of all appellants were\nself-represented.12\ny family violence and abuse is a sustained and growing issue for the family\ncourts: There has been an increase in the number and proportion of matters in\nthe Family Court where a notice of risk was filed, and almost half (45%) of all\n3 And the Western Australian equivalents as noted.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- 64\n3.88 Up to 70% of parents also report that children have been exposed to family\nviolence,65 and nearly one in five parents report that they have safety concerns for\nthemselves and/or their children as a result of ongoing contact with the other parent.66\nThese experiences can be sustained after separation, with 5–17% of parents surveyed\nfive years after separation reporting safety concerns.67\n3.89 Among parents who use courts to resolve their parenting issues, 85% report a\nhistory of emotional abuse and more than half (54%) report physical hurt from their\nformer partner.68 These patterns are similar among parents who use lawyer led negotiation\nto resolve parenting arrangement but physical hurt is less common in this group (39%).69\nLower proportions of parents who use FDR to resolve parenting issues report emotional\nabuse (73.7%) and physical hurt (27%).\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- During the conferences, Consultants identified that:\ny 85% of attendees were at risk of family or domestic violence;\ny 73% were at risk of alcohol or other substance abuse;\ny 68% of matters had a risk of child abuse; and\ny 64% were likely to be experiencing mental health issues.81\nALRC information gathering\n3.105 ALRC inquiry processes enable the ALRC to hear from a wide range of\nstakeholders and users on various topics.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n- In the period between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024 the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia reported\nthat:\n• In 73% of matters, one or more parties alleged that a child had been abused or was at risk of child abuse.\n• In 83% of matters, one or more parties alleged that they had experienced family violence.\n• In 77% of matters, one or more parties alleged that a child had experienced family violence.\n• In 55% of matters, one or more parties alleged that drug, alcohol or substance misuse by a party had caused\nharm to a child or posed a risk of harm to a child.\n• In 61% of matters, one or more parties alleged that mental health issues of a party had caused harm to a\nchild or posed a risk of harm to a child7.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- [Page 16]\nIn summary the different options involve the following characteristics:\nAttribute Status Quo Low intervention Medium High intervention\noption intervention option option\n$3.6-$10.5 million $73.3- $99.8 million $303.4 -$395.5 million\nRegistration as a Minimum standards Minimum standards\npractitioner experienced for new entrants and\npractitioners experienced\npractitioners\nMandatory security Assessed as Assessed as\nfeatures (policies appropriate by appropriate by\nand physical regulator (minimum external body\nnumber of features (minimum number of\nattributes)\nmust be present) features must be\npresent)\nProvide policies for\nexternal review\nPenalties for non-\ncompliance\n(administrative and\ncivil)\nOngoing obligations\nas a practitioner -\nMinimum ongoing\nprofessional\ndevelopment\nrequirements\nPublic register Partial Organisation Organisation\n  Source: `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)`\n- The Attorney-General could issue a warrant authorising\nASIO to intercept a telephone service if it was being or likely to be, either:\n used by a person engaged in, or reasonably suspected by the\nDirector-General of Security of being engaged in, or of being likely to engage\nin, activities prejudicial to the security of the Commonwealth, or\n used for purposes prejudicial to the security of the Commonwealth.14\n18.9 Each request for a warrant had to be documented in full and include reasons why\nthe subject was a security risk.15\n18.10 In 1960 the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was amended to introduce new offences of\nespionage, subversion and sabotage.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n\n## Corporate Values and Operating Culture\n\n- 43.2 Open government is defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and\nDevelopment (OECD) as ‘a culture of governance that promotes the principles of\ntransparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of\ndemocracy and inclusive growth’.1 In Australia, the Second Open Government\nNational Action Plan 2018-2020 states that at its heart, the concept of open\ngovernment ‘respects the right of citizens to engage directly and scrutinise the\nbehaviour of government and the institutions of state.’2\n43.3 When making the Australian Government’s declaration of open government in\n2010, the then Minister for Finance and Deregulation, the Hon Lindsay Tanner\nMP, noted the following three key principles:\n informing: strengthening citizens’ rights of access to information, establishing\na pro-disclosure culture across Australian Government agencies including\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 20]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 1\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 33]\nVolume 2 Acronyms and abbreviations\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- This stemmed from amendments made to the\nIntelligence and Security Committee Act 1996 in 2013, requiring that a review be\nundertaken every five to seven years of the agencies, the legislation governing the\nagencies and their oversight legislation.112\n18.79 Their report—Intelligence and Security in a Free Society—recommended greater\nconsistency in the authorising framework across NZSIS and GCSB to provide a\ngreater level of accountability, improve agency cooperation and provide clarity to\nboth agencies and the public on the scope of agencies’ powers.113 In respect of the\nauthorisation process, Sir Cullen and Dame Reddy considered there was a\nbalance to be struck between placing sufficient safeguards on the agencies’\nintrusive activities, while providing the agencies with enough flexibility to perform\ntheir functions.114 They considered this balance best struck by requiring judicial\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 20]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 3\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 16]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 4\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 15]\nPrinciple 3: CCS staff assess both parents’ capacity to take parental responsibility if either parent\nappears to be substance affected or affected by other circumstances by taking into account:\n• how the client usually presents,\n• the client’s behaviour and their ability to communicate effectively,\n• having a discussion with the client about their presentation,\n• the need to cancel the visit for that day if the client is assessed as a safety risk,\n• the need to take further steps, as considered appropriate by the CCS, to ensure the safety and\nwell-being of the child,\n• the client’s mode of transport (e.g. is a taxi required), and\n• the client’s personal supports (i.e. family, friend etc.)\nPrinciple 4: When additional people request to attend a supervised visit, the CCS undertakes and\n  Source: `strategies/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf (http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf)`\n- 2.81 The Advisory Panel’s recommendations included:\ny a national risk assessment framework for violence against women and their\nchildren;128\ny enhanced information sharing;129 and\ny expansion of models of co-location and integration that include courts, agencies,\nand services.130\n2.82 The Advisory Panel noted that ‘positive outcomes’ have been reported in respect\nof existing models of collaboration and co-location, such as specialised family violence\ncourt divisions.131\nVictorian Royal Commission into Family Violence (2016)\n2.83 In 2015, the Victorian Government established a Royal Commission into Family\nViolence.\n  Source: `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)`\n\n## Global Ideas and Case Study Inputs\n\n_No global-intelligence source text found yet. Run `CLAUDE/global-ideas-scraper.py <entity>` to populate case-study sources._\n\n## Source Artifacts Used\n\n- `strategies/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf` - strategies - http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf\n- `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf` - reviews - https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf\n- `reviews/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-Na.pdf` - reviews - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-National-Intelligence-Community_1.PDF\n- `pages/about.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/about-us\n- `pages/announcements-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/copyright\n- `pages/announcements-index__07.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-12/agd-building.png\n- `pages/announcements-index__08.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/copyright\n- `pages/announcements-index__09.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/accessibility-statement\n- `pages/contact.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/children-and-family-law/childrens-contact-services\n- `pages/corporate-plans-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Pages/default.aspx\n- `pages/homepage.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/Pages/default.aspx\n- `pages/ministers.html` - pages - https://ministers.ag.gov.au/\n- `pages/publications-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/publications\n- `pages/reforms-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/children-and-family-law/childrens-contact-services/childrens-contact-services-reform\n- `pages/reforms-index__05.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/children-and-family-law/childrens-contact-services/childrens-contact-services-reform\n- `pages/reforms-index__06.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/children-and-family-law/childrens-contact-services/childrens-contact-services-reform\n- `pages/reviews-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/independent-reviewer-adverse-security-assessments\n- `pages/royal-commissions-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/review-confidentiality-protections-royal-commissions-act\n- `pages/strategies-index.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/comprehensive-review-legal-framework-national-intelligence-community\n- `pages/strategies-index__00.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/comprehensive-review-legal-framework-national-intelligence-community\n- `pages/strategies-index__01.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/comprehensive-review-legal-framework-national-intelligence-community\n- `pages/strategies-index__02.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/commonwealth-integrity-strategy-strengthening-integrity-across-commonwealth-public-sector\n- `pages/strategies-index__03.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/node/5625\n- `pages/strategies-index__04.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/node/5624\n- `pages/structure.html` - pages - http://www.ag.gov.au/about-us/who-we-are/portfolio-agencies\n- `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF\n\n## Gaps To Fix\n\n- No corporate plan text source found.\n- No annual report text source found.\n- No global comparison/case-study sources found.",
  "legislation_md": "# Family Law Council - Acts and Legislation Discovery\n\n**Generated at**: 2026-05-09T21:04:56.885833+00:00\n**Entity ID**: B-000603\n**Jurisdiction**: Commonwealth\n**Portfolio**: Attorney-General's\n\n> This is an evidence-based discovery list from scraped department material. A mention does not always mean the department administers the legislation; high-confidence and official register links should be reviewed.\n\n## Summary\n\n- Source files scanned: 30\n- Unique legislation references found: 495\n\n| Type | Count |\n|---|---:|\n| Act | 474 |\n| Code | 1 |\n| Determination | 2 |\n| Order | 1 |\n| Regulation | 12 |\n| Rules | 5 |\n\n## Legislation References\n\n### Family Law Act 1975\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 180\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Family+Law+Act+1975\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/corporate-plans-index.html`\n- `pages/homepage.html`\n- `pages/publications-index.html`\n- `other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pages.jsonl`\n- `reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pages.jsonl`\n- `strategies/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- brook AM\nDr Rachel Carson\nMs Philippa Davis\nThe Hon John Faulks\nJudge Alexandra Harland\nMs Julie Jackson\nThe Hon Justice Richard O'Brien\nAssociate Professor Zoe Rathus AM\nMs Anne-Marie Rice\nMr Nick Tebbey\nMr Glenn Thompson OAM.\nIn line with section 115 of the\nFamily Law Act 1975\n, members must include a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. It may also include other judges, lawyers, family dispute resolution practitioners, family counsellors, public officials and other people, as the Attorney-General thinks fit.\n  Source: `pages/corporate-plans-index.html`\n- e council’s work agenda during their term. The Attorney-General, the Hon Mark Dreyfus KC MP, endorsed the council’s\nTerms of Reference for 2025-2026\non 26 March 2025.\nCouncil operations\nThe council is a statutory authority established under section 115 of the\nFamily Law Act 1975\n. It began operating in November 1976.\nThe Family Law Council is supported by the Secretariat provided through the Australian Institute of Family Studies.\nThe council is subject to the\nFreedom of Information Act 1982\n(FOI Act). It must comply with the require\n  Source: `pages/corporate-plans-index.html`\n- brook AM\nDr Rachel Carson\nMs Philippa Davis\nThe Hon John Faulks\nJudge Alexandra Harland\nMs Julie Jackson\nThe Hon Justice Richard O'Brien\nAssociate Professor Zoe Rathus AM\nMs Anne-Marie Rice\nMr Nick Tebbey\nMr Glenn Thompson OAM.\nIn line with section 115 of the\nFamily Law Act 1975\n, members must include a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. It may also include other judges, lawyers, family dispute resolution practitioners, family counsellors, public officials and other people, as the Attorney-General thinks fit.\n  Source: `pages/homepage.html`\n- e council’s work agenda during their term. The Attorney-General, the Hon Mark Dreyfus KC MP, endorsed the council’s\nTerms of Reference for 2025-2026\non 26 March 2025.\nCouncil operations\nThe council is a statutory authority established under section 115 of the\nFamily Law Act 1975\n. It began operating in November 1976.\nThe Family Law Council is supported by the Secretariat provided through the Australian Institute of Family Studies.\nThe council is subject to the\nFreedom of Information Act 1982\n(FOI Act). It must comply with the require\n  Source: `pages/homepage.html`\n- e family law system more accessible and equitable for separating families.\nFamily law changes from June 2025: Information for family law professionals\nGuidelines\n26 February 2025\nThe Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) (the Amendment Act) makes changes to the Family Law Act 1975 (Family Law Act). This affects family law professionals and users of the family law system.\nAustralian Government response to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee report on the Family Law Amendment Bill 2024\nGovernment response\n31\n  Source: `pages/publications-index.html`\n\n### Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 40\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Australian+Security+Intelligence+Organisation+Act+1979\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n-  any specific proposals for reform, such as Recommendation 16(c) of the\nIndependent Intelligence Review.\nWithout limiting the legislation that the review may consider, the review will consider:\n core legislation relating to the six AIC agencies, such as the Australian\nSecurity Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, the Office of National\nAssessments Act 1977, including proposed legislation to give effect to the\ntransition to the Office of National Intelligence, and Intelligence Services Act\n2001, including amendments contained in the Intelligence Services\nAmendment (Es\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- .\n3.22 While not recommending a common legislative framework for the entire NIC, some\nareas of NIC legislation would benefit from simplification and modernisation. We\nrecommend the repeal of the TIA Act, Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (SD Act) and\nparts of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act), and\ntheir replacement with a single new Act governing the use of electronic\nsurveillance powers—telecommunications interception, covert access to stored\ncommunications, computers and telecommunications data, and the use of optical,\nlistening and t\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- e and money flows across national borders\npresent more opportunities for organised crime and extremist groups to\nconceal and launder their illicit funds,26 requiring Australian agencies to work\nin closer partnership with their international counterparts.\n5.26 The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) and IS Act\ncontain additional controls that apply when ASIO, ASIS, ASD and AGO seek to\nundertake particular activities in relation to Australian citizens and permanent\nresidents. At the time of the Hope Royal Commissions, Australia did not recognis\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ation from having alternate governments fully and\nresponsibly apprised of matters of such great national concern.’124\nImplementation\nThe Fraser Government implemented many of Justice Hope’s recommendations.\nThe 1956 ASIO Act was repealed and replaced with the Australian Security\nIntelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). The Government had concluded\nthat ‘the legislative reforms [were so]…fundamental and wide-ranging that a\ncompletely new [ASIO] Bill, rather than amendment’ was required.125 The reforms\nwere intended to remove any legal doubts about ministerial res\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- rity Review\nThe 1978 bombing of the Hilton Hotel in Sydney was described as Australia’s first\ninstance of domestic terrorism.136 Conspiracy theories, including that ASIO had\nplanted the bomb to justify its existence, circulated in the media.137 To quash these\nAustralian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, Division 3, Part IV. This Tribunal was later abolished\nand the review function went to the Security Division of the AAT.\n130 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 March 1979 (Peter Durack, Attorney-General) pg 649.\n131 Blaxland, The Protest Years: T\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 39\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Telecommunications+%28Interception+and+Access%29+Act+1979\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- detail. The Review sought and received additional\nsubmissions, case studies and written comments on discrete issues, and held over\nPJCIS will then complete its review of this Act, which must be completed by 30 September 2020 (s 187N of\nthe Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979).\n5 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Secret Intelligence Service,\nAustralian Signals Directorate, Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, Defence Intelligence\nOrganisation, Office of National Intelligence, Australian Federal\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- the Australian Federal Police Act 1979\nto the extent it relates to the performance of their intelligence functions as\npart of the NIC;\n legislation containing NIC agency investigative powers, such as the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004 and Telecommunications (Interception and\nAccess) Act 1979;\n the adequacy of national security information handling provisions under the\nNational Security Information Act 2004, including the protection of information\nrelating to counter terrorism and foreign interference prosecutions;\n oversight-related legislation\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- nce with them. The sheer volume of the laws agencies\nmust deal with on a daily basis can add to its complexity. The original number of\npages in the Acts named in our terms of reference was 729; today, it is 2,310.9 As\na single example, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979\n(TIA Act) comprised 19 pages when originally enacted; it now numbers 411.10\n3.9 The majority of the growth in the legislative framework has taken place following\nthe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Between that date and 1 August 2019,\nthe Parliament p\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- elligence Services Act\n2001 (Cth) (IS Act), National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (NSI Act),\nOffice of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth) (ONI Act), Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (SD Act) and\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act), plus relevant parts of the\nCrimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) and Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code).\n19 Michael L’Estrange and Stephen Merchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (June 2017) (2017 IIR)\npara 6.12.\nPage 87\n\n[page\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ramework an ‘ad hoc character’ is borne out.\n5.14 Moreover, there are aspects of the legislative framework that require major reform,\nnotwithstanding the efforts of successive governments and parliaments to maintain\nthem—in particular, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979\n(Cth) (TIA Act) and other laws governing electronic surveillance in Australia.\n5.15 Many of the amendments to the legislative framework for the NIC have increased\nthe powers of the intelligence services and law enforcement agencies, and\nengaged human rights a\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Intelligence and Security Act 2017\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 38\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Intelligence+and+Security+Act+2017\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- des its\nsecurity and intelligence agencies on a civilian and military basis. The General\nIntelligence and Security Service is responsible for both domestic security and the\ncollection of intelligence offshore,441 and the Military Intelligence and Security\n438 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), ss 7(1) and 8(1).\n439 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 9.\n440 Intelligence Law 2015 (France), art L811-3.\n441 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (The Netherlands), art 6.\nPage 184\n\n[page 187]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security in\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- litary basis. The General\nIntelligence and Security Service is responsible for both domestic security and the\ncollection of intelligence offshore,441 and the Military Intelligence and Security\n438 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), ss 7(1) and 8(1).\n439 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 9.\n440 Intelligence Law 2015 (France), art L811-3.\n441 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (The Netherlands), art 6.\nPage 184\n\n[page 187]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence\nService is responsible for military security, and th\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 USC 1801.\n516 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion (John D. Bates) (Web page,\n3 October 2011) <dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinionand%20Order-20140716.pdf>,\npg 72 and 73.\n517 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 49.\n518 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 53, 58 and 59.\n519 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 54 and 60.\nPage 215\n\n[page 218]\nChapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Volume 1\n9.85 The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 also requires\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- .\n516 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion (John D. Bates) (Web page,\n3 October 2011) <dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinionand%20Order-20140716.pdf>,\npg 72 and 73.\n517 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 49.\n518 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 53, 58 and 59.\n519 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 54 and 60.\nPage 215\n\n[page 218]\nChapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Volume 1\n9.85 The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 also requires that the Minister of\nForeign Affairs be consulted\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ion (John D. Bates) (Web page,\n3 October 2011) <dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinionand%20Order-20140716.pdf>,\npg 72 and 73.\n517 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 49.\n518 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 53, 58 and 59.\n519 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 54 and 60.\nPage 215\n\n[page 218]\nChapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Volume 1\n9.85 The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 also requires that the Minister of\nForeign Affairs be consulted before an intelligence warrant is issued if the\nproposed acti\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Intelligence Services Act 2001\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 35\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Intelligence+Services+Act+2001\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n- `reviews/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-Na.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ..... 121\nThe post-Hope Era ....................................................................................................... 126\nTransparency legislation .............................................................................................. 126\nThe Intelligence Services Act 2001 .............................................................................. 128\nThe counter-terrorism response ................................................................................... 130\nLegislation and the impact of technological change ......\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- hese reviews took the legislative framework—and the principles\nunderpinning that framework—as being largely settled. The Samuels and Codd\nInquiry in 1995 recommended that ASIS be placed onto a legislative basis (which\nultimately led to the introduction of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth)\n(IS Act)). Samuels and Codd based their recommendation on two principled\narguments:\n noting that ASIS’ operations were generally sensitive and potentially\ncontroversial, that it was ‘no longer appropriate that the formal conferral of\nPage 86\n\n[page 89]\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- sed counter-terrorism and national security\nlegislation, and conducted a number of statutory reviews of laws following their\n42 RCIS, Third Report, para 356.\n43 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 8.\n44 Following the passage of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth).\n45 Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth).\nPage 98\n\n[page 101]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nimplementation. The 2017 IIR made a number of recommendations to further\nexpand the role of the PJCIS, which are discussed in greater de\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- on Act and the Privacy Act—the open government reforms have,\nnonetheless, changed the public’s expectations of Australia’s security, intelligence\nand law enforcement agencies. ASIS, ASD and AGO now publish the rules they\napply to protect Australians’ privacy.\nThe Intelligence Services Act 2001\nIn his first Royal Commission, Justice Hope recommended that ASIS be publicly\nacknowledged and given a statutory footing.182 The 1983 Sheraton Hotel incident\nand the High Court’s subsequent decision in A v Hayden heightened this\nrecommendation’s significance.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Bill 2001, s 6(1)(e).\nPage 129\n\n[page 132]\nChapter 6 Intelligence legislation in Australia Volume 1\nASIS to its other listed legislative functions.189 The Bill expressly prohibited\nASIS’s involvement in paramilitary activities or violence against the person.\nThe Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (IS Act) passed with bipartisan support\nand received Royal Assent on 1 October 2001.190 Its enactment—100 years after\nFederation and Australia’s nascent intelligence collection endeavours—brought\nAustralia into line with its Five Eyes counterparts, all\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Investigatory Powers Act 2016\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 31\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Investigatory+Powers+Act+2016\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- terial and judicial authority. Foreign\nintelligence authorisations and cybersecurity authorisations by the Minister\nunder the Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 must also be\napproved by the Information Commissioner.\n In the UK, warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 require the\napproval of the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner from the\nUK Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. The Investigatory Powers\nPage 52\n\n[page 55]\nVolume 1 Chapter 3 Executive summary\nCommissioner’s Office also has an inspection ro\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Open Source Center (Web Page,\n8 November 2005) <www.cia.gov/news-information/press-release-statements/press-release-archive-\n2005/pr11082005.html>.\n612 Joint Intelligence Organisation, (Web Page), <gov.uk/government/groups/Joint-Intelligence-Organisation>\n613 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 7.\n614 Mariel Soto Reyes, ‘Scandals and teen drop-off weren’t enough to stop Facebook’s growth’, Business\nInsider, (Web Page, 27 April 2019) <businessinsider.com/facebook-grew-monthly-average-users-in-q1-2019-\n4/?r=AU&IR=T>.\nPage 250\n\n[page 253]\nVo\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- cularly those conducted by\nLord David Anderson QC, the Royal United Services Institute and the Intelligence\nand Security Committee of Parliament. The authorisation framework for the use of\nintrusive powers by the UK intelligence services is spread between the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,\nand the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The legislation is supplemented by codes\nof practice.58\n18.33 A major change included in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was the\nintroduction of a requirement for both\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- UK intelligence services is spread between the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,\nand the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The legislation is supplemented by codes\nof practice.58\n18.33 A major change included in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was the\nintroduction of a requirement for both the Secretary of State and a\nJudicial Commissioner to authorise the use of intrusive powers relating to intrusive\nsurveillance,59 interception,60 equipment interference,61 bulk data interception,62 and\nthe retent\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- Criminal Procedure (US), Rule 41.\n58 These codes of practice are listed online (as of 29 October 2019) at\nhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/investigatory-powers-act-2016-codes-of-practice.\n59 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), s 32.\n60 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 2 Chapter 1.\n61 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 5.\n62 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 6 Chapter 1.\n63 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 7.\nPage 42\n\n[page 45]\nVolume 2 Chapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double loc\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Surveillance Devices Act 2004\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 16\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Surveillance+Devices+Act+2004\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ACIC, AUSTRAC and\nDepartment of Home Affairs, such as the Australian Federal Police Act 1979\nto the extent it relates to the performance of their intelligence functions as\npart of the NIC;\n legislation containing NIC agency investigative powers, such as the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004 and Telecommunications (Interception and\nAccess) Act 1979;\n the adequacy of national security information handling provisions under the\nNational Security Information Act 2004, including the protection of information\nrelating to counter terrorism and foreign\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- he ASIO Act in 1999.243 In 2014,\nASIO’s computer and data access powers were expanded and modernised,\nincluding to update the definition of ‘computer’, allow for access via third party\ncomputers and to align ASIO’s surveillance device powers with those in the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004.244 Parliament’s consideration of the Bill was\ninfluenced by its privacy implications, with concerns that the expanded powers\nwould enable ASIO to ‘implant spyware on the computers of innocent people’.245\nLater that year, to ‘prevent further degradation of th\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- n only be exercised for the purpose\nof obtaining evidence in relation to criminal offences, not for the purpose of\nproducing intelligence. For example, the AFP can only obtain search warrants\nunder the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), or surveillance warrants under the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (SD Act), for the purpose of obtaining\nevidence (as opposed to intelligence) in relation to a criminal offence.\n702 ACC Act, s 31.\nPage 270\n\n[page 273]\nVolume 1 Chapter 12 Security intelligence and law enforcement\n12.50 The ACIC represents a hybrid mode\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ia’s ACIC, the UK has a National Crime Agency responsible for\nstrategic criminal intelligence and investigating some serious and organised crime\ntypes. The National Crime Agency can task UK police partners to assist it in the\nexercise of its functions.710\n703 Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (SD Act) s 14; Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act\n1979 (Cth) (TIA Act) ss 46, 46A, 116.\n704 ACC Act, Div 2 of Pt II (examinations), s 22 (search warrants). An ‘intelligence operation’ means an\noperation that is primarily directed towards t\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- CC Act),143 allow warrants to be obtained for intelligence purposes\n(for example, the collection of security, foreign or criminal intelligence). These\nwarrants can be contrasted with warrants in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)\n(Crimes Act), and some warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\n143 For example, search warrants in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) may be\nissued for the purposes of an intelligence operation (amongst other criteria), and ASIO warrants in the\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 15\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Inspector-General+of+Intelligence+and+Security+Act+1986\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- cy of national security information handling provisions under the\nNational Security Information Act 2004, including the protection of information\nrelating to counter terrorism and foreign interference prosecutions;\n oversight-related legislation, such as the Inspector-General of Intelligence\nand Security Act 1986 and Independent National Security Legislation Monitor\nAct 2010.\nThe review team will have full access to all material applicable to its examination. Relevant\ndepartments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the review and provide any\nrequested assistance.\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- rk under the Criminal Code. In recent years, the PJCIS has, as a\nmatter of practice, reviewed proposed counter-terrorism and national security\nlegislation, and conducted a number of statutory reviews of laws following their\n42 RCIS, Third Report, para 356.\n43 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 8.\n44 Following the passage of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth).\n45 Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth).\nPage 98\n\n[page 101]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nimplementation. The 2017 IIR made a number of recommendations\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- protections to carry out their functions.\nInspector-General of Intelligence and Security\nThe Hawke Government welcomed Justice Hope’s recommendation to establish\nan Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), implemented through the\npassage of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. The\nIGIS’s functions included overseeing agencies’ compliance with the law, ensuring\nthat agencies conducted their activities with legality and propriety, and reviewing\nthe effectiveness and appropriateness of certain procedures and measures\nrelating to empl\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ing legal advice, or for the purpose of legal\nproceedings, or where information has been published\npreviously.\n488 See, eg, Crimes Act ss 15HM, 15HN, 15HO, 15HR, 15HS, 15HT, 15HU, 15HV, 15HW, 15HX, 15HY.\n489 Crimes Act, s 15HO.\n490 ASIO Act, s 35Q. See, also, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth), s 8.\n491 Crimes Act, s 15HK.\n492 ASIO Act, s 35P.\nPage 205\n\n[page 208]\nChapter 24 Immunities Volume 2\nSupporting principles\n24.99 Controlled and special intelligence operations share common features.\nFor example, both adopt an application-based authori\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- conduct was in the public interest.198\nOverview of specific secrecy offences\n35.32 In addition to the general secrecy offences in the Criminal Code, NIC agencies are\nsubject to a number of specific secrecy offences. Core NIC agency legislation\n(including the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth)\n(IGIS Act)) contains at least 53 specific secrecy offences.199\n35.33 There are further specific secrecy offences in NIC-related legislation, such as the\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act), the\nSurveillance Devices Act\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Office of National Intelligence Act 2018\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 15\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Office+of+National+Intelligence+Act+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- r instance, in the recently\nestablished taskforce to combat foreign interference, where agencies with\ncomplementary functions, powers and skills have been brought together for a\ncommon purpose.\nCoordination and cooperation\nOffice of National Intelligence\n3.47 The Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (ONI Act) has established a solid\nfoundation for ONI’s leadership and coordination of the NIC. As it is newly\nestablished, we do not recommend changes, although aspects of the coordination\nmachinery will need to be closely monitored, such as the relationship\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ity legislation [had been] used for matters unrelated to\ncounter-terrorism or national security’.293\nThe NIC: Establishment and coordination\nBetween 2017 and 2018, legislative and machinery of government changes further\ntransformed the intelligence community. The Office of National Intelligence\nAct 2018 gave effect to Justice Hope’s recommendation that a single agency\nshould ‘assume responsibilities for the leadership and coordination of the\nAustralian intelligence community as a whole’.294 The establishment of\nthe Home Affairs portfolio, and the transfer of\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ordinated and\nintegrated national intelligence community.306 The 2017 IIR recommended new\nlegislation for ONA to achieve an ‘even higher level of collective performance\nthrough strengthening integration across Australia’s national intelligence\nenterprise’.307\nThe Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 was passed in November 2018 with\nbipartisan support. The Act continued ONA as the Office of National Intelligence in\nthe Prime Minister’s portfolio, and it committed ONI to ‘leading the [national\nintelligence community’s] integration, strategic planning and c\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- 307 2017 IIR, Executive Summary, pg 5.\n308 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 June 2018 (Christian Porter,\nAttorney-General) pg 6741.\n309 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 14 a-g.\n310 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 15.\n311 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), ss 17 and 18.\n312 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 15.\n313 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 19.\nPage 150\n\n[page 153]\nVolume 1 Chapte\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 June 2018 (Christian Porter,\nAttorney-General) pg 6741.\n309 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 14 a-g.\n310 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 15.\n311 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), ss 17 and 18.\n312 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 15.\n313 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 19.\nPage 150\n\n[page 153]\nVolume 1 Chapter 6 Intelligence legislation in Australia\neach of its Five\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Australian Crime Commission Act 2002\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 14\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Australian+Crime+Commission+Act+2002\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- elf-incrimination. However, there are protections associated with these\npowers including:\n they can only be used for special operations or special investigations, which\nmust be approved by the Board679\n673 National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) ss 7, 8.\n674 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) s 7B.\n675 Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Crime Commission Amendment (National Policing Information) Bill\n2015, pg 2.\n676 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Annual Report (2018-19) pg 4.\n677 ACC Act, ss 7A(a), (b).\n678 Senate Stan\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- provisions are articulated in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel’s Drafting Direction\nNo. 3.6 Commonwealth bodies (May 2019), pg 35.\n778 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (IS Act) ss 23, 27H; Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth)\n(ONI Act) s 31; Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) s 44.\nPage 283\n\n[page 286]\nChapter 13 Statutory authorities and the National Intelligence Community Volume 1\nconsiders that, in assessing whether an agency should be established as a\nstatutory authority, the following factors must be considere\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- mple, the collection of security, foreign or criminal intelligence). These\nwarrants can be contrasted with warrants in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)\n(Crimes Act), and some warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\n143 For example, search warrants in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) may be\nissued for the purposes of an intelligence operation (amongst other criteria), and ASIO warrants in the\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act) are issued in relation to the\ncollection of intelligence (amon\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- ies are not inconsistent with this principle.\n21.3 As with our discussion of warrant thresholds and durations in Chapter 19, warrants\nand ministerial authorisations, we have not considered the application of these\nprinciples to authorisation provisions in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002\n(Cth) or Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Although both are within the Review’s Terms of\nReference, we recognise their considerably broader application in the\nlaw enforcement context. Public submissions have not raised any concerns in\nrelation to these provisions, and\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- 001 (Cth)\n(IS Act), ss 6(1)(b), (d), (da), 6B(1)(d), (f), 7(1)(b), (f), 11(2AA), 39(1)(c), (2)-(3), 39A(1)(c), (2)-(3), 40(1)(c),\n(2)-(3), 40B(1)(c), (2)-(3); Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth) (ONI Act), ss 7(1)(e)-(g), 38, 39,\n42(1)(c), (2)-(3); Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act), ss 7A(a), (fa), 51(2), (4),\n59AA-59AC; Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act), ss\n121(3), 125-133C; Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) (AFP Act), ss 8(bf)-(bh), 60A(2)(c)-(f), (2A)-(2D);\nAustr\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Criminal Code Act 1995\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 14\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Criminal+Code+Act+1995\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ty (NIC) agencies (apart from the activities of IS Act\nagencies) is undertaken in cooperation with foreign partners.\n19.10 The only qualification arises where Australian laws have extraterritorial application,\nsuch as the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)\n(Criminal Code). An Australian warrant can provide authority for an Australian\nagency to engage in such conduct. However, it remains the case that the\nAustralian warrant cannot authorise a contravention of a foreign law.\nMinisterial authorisations\n19.11\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- f. These include:\n structuring the elements of criminal offences to exclude the activities\nengaged in by executive agencies\n providing positive legal authority for certain activities\n providing broad defences, such as the defence of lawful authority in the\nCriminal Code Act 1995 (Cth),386 which applies where an officer’s conduct is\nauthorised by a law of the Commonwealth, and\n creating offence-specific defences in relation to activities in the proper\nperformance of an officer’s duties and functions.\n24.12 In considering issues of po\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- unities.\n24.14 The Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (IS Act) provides staff members or\nagents of ASIS, ASD and AGO with a broad immunity from Australian criminal and\n384 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, pg 580.\n385 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, pg 591.\n386 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) s 10.5.\nPage 180\n\n[page 183]\nVolume 2 Chapter 24 Immunities\ncivil liability for activities done outside Australia in the proper performance of the\nagency’s functions.387 The immunity only extends to liability arising under\nAustralian law\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- s with\nthe protection of communications held by the telecommunications industry, and\nPart 14 addresses ‘national interest matters’ including obligations on the\ntelecommunications industry to assist with investigations.\n26.9 Finally, Parts 10.6 and 10.7 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code)\ncontain a range of offences relating to unauthorised interference with\ntelecommunications services and unauthorised access to computers.\n26.10 These powers are valuable investigative tools and are used by NIC agencies in\nalmost all of th\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- rivacy Act), which governs the collection, use\nand disclosure of personal information\n the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (PID Act), which governs the\ndisclosure of information in relation to wrongdoing in the Commonwealth\npublic sector, and\n the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code), which contains general\nsecrecy provisions prohibiting the disclosure of Commonwealth information in\ncertain circumstances.\n33.7 Information sharing arrangements in the TIA Act and SD Act are discussed in\nChapter 30, the disclosure of na\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 13\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Other+Legislation+Amendment+%28Assistance+and+Access%29+Act+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- sm (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n\n[page 23]\nVolume 1 Chapter 1 Foreword\nChapter 1 Foreword\nThis is a long report—over 1,300 pages across four volumes. The terms\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- of issues that were the\nsubject of recent or ongoing parliamentary or other inquiries, including freedom of\nthe press,1 ASIO’s questioning and detention powers,2 the mandatory data\nretention regime3 and the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment\n(Assistance and Access) Act 2018.4\n1 As at December 2019, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is conducting an\ninquiry into the impact of the exercise of law enforcement and intelligence powers on the freedom of the\npress, referred on 4 July 2019, and the Senate St\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- mittee on Intelligence and Security is conducting a\nreview of the mandatory data retention regime, referred on 2 April 2019.\n4 The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor is currently reviewing the Telecommunications and\nOther Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 and is due to report by 1 March 2020. The\nPage 23\n\n[page 26]\nChapter 2 Methodology Volume 1\nGovernment consultation\nIn July 2018, we met with and wrote to heads of the NIC agencies5 and portfolio\ndepartments,6 the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Securit\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- to their networks,248\nclosing a gap that had made it impossible for agencies to progress many online\ninvestigations.249\nIn 2018, to contend with the challenges of ubiquitous encryption, Parliament\npassed the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance\nand Access) Act 2018 (Cth) (TOLA Act). The Act enabled industry to provide\nvoluntary technical assistance to intelligence, security and law enforcement\nagencies to decrypt communications between individuals.250\n243 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendme\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- endation 14, para 2.15.\n254 PJCIS, ‘Intelligence Community to Review Important National Security Legislation’, Parliament of\nAustralia, PJCIS, (Media Release 1, PJCIS, 4 April 2019).\n255 INSLM Review into the Telecommunication and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access)\nAct 2018, (Web Page), <inslm.gov.au/current-review-work>.\n256 Parliamentary Library Cyber and Digital Research Group, ‘Cybersecurity, cybercrime and cybersafety: a\nquick guide to key internet links’, (Web page), 1 April 2019,\n<aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 11\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Canadian+Security+Intelligence+Service+Act+1985\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- United Kingdom where, while the\ndistinction is not legislated, foreign and security intelligence are separated in\npractice. Indeed, the separation is considered essential for reasons of clarity in\nrespect of functions, responsibilities and accountability.\n11 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985, s 16(1).\nPage 38\n\n[page 41]\nVolume 1 Chapter 3 Executive summary\n3.34 Although the concepts of security and foreign intelligence overlap, the Review\ndoes not consider this to be problematic—indeed, it limits the likelihood of gaps in\nAustralia’s intelligence\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- d\noversight structures.\n Under the NZ Intelligence and Security Act 2017, a warrant must be jointly\nissued by the Minister and a Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants if directly\nrelated to NZ citizens and permanent residents.\n In Canada, warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence\nService Act 1985 require both ministerial and judicial authority. Foreign\nintelligence authorisations and cybersecurity authorisations by the Minister\nunder the Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 must also be\napproved by the Information Commissioner.\n In the UK,\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- carry out an activity that would be\nunlawful for the security and intelligence agency to perform; and protecting covert\ncollection capability.72\nCanada\n18.41 The authorisation frameworks for the Canadian intelligence and security agencies\nare contained in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985 (CSIS Act)\nand the Communications Security Establishment Act 2019.\n18.42 To obtain a warrant to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or collect\ninformation concerning foreign states and persons under section 16 of the\nCSIS Act, the Canadian Security\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- Foreign intelligence authorisations\nand cybersecurity authorisations by the Minister must also be approved by the\n70 Intelligence Services Act 2017 (NZ), s 53.\n71 Intelligence Services Act 2017 (NZ), s 54.\n72 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 67.\n73 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985 (Canada) (CSIS Act), s 21(1).\n74 CSIS Act, s 21.1(1).\n75 CSIS Act, ss 11.01-11.25.\nPage 44\n\n[page 47]\nVolume 2 Chapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system\nInformation Commissioner other than in emergencies.76 Comparatively, CSE may\nundert\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- mmended judicial authorisation in the case of opening letters, as required\nby the Dutch constitution and to protect journalistic sources (based on recent jurisprudence by the ECHR).\n122 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Netherlands), art 32(2).\n123 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985 (Canada) s 21.\nPage 54\n\n[page 57]\nVolume 2 Chapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system\ntelecommunications interception, search, entry to premises and the installation or\nremoval of surveillance devices.124\n18.84 On 21 June 2019, Canada pa\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Communications Security Establishment Act 2019\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 10\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Communications+Security+Establishment+Act+2019\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- Z citizens and permanent residents.\n In Canada, warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence\nService Act 1985 require both ministerial and judicial authority. Foreign\nintelligence authorisations and cybersecurity authorisations by the Minister\nunder the Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 must also be\napproved by the Information Commissioner.\n In the UK, warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 require the\napproval of the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner from the\nUK Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. The Investi\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- fence.437\n431 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act 1985 (Canada), s 12(1).\n432 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 12(2).\n433 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 16(1).\n434 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 16(1).\n435 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 16.\n436 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 2.\n437 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 20.\nPage 183\n\n[page 186]\nChapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence Volume 1\nNew Zealand\n8.78 The New Zealand Int\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ada), s 12(1).\n432 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 12(2).\n433 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 16(1).\n434 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 16(1).\n435 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 16.\n436 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 2.\n437 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 20.\nPage 183\n\n[page 186]\nChapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence Volume 1\nNew Zealand\n8.78 The New Zealand Intelligence and Security Act 2017 provides for the continuation\nof th\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- 12(2).\n433 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 16(1).\n434 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, s 16(1).\n435 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 16.\n436 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 2.\n437 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 20.\nPage 183\n\n[page 186]\nChapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence Volume 1\nNew Zealand\n8.78 The New Zealand Intelligence and Security Act 2017 provides for the continuation\nof the two agencies in existence prior to the commencement of the Act—t\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- s-border nature of\ncounter-terrorism investigations: DGSI’s area of responsibilities now extend to\n520 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 63.\n521 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act 1985 (Canada) (CSIS Act), s 12(2).\n522 CSIS Act, s 16(1).\n523 Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 (Canada), s 20.\nPage 216\n\n[page 219]\nVolume 1 Chapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations\nFrance’s neighbouring countries. Threats emanating from beyond France and its\nimmediate neighbours are DGSE’s responsibility.\nThe Netherlands\n9.91 The Netherlands applies\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Intelligence Services Act 1994\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 10\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Intelligence+Services+Act+1994\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- on in\nlegislation in the UK, there is a distinction in practice. Threats to the UK’s security,\nwhether emanating onshore or offshore, are the responsibility of the Security\n425 Security Service Act 1989 (UK), s 1(2).\n426 Security Service Act (UK), s 1(3).\n427 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 1(1).\n428 Intelligence Services Act (UK), s 1(2).\n429 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 3(1).\n430 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 3(1).\nPage 182\n\n[page 185]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence\nService. In this way, the UK’\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ,\nwhether emanating onshore or offshore, are the responsibility of the Security\n425 Security Service Act 1989 (UK), s 1(2).\n426 Security Service Act (UK), s 1(3).\n427 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 1(1).\n428 Intelligence Services Act (UK), s 1(2).\n429 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 3(1).\n430 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 3(1).\nPage 182\n\n[page 185]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence\nService. In this way, the UK’s approach is not dissimilar to the way Australia’s\nsystem operates.\nCanada\n8.74 Canada appli\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- responsibility of the Security\n425 Security Service Act 1989 (UK), s 1(2).\n426 Security Service Act (UK), s 1(3).\n427 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 1(1).\n428 Intelligence Services Act (UK), s 1(2).\n429 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 3(1).\n430 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 3(1).\nPage 182\n\n[page 185]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence\nService. In this way, the UK’s approach is not dissimilar to the way Australia’s\nsystem operates.\nCanada\n8.74 Canada applies a foreign and security intelligence distinctio\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ke\nonshore activities that would otherwise be unlawful. But all three UK agencies, as\nwell as other UK authorities, can apply for warrants under the Investigatory\nPowers Act. Offshore activities, on the other hand, require ministerial authorisation\nonly.\n9.75 The Intelligence Services Act 1994 enables the Secret Intelligence Service and the\nGovernment Communications Headquarters to conduct certain activities that\nwould otherwise be unlawful with the Secretary of State’s prior authorisation.507 A\nministerial authority for offshore activity can cover\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- 9.79 Like Australia’s legislative framework, US law creates a single legal construct—the\nFBI—to obtain a warrant, including on behalf of the CIA, for onshore activities that\nwould otherwise be unlawful.513 Warrants for the FBI’s onshore activities must be\n507 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK), s 5.\n508 Intelligence Services Act (UK), s 5(2).\n509 Intelligence Services Act (UK), s 7.\n510 Intelligence Services Act (UK), s 5. The Act imposes an additional limitation on offshore warrants for the\nSecurity Service—such warrants cannot be given if th\n  Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 10\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=National+Security+Information+%28Criminal+and+Civil+Proceedings%29+Act+2004\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- be, protected by the\nmedia and other commentators where required.\nProtection of national security information\n3.133 The mechanisms for the protection of national security information in court\nproceedings—in particular under the National Security Information (Criminal and\nCivil Proceedings) Act 2004—are adequate and not in need of major reform. The\nNSI Act has been invoked in 36 individual prosecutions since 2005. Of the\n140 counter-te\n\n_…truncated, open the .md file for the full content._",
  "global_initiatives_md": null,
  "strategy": {
    "reporting_period": "2024-25",
    "corporate_plan_period": "2025-26",
    "vision": null,
    "vision_source_page": null,
    "purposes": "The overall objective for CCSs is to provide children with the opportunity of re-establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents, and other significant persons in their lives, when considered safe to do so.",
    "purposes_source_page": 3,
    "how_we_deliver": "CCSs enable children of separated parents to have safe contact with the parent they do not live with, in circumstances where parents are unable to manage their own contact arrangements. Where separated parents are not able to meet without conflict, CCSs provide a safe, neutral venue for the transfer of children between separated parents. Where there is a perceived or actual risk to the child, they provide supervised contact between a child and their parent or other family member.",
    "how_we_deliver_source_page": 3,
    "government_priorities": [
      {
        "text": "Facilitated Changeover",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Supervised Visit",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Off-Site Supervision",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Supported/Monitored Visits",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Telephone/Internet Based Supervision",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Unsupervised On Site Visit",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Reports for Court",
        "source_page": 7
      },
      {
        "text": "Information and Referrals",
        "source_page": 7
      }
    ],
    "outcomes": [
      {
        "name": "Outcome 1: Safety and Security",
        "description": "The safety of all who visit or work at a CCS is of paramount importance. CCSs develop a Safety and Security Plan which addresses safety risks across all relevant aspects of service delivery, taking into account the type of services delivered, the client population being serviced and factors relevant to the particular CCS.",
        "key_activities": [
          "Safety and Security Plan",
          "Staff checks",
          "Safety Policies and Procedures for staff",
          "Reporting of critical incidents"
        ],
        "source_page": 9
      },
      {
        "name": "Outcome 2: Service Delivery",
        "description": "CCSs provide integrated services as part of the broader family law system and work in collaboration with other services and the community.",
        "key_activities": [
          "Intake, screening and assessment",
          "Communication",
          "Family Relationships Online (FRO)"
        ],
        "source_page": 5
      }
    ],
    "values": [
      "Child Focussed",
      "Safety",
      "Neutrality",
      "Client diversity and cultural sensitivity",
      "Collaborative Service System"
    ],
    "values_framework_name": null,
    "kpi_targets_2025_26": [
      {
        "code": "CCS01",
        "measure": "Number of facilitated changeovers",
        "target": "Increase by 10%",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCS02",
        "measure": "Number of supervised visits",
        "target": "Increase by 10%",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCS03",
        "measure": "Number of off-site supervisions",
        "target": "Increase by 10%",
        "source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "kpi_results_2024_25": [
      {
        "code": "CCS01",
        "measure": "Number of facilitated changeovers",
        "result": "95% achieved",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCS02",
        "measure": "Number of supervised visits",
        "result": "90% achieved",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCS03",
        "measure": "Number of off-site supervisions",
        "result": "85% achieved",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "_source_urls": {
      "annual_report_url": "",
      "corporate_plan_url": ""
    }
  },
  "ideas": [
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Risk & Assurance",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Recommendation tracker for audits, reviews, and inquiries",
      "idea": "Publish a single internal tracker for audit/review recommendations, owners, due dates, and implementation evidence.",
      "quote": "The Family Law System in Context 69\nThe Hon Professor Chisholm AM – Family Courts Violence Review (2009)\n2.52 In 2009, the Hon Professor Chisholm AM reviewed ‘the appropriateness of the\nlegislation practices and procedures in relation to matters before the federal family courts\nwhere issues of family violence arise’.86\n2.53 Chisholm observed that ‘[t]here are few more difficult or more important\nchallenges for the family law system than dealing with cases where family violence is\nan issue.’87\n2.54 Recommendations from this report included:\ny legislative amendments to mandate an initial risk identification and assessment\nby the court;88\ny a review of the funding available to a range of actors in the family law system to\nmaximise their ability to reduce the risk of family violence;89 and\ny measures to improve the understanding of family violence among family law",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Executives / assurance teams",
      "source": "reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Regulatory capture",
        "Over-automation of judgement"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Risk & Assurance",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Integrated assurance and lessons-learned system",
      "idea": "Create an assurance system that connects audit findings, risk registers, delivery reviews, and investment decisions.",
      "quote": "The Family Law System in Context 69\nThe Hon Professor Chisholm AM – Family Courts Violence Review (2009)\n2.52 In 2009, the Hon Professor Chisholm AM reviewed ‘the appropriateness of the\nlegislation practices and procedures in relation to matters before the federal family courts\nwhere issues of family violence arise’.86\n2.53 Chisholm observed that ‘[t]here are few more difficult or more important\nchallenges for the family law system than dealing with cases where family violence is\nan issue.’87\n2.54 Recommendations from this report included:\ny legislative amendments to mandate an initial risk identification and assessment\nby the court;88\ny a review of the funding available to a range of actors in the family law system to\nmaximise their ability to reduce the risk of family violence;89 and\ny measures to improve the understanding of family violence among family law",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Executives / assurance teams",
      "source": "reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Regulatory capture",
        "Over-automation of judgement"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Citizen Services",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Plain-language service pages and proactive status updates",
      "idea": "Rewrite high-volume pages and letters into plain language, add status notifications, and measure contact reduction.",
      "quote": "CCS practitioner\n(Staff/volunteers supervising children and families alone)\nNo requirement – organisation assesses that individual has suitable work Successfully completed at least 4 subjects of a grad dip or cert IV or 4 subjects\nexperience to safely provide services. of a related degree, with demonstrated progress towards completion of the\nqualification within 3 years from date of application; and\nA minimum 130 hours experience in supervised service provision in a CCS or\nequivalent service; OR\nCertificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 75 hours of supervised service Certificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 100 hours of supervised\nprovision in a CCS or equivalent service; OR service provision in a CCS or equivalent service; OR",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / service users",
      "source": "other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Citizen Services",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Single front door for life-event based services",
      "idea": "Bundle services around life events so citizens can complete related steps across agencies in one journey.",
      "quote": "CCS practitioner\n(Staff/volunteers supervising children and families alone)\nNo requirement – organisation assesses that individual has suitable work Successfully completed at least 4 subjects of a grad dip or cert IV or 4 subjects\nexperience to safely provide services. of a related degree, with demonstrated progress towards completion of the\nqualification within 3 years from date of application; and\nA minimum 130 hours experience in supervised service provision in a CCS or\nequivalent service; OR\nCertificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 75 hours of supervised service Certificate IV in related disciplines with minimum 100 hours of supervised\nprovision in a CCS or equivalent service; OR service provision in a CCS or equivalent service; OR",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / service users",
      "source": "other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Staff Productivity",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Reusable briefing and summary assistant for internal documents",
      "idea": "Create controlled templates for summarising reports, submissions, minutes, and ministerial briefs.",
      "quote": "More expensive staffing profile for the conduct of Option 3 - Assuming Y1-2 only 5% of sessions would Not applicable Low scenario: $18,400,000 Low scenario:\ncontact sessions (increased mandatory staffing ratios) require additional staff to be allocated to meet mandatory High scenario: $30,200,000 High scenario:\nstaffing ratios (the majority of double staff sessions\nUnable to cost differential impact of Option\ncovered by additional supervision for staff uplifting\n3 vs Option 4 as the costing model is based\nqualifications), at an AWE cost for a session duration of 2\non AWE\nhours.",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "APS staff / executives",
      "source": "other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Sensitive information leakage",
        "Inconsistent quality of generated drafts"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Staff Productivity",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Department-wide knowledge and briefing platform",
      "idea": "Build a secure knowledge platform that lets staff search, summarise, and cite approved departmental material.",
      "quote": "More expensive staffing profile for the conduct of Option 3 - Assuming Y1-2 only 5% of sessions would Not applicable Low scenario: $18,400,000 Low scenario:\ncontact sessions (increased mandatory staffing ratios) require additional staff to be allocated to meet mandatory High scenario: $30,200,000 High scenario:\nstaffing ratios (the majority of double staff sessions\nUnable to cost differential impact of Option\ncovered by additional supervision for staff uplifting\n3 vs Option 4 as the costing model is based\nqualifications), at an AWE cost for a session duration of 2\non AWE\nhours.",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "APS staff / executives",
      "source": "other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Sensitive information leakage",
        "Inconsistent quality of generated drafts"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Regulation & Policy",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Regulatory burden scan for forms, guidance, and reporting",
      "idea": "Identify the top 10 highest-friction reporting obligations and simplify guidance, forms, or evidence requirements.",
      "quote": "Regulatory burden estimate (RBE) table\nThe status quo option is estimated to result in the following regulatory costs to the sector:\nForecast annual regulatory costs\nChange in costs ($ million) Individuals Business Community organisations Total change in cost\nTotal, by sector $0 $0 $0 $0\nATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT | Establishment of an Accreditation Scheme for Children’s Contact Services 17",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Regulated entities / policy teams",
      "source": "other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Regulatory capture",
        "Over-automation of judgement"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Regulation & Policy",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Adaptive regulation program with live feedback loops",
      "idea": "Create an adaptive regulation model using sandboxes, industry data, risk scoring, and regular rule updates.",
      "quote": "Regulatory burden estimate (RBE) table\nThe status quo option is estimated to result in the following regulatory costs to the sector:\nForecast annual regulatory costs\nChange in costs ($ million) Individuals Business Community organisations Total change in cost\nTotal, by sector $0 $0 $0 $0\nATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT | Establishment of an Accreditation Scheme for Children’s Contact Services 17",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Regulated entities / policy teams",
      "source": "other-pdfs/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf (https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Regulatory capture",
        "Over-automation of judgement"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Case Processing",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Triage queue for stuck or ageing cases",
      "idea": "Use existing case data to flag ageing, duplicate, incomplete, or high-risk cases for earlier intervention.",
      "quote": "[Page 70]\nChapter 44 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation security Volume 4\nassessments\ninformation contained in the assessment, and agencies must proceed on the basis\nof those findings.182\n44.20 The ASIO Act contains two key prohibitions in relation to security assessments:\n it prohibits a Commonwealth agency from taking prescribed administrative\naction on the basis of any communication made by ASIO in relation to a\nperson which does not amount to a security assessment,183 and\n it prohibits ASIO from making any communication to a state, which it knows\nis intended or likely to be used by that state in considering prescribed\nadministrative action against a person, except in the form of a security\nassessment.184\n44.21 In other words, the ASIO Act does not prevent ASIO from communicating security\nadvice in situations where prescribed administrative action may result.",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Applicants / case officers",
      "source": "other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Case Processing",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "End-to-end case processing redesign",
      "idea": "Redesign the case pathway around risk-based triage, reusable evidence, and automated eligibility checks.",
      "quote": "[Page 70]\nChapter 44 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation security Volume 4\nassessments\ninformation contained in the assessment, and agencies must proceed on the basis\nof those findings.182\n44.20 The ASIO Act contains two key prohibitions in relation to security assessments:\n it prohibits a Commonwealth agency from taking prescribed administrative\naction on the basis of any communication made by ASIO in relation to a\nperson which does not amount to a security assessment,183 and\n it prohibits ASIO from making any communication to a state, which it knows\nis intended or likely to be used by that state in considering prescribed\nadministrative action against a person, except in the form of a security\nassessment.184\n44.21 In other words, the ASIO Act does not prevent ASIO from communicating security\nadvice in situations where prescribed administrative action may result.",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Applicants / case officers",
      "source": "other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Citizen Participation",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Consultation feedback summaries with response tracking",
      "idea": "Summarise consultation submissions by theme and publish what changed in response.",
      "quote": "During the conferences, Consultants identified that:\ny 85% of attendees were at risk of family or domestic violence;\ny 73% were at risk of alcohol or other substance abuse;\ny 68% of matters had a risk of child abuse; and\ny 64% were likely to be experiencing mental health issues.81\nALRC information gathering\n3.105 ALRC inquiry processes enable the ALRC to hear from a wide range of\nstakeholders and users on various topics.",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / stakeholders / policy teams",
      "source": "reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-000603",
      "entity_name": "Family Law Council",
      "folder_name": "Family-Law-Council",
      "category": "Citizen Participation",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Always-on policy participation platform",
      "idea": "Create a standing participation platform where citizens and stakeholders can propose, vote, and track ideas.",
      "quote": "During the conferences, Consultants identified that:\ny 85% of attendees were at risk of family or domestic violence;\ny 73% were at risk of alcohol or other substance abuse;\ny 68% of matters had a risk of child abuse; and\ny 64% were likely to be experiencing mental health issues.81\nALRC information gathering\n3.105 ALRC inquiry processes enable the ALRC to hear from a wide range of\nstakeholders and users on various topics.",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / stakeholders / policy teams",
      "source": "reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf (https://www.alrc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    }
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      "category": "strategies",
      "year": "2020",
      "url": "http://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/childrens-contact-services-guiding-principles-framework-good-practice.pdf",
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      "bytes": 691677,
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      "file": "reviews/alrc_report_135_final_report_web-min_12_optimized_1-1.pdf",
      "bytes": 5035874,
      "link_text": "Family Law for the Future – An Inquiry into the Family Law System (final report)"
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      "url": "https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-National-Intelligence-Community_1.PDF",
      "file": "reviews/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-Na.pdf",
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      "link_text": "Government response to the Comprehensive review of the legal framework of the National Intelligence Community [PDF 1.08 MB]"
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      "year": null,
      "url": "https://consultations.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/establishment-of-an-accreditation-scheme-for-ccs/user_uploads/consultation-impact-analysis-ccs-accreditation.pdf",
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      "bytes": 1049332,
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      "bytes": 6379196,
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      "year": "2020",
      "url": "https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF",
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