{
  "entity_id": "B-001955",
  "folder": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
  "name": "International Air Services Commission",
  "type": "Statutory Body",
  "jurisdiction": "Commonwealth",
  "portfolio": "Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, \r\nCommunications, Sport and the Arts",
  "website": "http://www.iasc.gov.au/",
  "data_status": "rich",
  "completeness": {
    "has_strategy_brief": true,
    "has_strategy_structured": true,
    "has_vision": false,
    "has_kpi_targets": true,
    "has_kpi_results": true,
    "has_strategy_overview": true,
    "has_legislation_text": true,
    "has_legislation_structured": false,
    "has_global_initiatives_text": false,
    "has_ideas": true,
    "has_artifacts": true,
    "n_ideas": 12,
    "n_legislation": 0,
    "n_artifacts": 10,
    "n_kpi_targets": 2,
    "n_kpi_results": 2,
    "n_outcomes": 3,
    "verified_own_data": true
  },
  "strategy_profile": {
    "status": "published",
    "confidence": "high",
    "summary": "The object of the IASC Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services by Australian carriers, resulting in: a) increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits; b) growth in Australian tourism and trade; and c) the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries. [CP p.6]",
    "official_site_url": "http://www.iasc.gov.au/",
    "source_documents": [
      {
        "type": "annual_report",
        "title": "IASC annual report 2024-2025",
        "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf",
        "period": "2024-25",
        "confidence": "high"
      },
      {
        "type": "annual_report",
        "title": "IASC annual report 2023-2024",
        "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf",
        "period": "2023-24",
        "confidence": "high"
      },
      {
        "type": "annual_report",
        "title": "IASC annual report 2022-2023",
        "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf",
        "period": "2022-23",
        "confidence": "high"
      },
      {
        "type": "annual_report",
        "title": "IASC annual report 2021-2022",
        "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf",
        "period": "2021-22",
        "confidence": "high"
      },
      {
        "type": "annual_report",
        "title": "IASC annual report 2020-2021",
        "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf",
        "period": "2020-21",
        "confidence": "high"
      }
    ],
    "purpose": {
      "text": "The object of the IASC Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services by Australian carriers, resulting in: a) increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits; b) growth in Australian tourism and trade; and c) the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries. [CP p.6]",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": 6,
      "source_deep_url": ""
    },
    "vision": null,
    "strategic_priorities": [
      {
        "title": "Promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services",
        "description": "Promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": 6,
        "source_deep_url": ""
      },
      {
        "title": "Growth in Australian tourism and trade",
        "description": "Growth in Australian tourism and trade",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": 6,
        "source_deep_url": ""
      },
      {
        "title": "Maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries",
        "description": "Maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": 6,
        "source_deep_url": ""
      }
    ],
    "values": [
      {
        "name": "economic efficiency",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "consumer benefit",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "tourism and trade",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "name": "competitiveness",
        "description": "",
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "outcomes": [
      {
        "name": "Outcome 1: Enhanced consumer benefits",
        "description": "Increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits.",
        "activities": [
          "assessing applications for capacity allocations",
          "reviewing determinations",
          "providing advice to the Minister"
        ],
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": 6,
        "source_deep_url": ""
      },
      {
        "name": "Outcome 2: Growth in Australian tourism and trade",
        "description": "Growth in Australian tourism and trade.",
        "activities": [
          "allocating capacity to Australian carriers",
          "renewing determinations",
          "varying determinations"
        ],
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": 6,
        "source_deep_url": ""
      },
      {
        "name": "Outcome 3: Maintenance of competitive Australian carriers",
        "description": "The maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries.",
        "activities": [
          "assessing airline capability",
          "ensuring compliance with air services arrangements"
        ],
        "source_url": "",
        "source_page": 6,
        "source_deep_url": ""
      }
    ],
    "performance_measures": [
      {
        "code": "CCE01",
        "measure": "Capacity allocation",
        "target": "Unlimited capacity",
        "latest_result": "Unlimited capacity allocated",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "target_source_url": "",
        "target_source_page": null,
        "result_source_url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf",
        "result_source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCE02",
        "measure": "Code sharing agreements",
        "target": "Increased number of agreements",
        "latest_result": "Increased number of agreements",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "target_source_url": "",
        "target_source_page": null,
        "result_source_url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf",
        "result_source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "document_alignment_terms": {
      "must_support": [
        "The object of the IASC Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services by Australia",
        "Promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services",
        "Growth in Australian tourism and trade",
        "Maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries"
      ],
      "watch_terms": [
        "Capacity allocation",
        "Code sharing agreements"
      ],
      "avoid_claiming_without_evidence": []
    },
    "review_note": ""
  },
  "strategy_brief_md": "# International Air Services Commission — Strategy Brief\n\n**Reporting period**: 2024-25\n**Corporate plan in force**: 2025-26\n**Annual Report**: [2024-25](https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf)\n\n## Our purpose / purposes\n\n> The object of the IASC Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services by Australian carriers, resulting in: a) increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits; b) growth in Australian tourism and trade; and c) the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries. [CP p.6] [CP p.6]\n\n## Government priorities for this department\n\n- Promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services [CP p.6]\n- Growth in Australian tourism and trade [CP p.6]\n- Maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries [CP p.6]\n\n## Outcomes\n\n### Outcome 1: Enhanced consumer benefits\nIncreased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits. [CP p.6]\n\n**Key activities:**\n- assessing applications for capacity allocations\n- reviewing determinations\n- providing advice to the Minister\n\n### Outcome 2: Growth in Australian tourism and trade\nGrowth in Australian tourism and trade. [CP p.6]\n\n**Key activities:**\n- allocating capacity to Australian carriers\n- renewing determinations\n- varying determinations\n\n### Outcome 3: Maintenance of competitive Australian carriers\nThe maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries. [CP p.6]\n\n**Key activities:**\n- assessing airline capability\n- ensuring compliance with air services arrangements\n\n## Values and principles\n\n_IASC Values_\n\n- economic efficiency\n- consumer benefit\n- tourism and trade\n- competitiveness\n\n## What they will measure themselves on this year (targets from 2025-26 corporate plan)\n\n| Code | Measure | Target | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| CCE01 | Capacity allocation | Unlimited capacity |  |\n| CCE02 | Code sharing agreements | Increased number of agreements |  |\n\n## How they performed last year (results from 2024-25 annual report)\n\n| Code | Measure | Result | Status | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| CCE01 | Capacity allocation | Unlimited capacity allocated | Achieved |  |\n| CCE02 | Code sharing agreements | Increased number of agreements | Achieved |  |",
  "strategy_overview_evidence_md": null,
  "internal_strategy_evidence_md": "# International Air Services Commission - Strategy, Performance, and Operating Profile\n\n**Generated at**: 2026-05-09T22:29:04.123145+00:00\n**Entity ID**: B-001955\n**Entity type**: Statutory Body\n**Jurisdiction**: Commonwealth\n**Portfolio**: Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, \n\nCommunications, Sport and the Arts\n**Website**: http://www.iasc.gov.au/\n\n> Draft generated from scraped source material. Treat this as an evidence pack for editorial review, not a final judgement.\n\n## Source Coverage\n\n| Source type | Count |\n|---|---:|\n| annual-reports | 5 |\n| other-pdfs | 5 |\n| pages | 32 |\n\n## Executive Readout\n\n### Purpose\n\n- Division 3—Renewal of determinations\n14 Presumption in favour of making the same allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission is proposing, while a determination is in force, to make\na fresh determination allocating the capacity to which the original\ndetermination relates under section 8 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering whether the allocation of capacity in the\noriginal determination is no longer of benefit to the public for the purpose\nof subparagraph 8(2)(a)(i) of the Act.\n(2) Without limiting the matters to which the Commission may have regard,\nan allocation is generally no longer of benefit to the public if:\n(a) the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and\n(b) there are other applications for some or all of the capacity; and\n(c) the Commission, having regard to the reasonable capability criterion and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 15 Making a different allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where, in the course of considering the renewal of a\ndetermination, the Commission is satisfied, for the purposes of subparagraph\n8(2)(a)(i) of the Act, that the allocation of capacity in the original determination\nis no longer of benefit to the public.\n(2) In assessing whether an allocation of capacity made by a fresh determination is\nof benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 8(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) is to have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 57]\nDivision 4—Review of determinations\n16 Variations on review for cause\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission has conducted a review for cause in relation to a\ndetermination pursuant to section 10 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering making a decision to vary the determination\nunder paragraph 23(1)(b) of the Act in a way that varies, or has the effect of\nvarying, an allocation of capacity.\n(2) If the grounds on which the review was initiated relate to a condition imposed\nunder paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) may have regard to the criteria set out in paragraphs 24(3)(a) to (d) of this\ninstrument; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Note: Paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act allows for the imposition of a condition that capacity be fully used.\n(3) If the review was initiated on any other grounds, and the Commission does not\nreceive submissions opposing the variation being considered by the\nCommission, then in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(4) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n\n### Role and Functions\n\n- [Page 75]\nIndonesia, 32 U\nJapan, 16; Tokyo-Haneda route, 2, 16, 28, 33\nuncontested applications, 45, 47\nKorea route freight capacity, 28, 33\ndecision times, 19\nnew capacity determinations, 28, 33\npassenger share, 3 V\nrenewals of capacity determinations, 33\nvariations of determinations, 6–7, 27-29, 32–3\nresolutions, 28, 32-33\nPolicy Statement requirements, 49–50, 52–3\nvariations of determinations, 32, 33\nVirgin Australia, 1, 2, 16\nsee also Jetstar Airways\nCook Islands, 27, 31\nquorum, 21\nHong Kong, 28, 32\nR Indonesia, 16, 28, 32\nJapan (Tokyo-Haneda route), 2, 16, 28, 32–3\nreasonable capability criterion, 8, 43\nPapua New Guinea, 29, 32–3\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\npassenger share, 3\nRemuneration Tribunal, 22 renewals of capacity determinations, 32\nrenewals of capacity allocations, 6, 16 revocation of determinations, 27-29, 31, 32–3\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 82]\ndeterminations and decisions, 5–8, 15–18, 33–42 Indonesia, 38–9\nCommission procedures, 47–8\ninterest, conflict of, 28\nexternal scrutiny, 29\ninterested parties, see stakeholders\nnew operators case study, 21–4\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13 interim determinations, 6\nDili, 2 International Air Services Commission Act 1992,\n5–8\nDirector, 3, 11, 28, 29\ncorporate governance practices, 27–8\nE Register of Available Capacity, 12–13\nserving object performance target, 15–18\necologically sustainable development\nInternational Air Services Commission Policy\n(environmental performance reporting), 44\nStatement 2018, 5–8, 15, 49–61\nEl Al Israel Airlines, 41, 42\nItaly, 1, 2, 16, 39–40\nEmirates Airline, 38–42\nJ\nEtihad Airline, 39\nJapan, 17, 40\nexpenditure, see finance\nJet Airways, 42\nexternal scrutiny, 29\nJetstar Airways, 3, 37–42\nF Vietnam freight services, 42\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf)`\n- [Page 83]\nO South Africa, 41\nSouth Korea, 2, 16, 41\noccupational health and safety, 43\nSri Lankan Airlines, 41\nP\nstaff, see Secretariat\nPapua New Guinea, 40 stakeholders and interested parties, 12\nonline questionnaire response, 18-19\npassenger operations, 2–3\nsee also determinations and decisions Sydney, 2, 16\nperformance report, 15–25\nT\nPerth, 2\nTasman Cargo Airlines, 17, 38\nPionair Australia Pty Ltd, 1\ntendering, 29\npolicy statement, 5–8, 15, 49–61\nThailand, 42\npublic benefit criteria, 6\ntimeliness of decisions, 20\npurchasing, 29\nTimor-Leste, 2, 16, 42\nQ\nTokyo (Haneda), 17, 40\nQantas, 1- 3, 16–17, 37–42 transfer of capacity allocation, 6–7\nsee also Jetstar Airways see also code share services\nTranspac Express (Australia) Pty Ltd, 1\nR\ntravel restrictions, 1–2, 17, 25\nreasonable capability criterion, 8\nU\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf)`\n- [Page 80]\nD H\nDarwin, 14 Haneda, 16, 19\ndecision times, 19 hearings, 21\nDenpasar, 14, 35, 36\nHong Kong, 34, 37\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nhuman resources, see Secretariat\nDevelopment, Communications and the Arts, 9,\n10–11, 20, 22, 23, 41, 42 I\ndeterminations and decisions, 3–6, 13–17, 27–31\nIndonesia, 14, 19, 35–6\nCommission procedures, 45–6\nInformation Publication Scheme, 41\ndecision times, 19\nexternal scrutiny, 22 interest, conflict of, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\ninterested parties, 10, 17–18\nstakeholder feedback, 17–18\ninterim determinations, 4\nDili, 14\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992,\nDirector, 9, 22, 23\n3–6\nE corporate governance practices, 21–2\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\necologically sustainable development\nserving object performance target, 13–17\n(environmental performance reporting), 41\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)`\n- [Page 80]\nE I\necologically sustainable development, 42 inbound international passenger services, 1\nefficiency of financial resources, 23 IndiGo, 18, 32, 38\nEmirates, 2, 37 Indonesia, 1, 2, 16, 17, 18, 22, 30, 31, 35–6\nenvironmental performance reporting, 42 Interest, conflicts of, 26\nexpenditure, see finance interested parties, 12, 62\nextensions of date of capacity utilisation, 19, 38 interim determinations, 5\nexternal scrutiny, 26 International Air Services Commission\ncontact details, 64\nF\nmeetings, 1, 11, 25\nfeedback, 20–1, 64 membership, 9–11, 26\nperformance report, 15–23\nFiji, 2, 18, 29, 30, 34\nprocedures, 45–6\nfinance, 23\nrole and functions, vi, 5–8\nFinnair, 18, 31, 37 serving applicants and interested parties\nFrance, 2, 16, 30, 34 performance target, 20–1\nserving object of the Act performance target,\nfreedom of information, 41, 43–4\n15–16\nfreight service 2, 5, 12, 13\nwebsite, 64\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)`\n- [pages 82,83,84,86]\n, 28, 29\nKLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 38, 39, 42\nadvertising and market research, 44\nL\nFinnair, 42\nFrance, 38 legislation, see International Air Services\nCommission Act 1992\nfreedom of information, 43, 45–6\nfreight services, 3, 17, 38, 42 M\nfunctions, see role and functions management and accountability, 27–9\nmarket research, 44\nG\nmeetings, 1, 27\nglossary, 69–72\nattendance, 11\ngovernance arrangements, 27–8\nMelbourne, 2\nmembership, see Commissioners\nH\nMinister, 12, 28\nHaneda, 17, 40 policy statement, 5–8, 15, 49–61\nhearings, 27\nN\nHong Kong, 38\nnew capacity determinations, 16, 38, 39, 41, 42\nhuman resources, see Secretariat\nNew Delhi, 2\nI\nNew entrant, 21–4\nIncheon, 16 New operators case study, 21–4\nIndia, 2, 16, 38 New Zealand, 17\n74 International Air Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2021–22\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf)`\n\n### Strategic Priorities\n\n- [Page 33]\nPART 5\nFinancial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2021\n(1) (2) (3) (4)\n2020–21 2020–21 Variance 2021–22\nBudget Actual (Column 2–1) Budget\n$ $ $\nSalaries / Commissioners’ fees 262,237 195,219 -67,018 252,442\nRevenue 0 0 0 0\nSupplier expenses 24,854 8,871 -15,983 X\nTOTAL 287,091 204,090 -83,001 X\nHolders of public office 3 316 3\nStaff 1.8 1.8 1.8\nExplanatory notes\nThe Commission’s financial report is prepared on an accrual budgeting basis.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Division 3—Renewal of determinations\n14 Presumption in favour of making the same allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission is proposing, while a determination is in force, to make\na fresh determination allocating the capacity to which the original\ndetermination relates under section 8 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering whether the allocation of capacity in the\noriginal determination is no longer of benefit to the public for the purpose\nof subparagraph 8(2)(a)(i) of the Act.\n(2) Without limiting the matters to which the Commission may have regard,\nan allocation is generally no longer of benefit to the public if:\n(a) the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and\n(b) there are other applications for some or all of the capacity; and\n(c) the Commission, having regard to the reasonable capability criterion and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 15 Making a different allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where, in the course of considering the renewal of a\ndetermination, the Commission is satisfied, for the purposes of subparagraph\n8(2)(a)(i) of the Act, that the allocation of capacity in the original determination\nis no longer of benefit to the public.\n(2) In assessing whether an allocation of capacity made by a fresh determination is\nof benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 8(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) is to have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 57]\nDivision 4—Review of determinations\n16 Variations on review for cause\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission has conducted a review for cause in relation to a\ndetermination pursuant to section 10 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering making a decision to vary the determination\nunder paragraph 23(1)(b) of the Act in a way that varies, or has the effect of\nvarying, an allocation of capacity.\n(2) If the grounds on which the review was initiated relate to a condition imposed\nunder paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) may have regard to the criteria set out in paragraphs 24(3)(a) to (d) of this\ninstrument; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Note: Paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act allows for the imposition of a condition that capacity be fully used.\n(3) If the review was initiated on any other grounds, and the Commission does not\nreceive submissions opposing the variation being considered by the\nCommission, then in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(4) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 58]\n(2) If the Commission does not receive submissions opposing the variation\nrequested in the application then, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(3) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of the Act,\nthe Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 24 Conditions relating to the full use of capacity\n(1) For the purpose of specifying a period during which capacity need not be fully\nused pursuant to subparagraph 15(2)(c)(i) of the Act, the Commission:\n(a) should specify as short a period as is reasonably possible, having regard\nto the full range of things necessary to be done by the Australian carrier in\norder to commence operating under the determination; and\n(b) should not specify a period of more than two years other than in\nexceptional circumstances.\n(2) Where the Commission has commenced a review process under sections\n10 and 23 of the Act because an Australian carrier has not complied with a\ncondition that capacity be fully used, the Commission may have regard to the\ncriteria set out in subsection (3) for the following purposes:\n(a) deciding whether to confirm, vary, suspend or revoke the determination\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 73]\nIndex\nA office holders since 1992, 59\nyear in review, 1–3\naccountability and management, 20, 21–3, 23,\n39–40 code share services, 1, 6, 7, 16, 33\nAct, see International Air Services Commission Commission procedures, 39-40\nAct 1992; legislation Commissioners, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 39, 43–4 meetings, 2, 20, 21, 23; attendance, 11\noffice holders since 1992, 59\nadvertising and market research, 36\nsee also Chairperson\nair freight services, 2, 27-28, 31, 33, 34\nremuneration, 22\nAir New Zealand, 1, 3\ncommunications with interested parties, 12, 17–18\nair services arrangements, 12–13\ncompetitive tendering, 23\nairlines, 1–3, 12–13 complaints handling, 58\nsee also determinations and decisions; Qantas;\nconflict of interest, 22\nVirgin Australia\nconsultants and contractors, 23\nall-cargo services, 2, 27-29, 31, 33, 34\ncontact details, 58\nannual report, 20, 22\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [pages 73,74,75,76,78]\n9–40\nappointments, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nCOVID-19, 1, 2, 3, 16, 19, 25\nasset management, 23\nD\nB\ndecision times, 19\nBoeing 737 aircraft, 1\nDenpasar, 16\nBoeing 777 aircraft, 2\nsee also Indonesia.\nbudget, see finance\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nBureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Communications, 11, 12–13,\nEconomics (BITRE), 2 22, 35\nAviation and Airports Division, 20\nC\ndeterminations and decisions, 1, 5–8, 15–19,\nCairns, 16 27–29, 31-34\ncapacity, see determinations and decisions Commission procedures, 39–40\ndecision times, 19, 57\ncargo (freight) services, 2, 31, 33, 34\nexternal scrutiny, 23\nChairperson, 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\nattendance at meetings, 11\nmessage accompanying service charter, 55\nAppendix 9  Index 65\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 75]\nIndonesia, 32 U\nJapan, 16; Tokyo-Haneda route, 2, 16, 28, 33\nuncontested applications, 45, 47\nKorea route freight capacity, 28, 33\ndecision times, 19\nnew capacity determinations, 28, 33\npassenger share, 3 V\nrenewals of capacity determinations, 33\nvariations of determinations, 6–7, 27-29, 32–3\nresolutions, 28, 32-33\nPolicy Statement requirements, 49–50, 52–3\nvariations of determinations, 32, 33\nVirgin Australia, 1, 2, 16\nsee also Jetstar Airways\nCook Islands, 27, 31\nquorum, 21\nHong Kong, 28, 32\nR Indonesia, 16, 28, 32\nJapan (Tokyo-Haneda route), 2, 16, 28, 32–3\nreasonable capability criterion, 8, 43\nPapua New Guinea, 29, 32–3\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\npassenger share, 3\nRemuneration Tribunal, 22 renewals of capacity determinations, 32\nrenewals of capacity allocations, 6, 16 revocation of determinations, 27-29, 31, 32–3\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n\n## KPIs, Targets, and Where They Are At\n\n- [Page 84]\nR submissions see applications – submissions in\nresponse to\nreasonable capability criterion see determinations,\nsustainability see ecologically sustainable\ncriteria for\ndevelopment and environmental performance\nRegister of Available Capacity, 13, 71 reporting\nRemuneration Tribunal, 30 Sydney, 16, 17\nRemuneration Tribunal Act 1973, 30\nT\nreport on performance, 15–27\ncompliments and complaints, 21 Tasman Cargo Airlines, 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, 27, 33,\n34, 41, 72\ndecision times, 21–23\nEfficiency in use of financial resources Thailand, 2, 17, 26, 27, 37, 46,\n(performance measure), 27 Timor-Leste, 26\nperformance criteria, 15\nTonga, 26\nServing applicants and interested parties\ntransfer of capacity allocation, see code sharing\n(performance measure), 20–23\nServing the object of the IASC Act\nU\n(performance measure), 15–20\nvolume of activity, 16;\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf)`\n- [Page 82]\ndeterminations and decisions, 5–8, 15–18, 33–42 Indonesia, 38–9\nCommission procedures, 47–8\ninterest, conflict of, 28\nexternal scrutiny, 29\ninterested parties, see stakeholders\nnew operators case study, 21–4\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13 interim determinations, 6\nDili, 2 International Air Services Commission Act 1992,\n5–8\nDirector, 3, 11, 28, 29\ncorporate governance practices, 27–8\nE Register of Available Capacity, 12–13\nserving object performance target, 15–18\necologically sustainable development\nInternational Air Services Commission Policy\n(environmental performance reporting), 44\nStatement 2018, 5–8, 15, 49–61\nEl Al Israel Airlines, 41, 42\nItaly, 1, 2, 16, 39–40\nEmirates Airline, 38–42\nJ\nEtihad Airline, 39\nJapan, 17, 40\nexpenditure, see finance\nJet Airways, 42\nexternal scrutiny, 29\nJetstar Airways, 3, 37–42\nF Vietnam freight services, 42\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf)`\n- [Page 80]\nD H\nDarwin, 14 Haneda, 16, 19\ndecision times, 19 hearings, 21\nDenpasar, 14, 35, 36\nHong Kong, 34, 37\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nhuman resources, see Secretariat\nDevelopment, Communications and the Arts, 9,\n10–11, 20, 22, 23, 41, 42 I\ndeterminations and decisions, 3–6, 13–17, 27–31\nIndonesia, 14, 19, 35–6\nCommission procedures, 45–6\nInformation Publication Scheme, 41\ndecision times, 19\nexternal scrutiny, 22 interest, conflict of, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\ninterested parties, 10, 17–18\nstakeholder feedback, 17–18\ninterim determinations, 4\nDili, 14\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992,\nDirector, 9, 22, 23\n3–6\nE corporate governance practices, 21–2\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\necologically sustainable development\nserving object performance target, 13–17\n(environmental performance reporting), 41\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)`\n- [Page 80]\nE I\necologically sustainable development, 42 inbound international passenger services, 1\nefficiency of financial resources, 23 IndiGo, 18, 32, 38\nEmirates, 2, 37 Indonesia, 1, 2, 16, 17, 18, 22, 30, 31, 35–6\nenvironmental performance reporting, 42 Interest, conflicts of, 26\nexpenditure, see finance interested parties, 12, 62\nextensions of date of capacity utilisation, 19, 38 interim determinations, 5\nexternal scrutiny, 26 International Air Services Commission\ncontact details, 64\nF\nmeetings, 1, 11, 25\nfeedback, 20–1, 64 membership, 9–11, 26\nperformance report, 15–23\nFiji, 2, 18, 29, 30, 34\nprocedures, 45–6\nfinance, 23\nrole and functions, vi, 5–8\nFinnair, 18, 31, 37 serving applicants and interested parties\nFrance, 2, 16, 30, 34 performance target, 20–1\nserving object of the Act performance target,\nfreedom of information, 41, 43–4\n15–16\nfreight service 2, 5, 12, 13\nwebsite, 64\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)`\n- Objectives\nThe objectives of this plan are to outline appropriate mechanisms and procedures to:\nmanage the information holdings relevant to the IPS;\nproactively identify and publish all information required to be published, including this plan (s 8(2));\nproactively identify and publish any optional information (s 8(4));\nreview and ensure on a regular basis that information published under the IPS is accurate, up-to date and complete (s 8B);\nensure that information published under the IPS is easy to find, understandable and re-useable;\nensure that the format of online content conforms with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (Version 2); and\nmeasure the success of the IASC's IPS.\n  Source: `pages/priorities-index__25.html (http://www.iasc.gov.au/foi/ipp)`\n- [Page 33]\nPART 5\nFinancial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2021\n(1) (2) (3) (4)\n2020–21 2020–21 Variance 2021–22\nBudget Actual (Column 2–1) Budget\n$ $ $\nSalaries / Commissioners’ fees 262,237 195,219 -67,018 252,442\nRevenue 0 0 0 0\nSupplier expenses 24,854 8,871 -15,983 X\nTOTAL 287,091 204,090 -83,001 X\nHolders of public office 3 316 3\nStaff 1.8 1.8 1.8\nExplanatory notes\nThe Commission’s financial report is prepared on an accrual budgeting basis.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Division 3—Renewal of determinations\n14 Presumption in favour of making the same allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission is proposing, while a determination is in force, to make\na fresh determination allocating the capacity to which the original\ndetermination relates under section 8 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering whether the allocation of capacity in the\noriginal determination is no longer of benefit to the public for the purpose\nof subparagraph 8(2)(a)(i) of the Act.\n(2) Without limiting the matters to which the Commission may have regard,\nan allocation is generally no longer of benefit to the public if:\n(a) the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and\n(b) there are other applications for some or all of the capacity; and\n(c) the Commission, having regard to the reasonable capability criterion and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 15 Making a different allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where, in the course of considering the renewal of a\ndetermination, the Commission is satisfied, for the purposes of subparagraph\n8(2)(a)(i) of the Act, that the allocation of capacity in the original determination\nis no longer of benefit to the public.\n(2) In assessing whether an allocation of capacity made by a fresh determination is\nof benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 8(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) is to have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 57]\nDivision 4—Review of determinations\n16 Variations on review for cause\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission has conducted a review for cause in relation to a\ndetermination pursuant to section 10 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering making a decision to vary the determination\nunder paragraph 23(1)(b) of the Act in a way that varies, or has the effect of\nvarying, an allocation of capacity.\n(2) If the grounds on which the review was initiated relate to a condition imposed\nunder paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) may have regard to the criteria set out in paragraphs 24(3)(a) to (d) of this\ninstrument; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Note: Paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act allows for the imposition of a condition that capacity be fully used.\n(3) If the review was initiated on any other grounds, and the Commission does not\nreceive submissions opposing the variation being considered by the\nCommission, then in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(4) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 58]\n(2) If the Commission does not receive submissions opposing the variation\nrequested in the application then, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(3) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of the Act,\nthe Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 24 Conditions relating to the full use of capacity\n(1) For the purpose of specifying a period during which capacity need not be fully\nused pursuant to subparagraph 15(2)(c)(i) of the Act, the Commission:\n(a) should specify as short a period as is reasonably possible, having regard\nto the full range of things necessary to be done by the Australian carrier in\norder to commence operating under the determination; and\n(b) should not specify a period of more than two years other than in\nexceptional circumstances.\n(2) Where the Commission has commenced a review process under sections\n10 and 23 of the Act because an Australian carrier has not complied with a\ncondition that capacity be fully used, the Commission may have regard to the\ncriteria set out in subsection (3) for the following purposes:\n(a) deciding whether to confirm, vary, suspend or revoke the determination\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 73]\nIndex\nA office holders since 1992, 59\nyear in review, 1–3\naccountability and management, 20, 21–3, 23,\n39–40 code share services, 1, 6, 7, 16, 33\nAct, see International Air Services Commission Commission procedures, 39-40\nAct 1992; legislation Commissioners, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 39, 43–4 meetings, 2, 20, 21, 23; attendance, 11\noffice holders since 1992, 59\nadvertising and market research, 36\nsee also Chairperson\nair freight services, 2, 27-28, 31, 33, 34\nremuneration, 22\nAir New Zealand, 1, 3\ncommunications with interested parties, 12, 17–18\nair services arrangements, 12–13\ncompetitive tendering, 23\nairlines, 1–3, 12–13 complaints handling, 58\nsee also determinations and decisions; Qantas;\nconflict of interest, 22\nVirgin Australia\nconsultants and contractors, 23\nall-cargo services, 2, 27-29, 31, 33, 34\ncontact details, 58\nannual report, 20, 22\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [pages 73,74,75,76,78]\n9–40\nappointments, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nCOVID-19, 1, 2, 3, 16, 19, 25\nasset management, 23\nD\nB\ndecision times, 19\nBoeing 737 aircraft, 1\nDenpasar, 16\nBoeing 777 aircraft, 2\nsee also Indonesia.\nbudget, see finance\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nBureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Communications, 11, 12–13,\nEconomics (BITRE), 2 22, 35\nAviation and Airports Division, 20\nC\ndeterminations and decisions, 1, 5–8, 15–19,\nCairns, 16 27–29, 31-34\ncapacity, see determinations and decisions Commission procedures, 39–40\ndecision times, 19, 57\ncargo (freight) services, 2, 31, 33, 34\nexternal scrutiny, 23\nChairperson, 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\nattendance at meetings, 11\nmessage accompanying service charter, 55\nAppendix 9  Index 65\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n\n## Key Metrics\n\n| Values found | Evidence | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| 3\nStaff | [Page 33]\nPART 5\nFinancial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2021\n(1) (2) (3) (4)\n2020–21 2020–21 Variance 2021–22\nBudget Actual (Column 2–1) Budget\n$ $ $\nSalaries / Commissioners’ fees 262,237 195,219 -67,018 252,442\nRevenue 0 0 0 0\nSupplier expenses 24,854 8,871 -15,983 X\nTOTAL 287,091 204,090 -83,001 X\nHolders of public office 3 316 3\nStaff 1.8 1.8 1.8\nExplanatory notes\nThe Commission’s financial report is prepared on an accrual budgeting | `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)` |\n| $6, 1% | IY$��Hɝ\u001e���v��(�7�H\u001b(�G�\u001b��3 E��u��1o�u�E\u001c�iY�x\n\u001b�\u0014�k^���t].\u000e\\�N�c�\\��N��\u0002N�K�\u0012I$��$�K�\u0012d�]q�V��%�'A{���R�]�78졣���kc20�\u000f��m\u0017��\b��e����i�C�W�\u0012���3�r\u0016�����+��N����.ݢ�t��m\u0006�lj'E�Uz�O��XOQ��*��\u000f.\u0013&Wj�\u000b��b;�4��x63\u001b��*�aq��X{�.�\"qxޥ�q���\u0012�H\u0014C\u0018���%��Z�Z�\u001d E��5$\u0003�1%t�m�\"\u0002�9@�ʐz7R��i�����ZN\u0018\u0010��:�ǡ+-]Rj�s�R�c���^\b\\|���x��J�+\"\u0004\u0017q����p��\u0019�h� �\\2c�\b�Y�q\u001d���\u0004!\b�\u0014��\u0012y[�\bJ\u001c=��;'y��I$�\b�I$\u0017\u001c:I&Pp�$�ㄒk���+�N 61&Vh���\u001d\u001a\u0007rU�#��L~�P�T\u0003�\u001dϓGT�n \u0013G�����ރr{��@���b�[��v3\u0006 | `pages/annual-reports-index__01.html (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)` |\n| $0\u001e, 5% | W�.7���CyL\u001a���{�r{Ha-@:D\u001c<�\u0004�qDP�\u000e\u001e���\u0015�\n�\u0004o�q\u000ep�%�6OT`�\"X\u0016����\u0010\u000be��2չ&}��o���\u0002�M\u000b~\u0004\u0011�;\u001cp���XlA\u0006�\u0019�\u0012�>C*�n\bb\u0011?�\u0004��,�\u001f�}Ny�v@B�\u0016��7��v�@\nw\u0003\bу �OO����\u0006;��\u0006\u000f�\u0007�A���`r&��\u001d�\u000e�\u001e\u001cb;���.��\f S��s����KmP1Ћ�5$\u0010=J�j\u0010t�}���X\u000fХ�M��7���G\u001dá�>^a��\b)\n\u00161\u001db]ٖ��%��\u001d`t%\u0003-qCfb��aE��\u0004k\u000e��\n\u001d0s}�\u0007t�k:�*��5%Sޖ�'Ew���\u0010\u0015��\u0018N��\u0016��\\�k���\\|셭\u001eH\f�b3�bbq�\u0010��d�\f�\f��e9%��\u0010�\u0001�X\u0001Ç\u0005����=\u0019,\u001e�\u0014d�4�'0\u0014��Ό\u0005�Wg�\u001a\\|\b�\u001c\u000f$0\u001e8�U��й\u001a~��r\"*$���yJD��:�D���0�m�¹��>M CG���@Ѱ;%}��,\n�\u0003���\u0014\u0007hg\u001a�q\u001a�\u0012\u000b��g | `pages/annual-reports-index__17.html (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0708.pdf)` |\n| $287,091 | [Page 28]\nPhoto © Qantas Airways Limited\nEfficiency of financial resources\nThe Commission’s budget for the year was $287,091. | `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)` |\n| 40\nstaff | [Page 82]\nS V\nSamoa, 2, 38 Vanuatu, 40\nseats, see determinations and decisions variation of determinations, 4–5, 14, 15\nSecretariat, 9, 21, 22, 23, 41, 42 France, 16, 34\nIndonesia, 35, 36\nservice charter, 17, 19, 61–4\nItaly, 36\nSingapore, 15, 39\nJapan, 36–7\nSingapore Airlines, 35, 36, 37, 40 New Zealand, 38\nSolomon Islands, 39 Samoa, 38\nSouth Africa, 39 Singapore, 39\nTonga, 39\nSouth Korea, 37\nVanuatu, 40\nstaff, see Secretariat\nVietnam, 15, 40\nsta | `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)` |\n| 32\nstaff | [Page 82]\nS V\nSamoa, 2, 16, 17, 32, 38 Vanuatu, 2, 16, 17, 19, 29, 32, 39\nSecretariat, 12, 25, 26–7 variations of determinations, 7–8, 16, 18, 30–2,\n35, 38, 39\nSeoul, 17\nHong Kong, 30\nService Charter, 20, 61–4\nIndonesia, 31\nSingapore, 18, 38\nJapan, 31\nSingapore Airlines, 2 Korea, 31\nSolomon Islands, 2, 3, 16, 32, 39 Papua New Guinea, 31\nSri Lankan Airlines, 37 Singapore, 32\nSolomon Islands, 32\nstaff see Secretariat\nVavros, Damon, 11\nT Virgin Aust | `annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)` |\n| 3\nStaff | [Page 33]\nPART 5\nFinancial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2021\n(1) (2) (3) (4)\n2020–21 2020–21 Variance 2021–22\nBudget Actual (Column 2–1) Budget\n$ $ $\nSalaries / Commissioners’ fees 262,237 195,219 -67,018 252,442\nRevenue 0 0 0 0\nSupplier expenses 24,854 8,871 -15,983 X\nTOTAL 287,091 204,090 -83,001 X\nHolders of public office 3 316 3\nStaff 1.8 1.8 1.8\nExplanatory notes\nThe Commission’s financial report is prepared on an accrual budgeting | `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)` |\n\n## Key Achievements\n\n- Learn more\nCurrent Cases\nItaly, Timor-Leste and Vietnam - 30 April 2026\nLatest Updates\nFrance (Route 1) and Italy - 27 March 2026\nCanada - 24 March 2026\nSingapore - 6 March 2026\nSolomon Islands - 23 January 2026\nVanuatu and New Zealand - 23 January 2026\nSri Lanka - 11 December 2025\nVanuatu and New Zealand - 23 January 2026\nSolomon Islands - 23 January 2026\nIndonesia - 19 December 2025\nIndonesia - 4 November 2025\nCompleted Cases\nFrance (Route 1) and Italy - 27 March 2026\nCanada - 24 March 2026\nSingapore - 6 March 2026\nSolomon Islands - 23 January 2026\nVanuatu and New Zealand - 23 January 2026\nIndonesia - 19 December 2025\nSri Lanka - 11 December 2025\nIndonesia - 4 November 2025\nUnited Kingdom - 3 October 2025\nNew Zealand - 24 September 2025\n  Source: `pages/homepage.html (http://www.iasc.gov.au/)`\n- In accordance with s 8(2), the IASC has published on its FOI page the following information:\nthe IASC Information Publication Plan for the IPS [s 8(2)(a)] which is this document;\nwho we are [s 8(2)(b)] including biographical notes of the members of the Commission;\nwhat we do [s 8(2)(c) and s 8(2)(j)], including information about the IASC's functions, decision making powers and operational information including rules and guidelines that assist the IASC to make decisions or recommendations affecting members of the public;\nstatutory appointments [s 8(2)(d)] including a list of past and present statutory public office holders of the IASC;\nannual reports and responses to Parliament [s 8(2)(e) and s 8(2)(h)];\ndecisions and determinations/ completed cases/ legislative framework and procedures/ client service charter which form part of the IASC's operational information [s 8(2)(j)];\n  Source: `pages/priorities-index__25.html (http://www.iasc.gov.au/foi/ipp)`\n- [Page 33]\nPART 5\nFinancial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2021\n(1) (2) (3) (4)\n2020–21 2020–21 Variance 2021–22\nBudget Actual (Column 2–1) Budget\n$ $ $\nSalaries / Commissioners’ fees 262,237 195,219 -67,018 252,442\nRevenue 0 0 0 0\nSupplier expenses 24,854 8,871 -15,983 X\nTOTAL 287,091 204,090 -83,001 X\nHolders of public office 3 316 3\nStaff 1.8 1.8 1.8\nExplanatory notes\nThe Commission’s financial report is prepared on an accrual budgeting basis.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Division 3—Renewal of determinations\n14 Presumption in favour of making the same allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission is proposing, while a determination is in force, to make\na fresh determination allocating the capacity to which the original\ndetermination relates under section 8 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering whether the allocation of capacity in the\noriginal determination is no longer of benefit to the public for the purpose\nof subparagraph 8(2)(a)(i) of the Act.\n(2) Without limiting the matters to which the Commission may have regard,\nan allocation is generally no longer of benefit to the public if:\n(a) the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and\n(b) there are other applications for some or all of the capacity; and\n(c) the Commission, having regard to the reasonable capability criterion and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 15 Making a different allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where, in the course of considering the renewal of a\ndetermination, the Commission is satisfied, for the purposes of subparagraph\n8(2)(a)(i) of the Act, that the allocation of capacity in the original determination\nis no longer of benefit to the public.\n(2) In assessing whether an allocation of capacity made by a fresh determination is\nof benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 8(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) is to have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 57]\nDivision 4—Review of determinations\n16 Variations on review for cause\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission has conducted a review for cause in relation to a\ndetermination pursuant to section 10 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering making a decision to vary the determination\nunder paragraph 23(1)(b) of the Act in a way that varies, or has the effect of\nvarying, an allocation of capacity.\n(2) If the grounds on which the review was initiated relate to a condition imposed\nunder paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) may have regard to the criteria set out in paragraphs 24(3)(a) to (d) of this\ninstrument; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Note: Paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act allows for the imposition of a condition that capacity be fully used.\n(3) If the review was initiated on any other grounds, and the Commission does not\nreceive submissions opposing the variation being considered by the\nCommission, then in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(4) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 58]\n(2) If the Commission does not receive submissions opposing the variation\nrequested in the application then, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(3) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of the Act,\nthe Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 24 Conditions relating to the full use of capacity\n(1) For the purpose of specifying a period during which capacity need not be fully\nused pursuant to subparagraph 15(2)(c)(i) of the Act, the Commission:\n(a) should specify as short a period as is reasonably possible, having regard\nto the full range of things necessary to be done by the Australian carrier in\norder to commence operating under the determination; and\n(b) should not specify a period of more than two years other than in\nexceptional circumstances.\n(2) Where the Commission has commenced a review process under sections\n10 and 23 of the Act because an Australian carrier has not complied with a\ncondition that capacity be fully used, the Commission may have regard to the\ncriteria set out in subsection (3) for the following purposes:\n(a) deciding whether to confirm, vary, suspend or revoke the determination\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 73]\nIndex\nA office holders since 1992, 59\nyear in review, 1–3\naccountability and management, 20, 21–3, 23,\n39–40 code share services, 1, 6, 7, 16, 33\nAct, see International Air Services Commission Commission procedures, 39-40\nAct 1992; legislation Commissioners, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 39, 43–4 meetings, 2, 20, 21, 23; attendance, 11\noffice holders since 1992, 59\nadvertising and market research, 36\nsee also Chairperson\nair freight services, 2, 27-28, 31, 33, 34\nremuneration, 22\nAir New Zealand, 1, 3\ncommunications with interested parties, 12, 17–18\nair services arrangements, 12–13\ncompetitive tendering, 23\nairlines, 1–3, 12–13 complaints handling, 58\nsee also determinations and decisions; Qantas;\nconflict of interest, 22\nVirgin Australia\nconsultants and contractors, 23\nall-cargo services, 2, 27-29, 31, 33, 34\ncontact details, 58\nannual report, 20, 22\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [pages 73,74,75,76,78]\n9–40\nappointments, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nCOVID-19, 1, 2, 3, 16, 19, 25\nasset management, 23\nD\nB\ndecision times, 19\nBoeing 737 aircraft, 1\nDenpasar, 16\nBoeing 777 aircraft, 2\nsee also Indonesia.\nbudget, see finance\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nBureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Communications, 11, 12–13,\nEconomics (BITRE), 2 22, 35\nAviation and Airports Division, 20\nC\ndeterminations and decisions, 1, 5–8, 15–19,\nCairns, 16 27–29, 31-34\ncapacity, see determinations and decisions Commission procedures, 39–40\ndecision times, 19, 57\ncargo (freight) services, 2, 31, 33, 34\nexternal scrutiny, 23\nChairperson, 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\nattendance at meetings, 11\nmessage accompanying service charter, 55\nAppendix 9  Index 65\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 75]\nIndonesia, 32 U\nJapan, 16; Tokyo-Haneda route, 2, 16, 28, 33\nuncontested applications, 45, 47\nKorea route freight capacity, 28, 33\ndecision times, 19\nnew capacity determinations, 28, 33\npassenger share, 3 V\nrenewals of capacity determinations, 33\nvariations of determinations, 6–7, 27-29, 32–3\nresolutions, 28, 32-33\nPolicy Statement requirements, 49–50, 52–3\nvariations of determinations, 32, 33\nVirgin Australia, 1, 2, 16\nsee also Jetstar Airways\nCook Islands, 27, 31\nquorum, 21\nHong Kong, 28, 32\nR Indonesia, 16, 28, 32\nJapan (Tokyo-Haneda route), 2, 16, 28, 32–3\nreasonable capability criterion, 8, 43\nPapua New Guinea, 29, 32–3\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\npassenger share, 3\nRemuneration Tribunal, 22 renewals of capacity determinations, 32\nrenewals of capacity allocations, 6, 16 revocation of determinations, 27-29, 31, 32–3\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n\n## Key Issues, Risks, and Recommendations\n\n- The Commission expects that the return of international passenger services will be\npiecemeal and fragmented as various jurisdictions adjust border constraints in line\nwith levels of vaccination and the perceived risk of further COVID-19 outbreaks.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Upon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 24 February 2023,\nResolution [2023] IASC R01 varying Determination [2019] IASC 119 to extend the date\nof utilisation of capacity allocated from no later than 26 March 2023 to 30 June 2023,\ndue to global supply chain disruptions brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic\ncausing delays to aircraft manufacturers’ production schedules and accordingly,\naircraft delivery timeframes.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)`\n- As a consequence of the delay in delivery of its B737-8\nMAX aircraft, the airline required additional time to commence the services.\n  \nKorea\nUpon the application of Qantas, the Commission’s Delegate issued, on 25 November 2022,\nDecision [2022] IASC 218, revoking Determination [2021] IASC 108.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)`\n- In the financial year 2023–24, the Commission received\n42 applications resulting in 13 determinations allocating new capacity, 10 variation\ndecisions, 15 determinations renewing capacity allocations, 3 revocation decisions\n(at the request of the airline holding the capacity), and one decision not to issue a\ndetermination.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)`\n- Upon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 25 June 2024,\nDecision [2024] IASC 114, deciding not to issue a determination allocating capacity to\nVirgin Australia.\n  \nJapan\nUpon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 16 November 2023,\nDecision [2023] IASC 212, varying Determination [2019] IASC 119 to permit Virgin\nAustralia to code share with Air Canada and Qatar Airways, subject to certain\nconditions.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)`\n- She is a former member\nof the ACT Government’s Brand Strategic Advisory Board and a former Non-Executive\nDirector and Audit and Risk Committee member of Community Services #1.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf)`\n- In accordance with s 8(2), the IASC has published on its FOI page the following information:\nthe IASC Information Publication Plan for the IPS [s 8(2)(a)] which is this document;\nwho we are [s 8(2)(b)] including biographical notes of the members of the Commission;\nwhat we do [s 8(2)(c) and s 8(2)(j)], including information about the IASC's functions, decision making powers and operational information including rules and guidelines that assist the IASC to make decisions or recommendations affecting members of the public;\nstatutory appointments [s 8(2)(d)] including a list of past and present statutory public office holders of the IASC;\nannual reports and responses to Parliament [s 8(2)(e) and s 8(2)(h)];\ndecisions and determinations/ completed cases/ legislative framework and procedures/ client service charter which form part of the IASC's operational information [s 8(2)(j)];\n  Source: `pages/priorities-index__25.html (http://www.iasc.gov.au/foi/ipp)`\n- Additionally, administrative issues such as staffing, financial and risk\nmanagement issues, as appropriate, are discussed at these meetings.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 33]\nPART 5\nFinancial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2021\n(1) (2) (3) (4)\n2020–21 2020–21 Variance 2021–22\nBudget Actual (Column 2–1) Budget\n$ $ $\nSalaries / Commissioners’ fees 262,237 195,219 -67,018 252,442\nRevenue 0 0 0 0\nSupplier expenses 24,854 8,871 -15,983 X\nTOTAL 287,091 204,090 -83,001 X\nHolders of public office 3 316 3\nStaff 1.8 1.8 1.8\nExplanatory notes\nThe Commission’s financial report is prepared on an accrual budgeting basis.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Division 3—Renewal of determinations\n14 Presumption in favour of making the same allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission is proposing, while a determination is in force, to make\na fresh determination allocating the capacity to which the original\ndetermination relates under section 8 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering whether the allocation of capacity in the\noriginal determination is no longer of benefit to the public for the purpose\nof subparagraph 8(2)(a)(i) of the Act.\n(2) Without limiting the matters to which the Commission may have regard,\nan allocation is generally no longer of benefit to the public if:\n(a) the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and\n(b) there are other applications for some or all of the capacity; and\n(c) the Commission, having regard to the reasonable capability criterion and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- 15 Making a different allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where, in the course of considering the renewal of a\ndetermination, the Commission is satisfied, for the purposes of subparagraph\n8(2)(a)(i) of the Act, that the allocation of capacity in the original determination\nis no longer of benefit to the public.\n(2) In assessing whether an allocation of capacity made by a fresh determination is\nof benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 8(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) is to have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 57]\nDivision 4—Review of determinations\n16 Variations on review for cause\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission has conducted a review for cause in relation to a\ndetermination pursuant to section 10 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering making a decision to vary the determination\nunder paragraph 23(1)(b) of the Act in a way that varies, or has the effect of\nvarying, an allocation of capacity.\n(2) If the grounds on which the review was initiated relate to a condition imposed\nunder paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) may have regard to the criteria set out in paragraphs 24(3)(a) to (d) of this\ninstrument; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- Note: Paragraph 15(2)(c) of the Act allows for the imposition of a condition that capacity be fully used.\n(3) If the review was initiated on any other grounds, and the Commission does not\nreceive submissions opposing the variation being considered by the\nCommission, then in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(4) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 23(3) of the Act, the\nCommission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 58]\n(2) If the Commission does not receive submissions opposing the variation\nrequested in the application then, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(3) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of the Act,\nthe Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n\n## Corporate Values and Operating Culture\n\n- [Page 73]\nIndex\nA office holders since 1992, 59\nyear in review, 1–3\naccountability and management, 20, 21–3, 23,\n39–40 code share services, 1, 6, 7, 16, 33\nAct, see International Air Services Commission Commission procedures, 39-40\nAct 1992; legislation Commissioners, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 39, 43–4 meetings, 2, 20, 21, 23; attendance, 11\noffice holders since 1992, 59\nadvertising and market research, 36\nsee also Chairperson\nair freight services, 2, 27-28, 31, 33, 34\nremuneration, 22\nAir New Zealand, 1, 3\ncommunications with interested parties, 12, 17–18\nair services arrangements, 12–13\ncompetitive tendering, 23\nairlines, 1–3, 12–13 complaints handling, 58\nsee also determinations and decisions; Qantas;\nconflict of interest, 22\nVirgin Australia\nconsultants and contractors, 23\nall-cargo services, 2, 27-29, 31, 33, 34\ncontact details, 58\nannual report, 20, 22\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 79]\nINDEX\nA Chairperson, 6, 7–8, 22\nattendance at meetings, 9\naccountability and management, 21–3\nmessage accompanying service charter, 61\nadditional criteria, 6\noffice holders since 1992, 65\nadvertising and market research, 41\nyear in review, 1–2\nAERgO, 2, 14, 19, 38\ncode share services, 4, 5\nair freight services, see freight services France, 16, 34\nair services arrangements, 10–11 Indonesia, 35, 36\nAircalin, 37–8 Italy, 36\nKorea, 37\nairlines, 1, 10–11\nNew Caledonia, 37–8\nsee also determinations and decisions; Jetstar\nAirways; Qantas; Virgin Australia New Zealand, 38\nSingapore, 39\nAlliance Airlines, 14\nVanuatu, 40\nannual report, 20, 22\nCommissioners, 6–9, 20, 21–2\nApia, 2\nmeetings, 2, 20, 21, 22, 23; attendance, 9\napplications, see determinations and decisions\noffice holders since 1992, 65–6\nappointments, 6–8, 22\nsee also Chairperson\nasset management, 23\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)`\n- [pages 40,41,42,43,44,45,46]\nre subject to the Australian Public\nService Values and the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (as set out in the\nPublic Service Act 1999) and all other relevant public service terms and conditions.\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf)`\n- Acknowledgements and copyright\nLetter of Transmittal\nPart 1 The Year in Review by the Chairperson, Dr Ian Douglas\nAppointment matters\nPart 2 Overview of the International Air Services Commission\nThe role and functions of the Commission\nExecutive profile\nThe Secretariat\nCommunications with interested parties\nThe role of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Cities and Regional Development\nPart 3 Report on performance\nOverview\nResults against performance targets\nCase Study—Capacity utilisation\nServing applicants and interested parties\nEfficiency of financial resources\nPart 4 Management and accountability\nCorporate governance practices\nManagement of human resources\nPart 5 Financial report\nFinancial report as at 30 June 2019\nAppendix 1 Determinations and Decisions\nAppendix 2 Route-by-route summary of Commission determinations and decisions in 2018–19\nAppendix 3 Other information\n  Source: `pages/annual-reports-index__06.html (https://www.iasc.gov.au/about/annual_report/2018_2019/index.aspx)`\n- Division 3—Renewal of determinations\n14 Presumption in favour of making the same allocation of capacity\n(1) This section applies where:\n(a) the Commission is proposing, while a determination is in force, to make\na fresh determination allocating the capacity to which the original\ndetermination relates under section 8 of the Act; and\n(b) the Commission is considering whether the allocation of capacity in the\noriginal determination is no longer of benefit to the public for the purpose\nof subparagraph 8(2)(a)(i) of the Act.\n(2) Without limiting the matters to which the Commission may have regard,\nan allocation is generally no longer of benefit to the public if:\n(a) the carrier seeking renewal has failed to service the route effectively; and\n(b) there are other applications for some or all of the capacity; and\n(c) the Commission, having regard to the reasonable capability criterion and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [pages 73,74,75,76,78]\n9–40\nappointments, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nCOVID-19, 1, 2, 3, 16, 19, 25\nasset management, 23\nD\nB\ndecision times, 19\nBoeing 737 aircraft, 1\nDenpasar, 16\nBoeing 777 aircraft, 2\nsee also Indonesia.\nbudget, see finance\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nBureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Communications, 11, 12–13,\nEconomics (BITRE), 2 22, 35\nAviation and Airports Division, 20\nC\ndeterminations and decisions, 1, 5–8, 15–19,\nCairns, 16 27–29, 31-34\ncapacity, see determinations and decisions Commission procedures, 39–40\ndecision times, 19, 57\ncargo (freight) services, 2, 31, 33, 34\nexternal scrutiny, 23\nChairperson, 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\nattendance at meetings, 11\nmessage accompanying service charter, 55\nAppendix 9  Index 65\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 75]\nIndonesia, 32 U\nJapan, 16; Tokyo-Haneda route, 2, 16, 28, 33\nuncontested applications, 45, 47\nKorea route freight capacity, 28, 33\ndecision times, 19\nnew capacity determinations, 28, 33\npassenger share, 3 V\nrenewals of capacity determinations, 33\nvariations of determinations, 6–7, 27-29, 32–3\nresolutions, 28, 32-33\nPolicy Statement requirements, 49–50, 52–3\nvariations of determinations, 32, 33\nVirgin Australia, 1, 2, 16\nsee also Jetstar Airways\nCook Islands, 27, 31\nquorum, 21\nHong Kong, 28, 32\nR Indonesia, 16, 28, 32\nJapan (Tokyo-Haneda route), 2, 16, 28, 32–3\nreasonable capability criterion, 8, 43\nPapua New Guinea, 29, 32–3\nRegister of Available Capacity, 12–13\npassenger share, 3\nRemuneration Tribunal, 22 renewals of capacity determinations, 32\nrenewals of capacity allocations, 6, 16 revocation of determinations, 27-29, 31, 32–3\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)`\n- [Page 81]\nINDEX\nA Chairperson, 3, 8, 9, 28\nattendance at meetings, 11\naccountability and management, 27–9\noffice holders since 1992, 67\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 51–2 year in review, 1–3\nadvertising and market research, 44 code share services, 6, 7\nAir France, 38, 42 route-by-route summary, 38–42\nair freight services, 3, 17, 38, 42 Colombo, 40–1\nAir New Zealand, 3 Commissioners, 3, 8–11\nair services arrangements, 12–13, 21 attendance, 11\nmeetings, 1, 27, 28, 29;\nairlines, 2–3, 12–13\noffice holders since 1992, 67–8\nsee also determinations and decisions;\nsee also Chairperson\nJetstar Airways; Qantas; Virgin Australia\ncommunications with interested parties, 12,\nannual report, 25, 28\n18–19\napplications, see determinations and decisions\ncompetitive tendering, 29\nappointments, 3, 8–11, 28\ncomplaints handling, 66\nAsiana Airlines, 16, 41\nconflict of interest, 28\nasset management, 29\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf)`\n\n## Global Ideas and Case Study Inputs\n\n_No global-intelligence source text found yet. Run `CLAUDE/global-ideas-scraper.py <entity>` to populate case-study sources._\n\n## Source Artifacts Used\n\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pdf` - annual-reports - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pdf` - annual-reports - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf\n- `annual-reports/2022-23.pdf` - annual-reports - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pdf` - annual-reports - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pdf` - annual-reports - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf\n- `pages/about.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/about/index\n- `pages/annual-reports-index.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/about/annual_report/index\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__00.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__01.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__02.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__03.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__04.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__05.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA4239_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0620_Web.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__06.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/about/annual_report/2018_2019/index.aspx\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__07.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/about/annual_report/2017_2018/index.aspx\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__08.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/about/annual_report/2016_2017/index.aspx\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__09.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report1516.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__10.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report1415.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__11.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report1314.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__12.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report1213.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__13.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report1112.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__14.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report1011.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__15.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0910.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__16.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0809.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__17.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0708.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__18.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/Report0607.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__19.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/Report0506.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__20.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/iasc_annual_report_2004-05.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__21.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0304.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__22.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0203.pdf\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__23.html` - pages - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/report0102.pdf\n- `pages/contact.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/foi/foi_contact\n- `pages/homepage.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/\n- `pages/priorities-index.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/about/index\n- `pages/priorities-index__25.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/foi/ipp\n- `pages/strategies-index.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/legislative/index\n- `pages/strategies-index__24.html` - pages - http://www.iasc.gov.au/legislative/index\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pdf\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pdf\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-making-a-submission.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/procedures-making-a-submission.pdf\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-review-of-determinations_0.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/procedures-review-of-determinations_0.pdf\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pdf\n\n## Gaps To Fix\n\n- No corporate plan text source found.\n- No global comparison/case-study sources found.",
  "legislation_md": "# International Air Services Commission - Acts and Legislation Discovery\n\n**Generated at**: 2026-05-09T21:17:07.548315+00:00\n**Entity ID**: B-001955\n**Jurisdiction**: Commonwealth\n**Portfolio**: Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, \n\nCommunications, Sport and the Arts\n\n> This is an evidence-based discovery list from scraped department material. A mention does not always mean the department administers the legislation; high-confidence and official register links should be reviewed.\n\n## Summary\n\n- Source files scanned: 42\n- Unique legislation references found: 19\n\n| Type | Count |\n|---|---:|\n| Act | 13 |\n| Instrument | 2 |\n| Regulation | 4 |\n\n## Legislation References\n\n### International Air Services Commission Act 1992\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 100\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=International+Air+Services+Commission+Act+1992\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/about.html`\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__06.html`\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__07.html`\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__08.html`\n- `pages/homepage.html`\n- `pages/priorities-index.html`\n- `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- About the Commission | International Air Services Commission\n\nAbout the Commission\nRole of the Commission\n|\nMembers of the Commission\n|\nThe Secretariat\nRole of the Commission\nThe Commission was established under the\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992\n. The object of the Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services, resulting in:\nincreased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an in\n  Source: `pages/about.html`\n- Annual Report 2018-19 | International Air Services Commission\n\nAnnual Report 2018-19\nPDF version\nPDF: 2.84 MB\nThe International Air Services Commission is an independent statutory authority, established under the\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992.\nIt allocates capacity available under Australia's air services arrangements with other economies to existing and prospective Australian international airlines by making formal determinations. Applications are assessed against public benefit criteria set out\n  Source: `pages/annual-reports-index__06.html`\n- Annual Report 2017-18 | International Air Services Commission\n\nAnnual Report 2017-18\nPDF version\nPDF: 1.37 MB\nThe International Air Services Commission is an independent statutory authority, established under the\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992.\nIt allocates capacity available under Australia's air services arrangements with other economies to existing and prospective Australian international airlines by making formal determinations. Applications are assessed against public benefit criteria set out\n  Source: `pages/annual-reports-index__07.html`\n- Annual Report 2016-17 | International Air Services Commission\n\nAnnual Report 2016-17\nPDF version\nPDF: 8.41 MB\nThe International Air Services Commission is an independent statutory authority, established under the\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992.\nIt allocates capacity available under Australia's air services arrangements with other economies to existing and prospective Australian international airlines by making formal determinations. Applications are assessed against public benefit criteria set out\n  Source: `pages/annual-reports-index__08.html`\n- International Air Services Commission\n\nHome\nThe International Air Services Commission is an independent statutory authority, established under the\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992\n. The Commission's primary responsibility is to serve the object of the Act by allocating capacity entitlements to Australian airlines for the operation of international airline services.\nLearn more\nCurrent Cases\nItaly, Timor-Leste and Vietnam - 30 April 2026\n  Source: `pages/homepage.html`\n\n### Freedom of Information Act 1982\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 14\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Freedom+of+Information+Act+1982\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/contact.html`\n- `pages/priorities-index__25.html`\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2022-23.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ational Air Services Commission\n\nFOI Contact Officer\nThe general power to grant or refuse access to documents held by the International Air Services Commission (IASC) is held by the Chairperson who is also the Principal Officer of the IASC for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the FOI Act).\nUnder an Instrument of Authorisation\nPDF: 181.11 KB\ndated 19 August 2013, the Chairperson has authorised to the Director and, in the absence of the Director, the Senior Adviser, all of the Chair’s powers and functions under the FOI Act.\nThe Dir\n  Source: `pages/contact.html`\n- Information Publication Plan | International Air Services Commission\n\nInformation Publication Plan\nIntroduction\nThe International Air Services Commission (IASC) is an agency subject to the\nFreedom of Information Act 1982\n(\nFOI Act\n) and is required to comply with the Information Publication Scheme (IPS) set out in Part II of the FOI Act. This plan describes how the IASC proposes to comply with those obligations as required by subsection 8(1) of the FOI Act.\nInformation Public\n  Source: `pages/priorities-index__25.html`\n- the same occupational health and safety arrangements\nas departmental officers. The Department’s annual report contains details of\nthose arrangements.\nFreedom of information\nThe International Air Services Commission (the Commission) is an agency subject to the\nFreedom of Information Act 1982 (the FOI Act). Major reforms of the FOI Act in 2011\nrequired relevant agencies to comply with the Information Publication Scheme (IPS) set\nout in Part II of the FOI Act. In compliance with the IPS requirements, the Commission has\nestablished an Information Pu\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- covered by the Department’s processes in this area.\n36 International Air Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2020–21\n\n[page 45]\nAPPENDIX 4\nFreedom of information schedule\nItem Information\nAccess facilities In many cases, application for information under the Freedom of Information\nAct 1982 (the FOI Act) might not be required because information or\ndocuments may be readily available on the Commission’s website. Formal\nrequests under the FOI Act must be made in writing to the Executive Director,\nFOI contact officer, of the Commission. The Commiss\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- with an expertise in administrative\nlaw, statutory interpretation and aviation law. She has provided\nin-house legal advice to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,\nparticularly regarding the application of the Transport Safety\nInvestigation Act 2003 and the Freedom of Information Act 1982. She provided legal\nadvice regarding the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and\nfor coronial inquiries regarding aviation accidents. Previously, she worked for the\nACT Government Solicitor on matters including regulation and licensing, pub\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 6\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Remuneration+Tribunal+Act+1973\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2022-23.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- pursuant to section 48 of the\nAct. Ms Genevieve Butler was appointed by the Minister under section 48 as Commission\nMember with effect from 14 May 2021.\nThe Remuneration Tribunal sets the Chair and Members’ remuneration and travel\nentitlements pursuant to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973.\nSection 47 of the Act requires members to disclose any interest that could conflict\nwith the performance of their functions in relation to proceedings conducted by\nthe Commission. Commissioners disclose potential conflict of interests at every\nCommission mee\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- ember 2021, the Governor-General appointed Ms McKeon as Commissioner,\npursuant to section 40 of the Act, for a three-year period until 15 December 2024.\nThe Remuneration Tribunal sets the Chair and Members’ remuneration and travel\nentitlements pursuant to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973.\nSection 47 of the Act requires members to disclose any interest that could conflict\nwith the performance of their functions in relation to proceedings conducted by\nthe Commission. Commissioners disclose potential conflict of interests at every\nCommission mee\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- e McKeon was appointed by the Governor-General as Commissioner, pursuant\nto section 40 of the Act, for a three-year term commencing on 16 December 2021.\nThe Remuneration Tribunal sets the Chair and Members’ remuneration and travel\nentitlements pursuant to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973.\nSection 47 of the Act requires members to disclose any interest that could conflict\nwith the performance of their functions in relation to proceedings conducted by\nthe Commission. Commissioners disclose potential conflict of interests at every\nCommission mee\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pages.jsonl`\n- Jane McKeon was appointed by the\nGovernor-General as Commissioner, pursuant to Section 40 of the Act, for a three-year\nterm commencing 16 December 2021.\nThe Remuneration Tribunal sets the Chair and Members’ remuneration and travel\nentitlements pursuant to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973.\nSection 47 of the Act requires members to disclose any interest that could conflict\nwith the performance of their functions in relation to proceedings conducted by\nthe Commission. Commissioners disclose potential conflicts of interest at every\nCommission mee\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- term commencing 16 December 2021.\nOn 1 August 2024, the Governor-General extended her appointment for a further period\nof 4 years from 16 December 2024.\nThe Remuneration Tribunal sets the Chair and Members’ remuneration and travel\nentitlements pursuant to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973.\nSection 47 of the IASC Act requires members to disclose any interest that could\nconflict with the performance of their functions in relation to proceedings conducted\nby the Commission. Commissioners disclose potential conflicts of interest at every\nCommissio\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 6\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Transport+Safety+Investigation+Act+2003\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/about.html`\n- `pages/priorities-index.html`\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2022-23.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- nevieve Butler is a senior government lawyer with an expertise in administrative law, particularly statutory interpretation, and aviation law. She has provided in-house legal advice to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, focusing on the application of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. She provided legal advice regarding the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and for coronial inquiries regarding aviation accidents. Previously, Genevieve provided legal advice and conducted litigation for the ACT Government Solicitor in t\n  Source: `pages/about.html`\n- nevieve Butler is a senior government lawyer with an expertise in administrative law, particularly statutory interpretation, and aviation law. She has provided in-house legal advice to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, focusing on the application of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. She provided legal advice regarding the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and for coronial inquiries regarding aviation accidents. Previously, Genevieve provided legal advice and conducted litigation for the ACT Government Solicitor in t\n  Source: `pages/priorities-index.html`\n- e 14 May 2021.\nMs Butler is a government lawyer with an expertise in administrative\nlaw, statutory interpretation and aviation law. She has provided\nin-house legal advice to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,\nparticularly regarding the application of the Transport Safety\nInvestigation Act 2003 and the Freedom of Information Act 1982. She provided legal\nadvice regarding the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and\nfor coronial inquiries regarding aviation accidents. Previously, she worked for the\nACT Government Solicitor on matters\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- e 14 May 2021.\nMs Butler is a government lawyer with an expertise in administrative\nlaw, statutory interpretation and aviation law. She has provided\nin-house legal advice to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,\nparticularly regarding the application of the Transport Safety\nInvestigation Act 2003 and the Freedom of Information Act 1982. She provided legal\nadvice regarding the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and for\ncoronial inquiries regarding aviation accidents. Previously, she provided legal advice and\nconducted litigation for\n  Source: `annual-reports/2022-23.pages.jsonl`\n- e 14 May 2021.\nMs Butler is a government lawyer with an expertise in administrative\nlaw, statutory interpretation and aviation law. She has provided\nin-house legal advice to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,\nparticularly regarding the application of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and\nthe Freedom of Information Act 1982. She provided legal advice regarding the search\nfor the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and for coronial inquiries regarding\naviation accidents. Previously, she provided legal advice and conducted litigation for\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Competition and Consumer Act 2010\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 5\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Competition+and+Consumer+Act+2010\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-making-a-submission.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- The Commission’s assessment of this application was closely interlinked with the\nAustralian Competition and Consumer Commission, which was simultaneously\nreviewing a separate application from Virgin Australia and Qatar Airways seeking\nauthorisation under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to engage in cooperative\nconduct. In this context, the Commission’s role in approving international airline rights\nthrough capacity allocations and the ACCC’s role, under its own process, assessing\ncompetitive impacts, were complementary.\nAs part of its statu\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- ary.\nAs part of its statutory obligations under section 12(1)(a) of the IASC Act, the\nCommission was required to invite other applications for capacity on the route. In line\nwith this process, because of the potential for a restriction to be imposed under the\nCompetition and Consumer Act 2010 that might prevent Virgin Australia from using\nthe capacity, as required by 12(1)(b) of the IASC Act and in accordance with regulation\n7(b) of the Regulations, the Commission invited submissions about the allocation of\nthe capacity. In addition, Virgin Austra\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- ,\nsummary table – passenger, 24–26\n71\nvariations, 2, 7, 61–62\nQantas, 17–18, 19, 24, 26, 33, 34, 35, 39–40,\napplications, 1–2, 29 41, 42–43, 45\ncomplex, 1, 22 Virgin Australia, 1, 16, 17, 22, 24, 26, 36, 37,\ncontested see opposed 39, 43, 45, 46\nopposed, 7, 21 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, 22\nsubmissions in response to, 6, 51 Complaints handling see report on performance –\ntypes of, 7 compliments and complaints\nvolume, 1\ncommunications with interested parties, 52\nsee also allocations; code sharing;\nconflicts of interest, 30\ndeterminations and\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- 7(b) of the Regulations requires the Commission to invite submissions about an\napplication for capacity if the Commission considers that, if the capacity were to be allocated to an\nAustralian carrier:\na) a restriction could be imposed on the carrier under the Competition and Consumer Act\n2010 preventing the carrier using that capacity; or\nb) the carrier may not be able to obtain an approval or licence (however described) that is\nnecessary to use that capacity; or\nc) for any other reason, the carrier may not be reasonably capable of using that capa\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pages.jsonl`\n- the Act and s7 of the Regulations refer):\no more than one application is made relating to the allocation of that capacity; or\no the Commission considers that, if the allocation were made to a carrier:\ni. a restriction could be imposed on the carrier under the Competition and Consumer\nAct 2010, preventing the carrier using the capacity; or\nii. the carrier may not be able to obtain an approval or licence that is necessary to use\nthe capacity; or\niii. for any reason, the carrier may not be reasonably capable of using that capacity.\n2. The Commission\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-making-a-submission.pages.jsonl`\n\n### International Air Services Act 1992\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 4\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=International+Air+Services+Act+1992\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ir Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2020–21\nPhoto © Virgin Australia\n\n[page 13]\nPART 2\nOverview of the International Air Services\nCommission\nThe role and functions of the Commission\nThe Commission is an independent statutory authority established under the\nInternational Air Services Act 1992 (the Act). The object of the Act is to enhance the\nwelfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the\nprovision of international air services, resulting in:\n increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, incl\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n- ir Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2021–22\nPhoto © Virgin Australia\n\n[page 13]\nPART 2\nOverview of the International\nAir Services Commission\nThe role and functions of the Commission\nThe Commission is an independent statutory authority established under the\nInternational Air Services Act 1992 (the Act). The object of the Act is to enhance the\nwelfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the\nprovision of international air services, resulting in:\n increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, incl\n  Source: `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl`\n- stralia\n4 International Air Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2023–24\n\n[page 13]\nPART 2\nOverview of the International\nAir Services Commission\nThe role and functions of the Commission\nThe Commission is an independent statutory authority established under the\nInternational Air Services Act 1992 (the Act). The object of the Act is to enhance the\nwelfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the\nprovision of international air services by Australian carriers, resulting in:\na) increased responsiveness by airlines to the\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- n Cargo\n4 International Air Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2024–25\n\n[page 13]\nPART 2\nOverview of the International\nAir Services Commission\nThe role and functions of the Commission\nThe Commission is an independent statutory authority established under the\nInternational Air Services Act 1992 (the IASC Act). The object of the IASC Act is\nto enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through\ncompetition in the provision of international air services by Australian carriers,\nresulting in:\na) increased responsiveness by airlin\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Act), the International Air Services Regulations 2018\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 3\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Act%29%2C+the+International+Air+Services+Regulations+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-making-a-submission.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-review-of-determinations_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ng capacity allocations\nwishing to apply for available capacity to operate scheduled air services on an international route. For\navoidance of doubt, nothing in this document overrides the requirements of the International Air\nServices Commission Act 1992 (the Act), the International Air Services Regulations 2018 (the\nRegulations) made pursuant to the Act, and the International Air Services Commission Policy\nStatement 2018 (the Policy Statement).\nIt is recommended that these procedures are read in conjunction with the Act, the Regulations and\nthe Policy Statement. For\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pages.jsonl`\n- ded to assist interested parties wishing to make a submission to the\nInternational Air Services Commission (the Commission). For avoidance of doubt, nothing in this\ndocument overrides the requirements of the International Air Services Commission Act 1992 (the Act),\nthe International Air Services Regulations 2018 (the Regulations), and the International Air Services\nCommission Policy Statement 2018 (the Policy Statement).\nIt is recommended that these procedures are read in conjunction with the Act, the Regulations and\nthe Policy Statement. For further details, refer t\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-making-a-submission.pages.jsonl`\n- reviews initiated by a carrier in relation to a determination held\nby that carrier and reviews initiated by the Commission.\nFor avoidance of doubt, nothing in this document overrides the requirements of the International Air\nServices Commission Act 1992 (the Act), the International Air Services Regulations 2018 (the\nRegulations), and the International Air Services Commission Policy Statement 2018 (the Policy\nStatement).\nIt is recommended that these procedures are read in conjunction with the Act, the Regulations and\nthe Policy Statement. For further details, refer t\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-review-of-determinations_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n### International Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n\n**Type**: Regulation\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 3\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=International+Air+Services+Commission+Regulations+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ission\n\nLegislative Framework and Procedures\nOverview\n|\nIASC Act\n|\nIASC Regulations\n|\nMinister's Policy Statement\n|\nCommission Procedures\nOverview\nThe Commission was established and operates pursuant to\nthe International Air Services Commission Act 1992\n,\nthe International Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n, and the Policy Statement issued by the Minister.\nThe Commission has\ndelegated certain powers and functions\nto its Director and/or Senior Adviser (officers of the Department).\nback to top\nThe IASC Act\nThe Commission was established under the\nInternational Ai\n  Source: `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- ission\n\nLegislative Framework and Procedures\nOverview\n|\nIASC Act\n|\nIASC Regulations\n|\nMinister's Policy Statement\n|\nCommission Procedures\nOverview\nThe Commission was established and operates pursuant to\nthe International Air Services Commission Act 1992\n,\nthe International Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n, and the Policy Statement issued by the Minister.\nThe Commission has\ndelegated certain powers and functions\nto its Director and/or Senior Adviser (officers of the Department).\nback to top\nThe IASC Act\nThe Commission was established under the\nInternational Ai\n  Source: `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n- e before exercising the delegated\nfunction or power.\n8 Revocations\n(1) Subject to the next subsection, all previous delegations of the International Air\nServices Commission’s powers or functions under the International Air Services\nCommission Act 1992 and the International Air Services Commission Regulations\n2018 are revoked.\n(2) For the avoidance of doubt this instrument does not revoke any instrument\nwhich:\n(a) authorises or appoints a person to be an authorised person or authorised\noffice under any Act or regulation mentioned in the Schedule; or\n(b) states that it\n  Source: `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Public Service Act 1999\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 3\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Public+Service+Act+1999\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- prised of one full-time Executive Level 2\nofficer as Director of the Secretariat.\nAs officers of the department, Secretariat staff members are subject to the Australian\nPublic Service Values and the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (as set out in\nthe Public Service Act 1999) and all other relevant public service terms and conditions.\n18 Decisions made by the Commission are not subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.\n26 International Air Services Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2023–24\n\n[page 35]\nPhoto © Qanta\n  Source: `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl`\n- ector of the Secretariat and one full-time APS Level 6 officer as Senior Adviser. As\nofficers of the department, Secretariat staff members are subject to the Australian Public\nService Values and the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (as set out in the\nPublic Service Act 1999) and all other relevant public service terms and conditions.\nAsset management\nAsset management is not a prominent aspect of the business of the Commission and is\nmanaged in accordance with departmental policies and procedures.\nPurchasing\nThe Commission made n\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- nitions\nIn this instrument:\nAPS means the Australian Public Service.\nAPS 6 means an APS employee in the Department who is classified as an APS Level 6\nemployee under the Classification Rules.\nClassification Rules means the rules issued under section 23 of the Public Service Act\n1999.\nDirector of the IASC means an EL 2 in the Department with responsibility for\noverseeing the operations and functions of the IASC section and the IASC office.\nEL 2 means an APS employee in the Department who is classified as an Executive Level\n2 employee unde\n  Source: `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n### IASC Regulations The International Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n\n**Type**: Regulation\n**Confidence**: medium\n**Mentions**: 2\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=IASC+Regulations+The+International+Air+Services+Commission+Regulations+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits; and\ngrowth in Australian tourism and trade; and\nthe maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries\nback to top\nThe IASC Regulations\nThe\nInternational Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n(the Regulations) provide a supporting administrative framework for the Commission, as well as certain procedures for the Commission to follow in particular circumstances regarding the allocation of available capacity. The Regulations also outline circumstanc\n  Source: `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits; and\ngrowth in Australian tourism and trade; and\nthe maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries\nback to top\nThe IASC Regulations\nThe\nInternational Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n(the Regulations) provide a supporting administrative framework for the Commission, as well as certain procedures for the Commission to follow in particular circumstances regarding the allocation of available capacity. The Regulations also outline circumstanc\n  Source: `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n\n### International Air Services Commission Delegation Instrument 2024\n\n**Type**: Instrument\n**Confidence**: medium\n**Mentions**: 2\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=International+Air+Services+Commission+Delegation+Instrument+2024\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ces Commission  ANNUAL REPORT 2024–25\n\n[page 29]\nand Webservices teams to identify possible measures to be implemented, including the\nassociated costs and timeframes.\nThe Commission also reviewed all of its published procedures to ensure consistency\nwith the International Air Services Commission Delegation Instrument 2024 (No. 1) and\nthe requirements of the legislative framework within which the Commission operates.\nAs part of this review, the procedures were updated to clarify existing processes\nfollowed by the Commission. The Commission consulted its airline stakeholders as\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n- ces\nCommission, make this instrument under section 27AB of the International Air Services Commission\nAct 1992.\nDate: 19 December 2024\nGenevieve Butler Jane McKeon\nChairperson Commissioner\nOFFICIAL\n\n[page 2]\nOFFICIAL\n1 Name of Instrument\nThis instrument is the International Air Services Commission Delegation Instrument\n2024 (No.1).\n2 Commencement\nThis instrument commences when it is signed.\n3 Authority\nThis instrument is made under section 27AB of the International Air Services\nCommission Act 1992.\n4 Definitions\nIn this instrument:\nAPS means the Australian Public Service.\nAPS 6\n  Source: `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Act), the International Air Services Commission Regulations 2018\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: medium\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Act%29%2C+the+International+Air+Services+Commission+Regulations+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- international carriers wishing to apply for available\ncapacity to operate scheduled air services on an international route. For avoidance of doubt, nothing\nin this document overrides the requirements of the International Air Services Commission Act 1992\n(the Act), the International Air Services Commission Regulations 2018 (the Regulations), and the\nInternational Air Services Commission Policy Statement 2018 (the Policy Statement).\nIt is recommended that these procedures are read in conjunction with the Act, the Regulations and\nthe Policy Statement. For further details, refer t\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pages.jsonl`\n\n### International Air Commission and Services Commission Act 1992\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: medium\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=International+Air+Commission+and+Services+Commission+Act+1992\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- mmission via email. Operational\nfiles are maintained on all the Commission’s activities and are stored at the\noffice of the Commission. These files are not open to public access.\nFunctions of the The functions of the Commission, as set out in section 6 of the International Air\nCommission and Services Commission Act 1992, are to:\nHow it is (a) make determinations;\norganised (b) conduct reviews of those determinations; and\n(c) provide advice to the Minister about any matter referred to the Commission\nby the Minister concerning international air operations.\nThe organisation of\n  Source: `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl`\n\n### OFFICIAL International Air Services Commission Delegation Instrument 2024\n\n**Type**: Instrument\n**Confidence**: medium\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=OFFICIAL+International+Air+Services+Commission+Delegation+Instrument+2024\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- [page 1]\nOFFICIAL\nInternational Air Services Commission Delegation\nInstrument 2024 (No. 1)\nWe, GENEVIEVE BUTLER and JANE MCKEON, Commissioners of the International Air Services\nCommission, make this instrument under section 27AB of the International Air Services Commission\nAct 1992.\nDate: 19 December 2024\nGenevieve Butler Jane McKeon\nChairp\n  Source: `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Services Commission Act 1993\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: medium\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Services+Commission+Act+1993\n\n**Sources**:\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ment, Communications, Sport and the\nIndex  73\n\n[page 82]\nArts, 12, 13, 17, 20–21, 23, 27, 70, 72 G\ndeterminations and decisions, 1–2, 16–23, 29\nglossary, 69–72\nallocations of capacity, 1, 59–60\ngoverning legislation see International Air\nconditions in, 64–65\nServices Commission Act 1993\ndecision times, 21–23\nduration of, 6, 63 H\nprocedures for, 51–52\nHong Kong, 1, 2, 17, 18, 19, 24, 27, 33, 34, 40–41\nrenewals, 1–2, 7, 17, 60\nreviews of, 2, 7, 61 air services arrangements with Australia, 2, 17\nrevocations, 16, 18 human resource management, 31\n  Source: `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Air Navigation Act 1920\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: low\n**Mentions**: 2\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Air+Navigation+Act+1920\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- es regarding the allocation of available capacity. The Regulations also outline circumstances when the Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts may make certain operational decisions under\nthe Air Navigation Act 1920\n.\nback to top\nThe Minister's Policy Statement\nIn allocating capacity, the Commission assesses the merits of claims by applicants under specified public benefit criteria. These criteria are detailed in Policy Statements issued, from time to time, by the Minist\n  Source: `pages/strategies-index.html`\n- es regarding the allocation of available capacity. The Regulations also outline circumstances when the Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts may make certain operational decisions under\nthe Air Navigation Act 1920\n.\nback to top\nThe Minister's Policy Statement\nIn allocating capacity, the Commission assesses the merits of claims by applicants under specified public benefit criteria. These criteria are detailed in Policy Statements issued, from time to time, by the Minist\n  Source: `pages/strategies-index__24.html`\n\n### Acts Interpretation Act 1901\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: low\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Acts+Interpretation+Act+1901\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- of\nthe positions specified in column 4 of that item.\nNote Delegations may be described in the Schedule by employee classification\n(e.g. “SES 1”) or by position description (e.g. “Deputy Secretary”). Section 34AA\nand subsection 46(1) (where applicable) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901\npermit delegations as set out in this instrument to persons acting in positions.\n(3) The delegates in each item are delegated the function or power of the IASC under\nthe section mentioned in column 2 of that item.\n(4) However, each delegation is made only to\n  Source: `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Air Navigation Regulation 2016\n\n**Type**: Regulation\n**Confidence**: low\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Air+Navigation+Regulation+2016\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- carrier\nhad demonstrated to the Commission’s satisfaction that the planned financial backing proposed in\nthe application had been contractually committed to within an acceptable time frame, or had been\nreceived.\n7. In any case, tickets are required under the Air Navigation Regulation 2016 to be sold as\n‘subject to Government approval’ until the airline obtains an International Airline Licence from the\nDepartment, for which an allocation of capacity from the Commission is a requirement for Australian\nairlines.\n8. In making subject-to-finance al\n  Source: `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Information (Charges) Regulations 1982\n\n**Type**: Regulation\n**Confidence**: low\n**Mentions**: 1\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Information+%28Charges%29+Regulations+1982\n\n**Sources**:\n- `pages/priorities-index__25.html`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- er or not to charge for information made available under the IPS, the IASC will take account of the ‘lowest reasonable cost' objective of the FOI Act (s3(4)). The amount or rate of any charge applied by the IASC will be informed by the Freedom of Information (Charges) Regulations 1982.\nThe IASC's approach to imposing charges and how these will be calculated (under ss8D(4) and 8D(5) of the FOI Act) are as follows:\nthe IASC may charge 10 cents per page plus postage costs to produce a hard copy of documents, or in certain circumstances the ac\n  Source: `pages/priorities-index__25.html`\n\n## Files Scanned\n\n- `pages/about.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__00.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__01.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__02.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__03.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__04.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__05.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__06.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__07.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__08.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__09.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__10.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__11.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__12.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__13.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__14.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__15.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__16.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__17.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__18.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__19.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__20.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__21.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__22.html` (page)\n- `pages/annual-reports-index__23.html` (page)\n- `pages/contact.html` (page)\n- `pages/homepage.html` (page)\n- `pages/priorities-index.html` (page)\n- `pages/priorities-index__25.html` (page)\n- `pages/strategies-index.html` (page)\n- `pages/strategies-index__24.html` (page)\n- `annual-reports/2020-21.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `annual-reports/2021-22.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `annual-reports/2022-23.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `annual-reports/2023-24.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `annual-reports/2024-25.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `other-pdfs/international-air-services-commission-delegation-instrument-2024-no.1-signed_0.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-for-capacity-carriers-holding-existing-allocations.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-applications-from-new-entrants.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-making-a-submission.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)\n- `other-pdfs/procedures-review-of-determinations_0.pages.jsonl` (pdf_pages)",
  "global_initiatives_md": null,
  "strategy": {
    "reporting_period": "2024-25",
    "corporate_plan_period": "2025-26",
    "vision": null,
    "vision_source_page": null,
    "purposes": "The object of the IASC Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services by Australian carriers, resulting in: a) increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits; b) growth in Australian tourism and trade; and c) the maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries. [CP p.6]",
    "purposes_source_page": 6,
    "how_we_deliver": null,
    "how_we_deliver_source_page": null,
    "government_priorities": [
      {
        "text": "Promoting economic efficiency through competition in the provision of international air services",
        "source_page": 6
      },
      {
        "text": "Growth in Australian tourism and trade",
        "source_page": 6
      },
      {
        "text": "Maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries",
        "source_page": 6
      }
    ],
    "outcomes": [
      {
        "name": "Outcome 1: Enhanced consumer benefits",
        "description": "Increased responsiveness by airlines to the needs of consumers, including an increased range of choices and benefits.",
        "key_activities": [
          "assessing applications for capacity allocations",
          "reviewing determinations",
          "providing advice to the Minister"
        ],
        "source_page": 6
      },
      {
        "name": "Outcome 2: Growth in Australian tourism and trade",
        "description": "Growth in Australian tourism and trade.",
        "key_activities": [
          "allocating capacity to Australian carriers",
          "renewing determinations",
          "varying determinations"
        ],
        "source_page": 6
      },
      {
        "name": "Outcome 3: Maintenance of competitive Australian carriers",
        "description": "The maintenance of Australian carriers capable of competing effectively with airlines of foreign countries.",
        "key_activities": [
          "assessing airline capability",
          "ensuring compliance with air services arrangements"
        ],
        "source_page": 6
      }
    ],
    "values": [
      "economic efficiency",
      "consumer benefit",
      "tourism and trade",
      "competitiveness"
    ],
    "values_framework_name": "IASC Values",
    "kpi_targets_2025_26": [
      {
        "code": "CCE01",
        "measure": "Capacity allocation",
        "target": "Unlimited capacity",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCE02",
        "measure": "Code sharing agreements",
        "target": "Increased number of agreements",
        "source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "kpi_results_2024_25": [
      {
        "code": "CCE01",
        "measure": "Capacity allocation",
        "result": "Unlimited capacity allocated",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "source_page": null
      },
      {
        "code": "CCE02",
        "measure": "Code sharing agreements",
        "result": "Increased number of agreements",
        "status": "Achieved",
        "source_page": null
      }
    ],
    "_source_urls": {
      "annual_report_url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf",
      "corporate_plan_url": ""
    }
  },
  "ideas": [
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Citizen Services",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Plain-language service pages and proactive status updates",
      "idea": "Rewrite high-volume pages and letters into plain language, add status notifications, and measure contact reduction.",
      "quote": "[Page 79]\nINDEX\nA Chairperson, 6, 7–8, 22\nattendance at meetings, 9\naccountability and management, 21–3\nmessage accompanying service charter, 61\nadditional criteria, 6\noffice holders since 1992, 65\nadvertising and market research, 41\nyear in review, 1–2\nAERgO, 2, 14, 19, 38\ncode share services, 4, 5\nair freight services, see freight services France, 16, 34\nair services arrangements, 10–11 Indonesia, 35, 36\nAircalin, 37–8 Italy, 36\nKorea, 37\nairlines, 1, 10–11\nNew Caledonia, 37–8\nsee also determinations and decisions; Jetstar\nAirways; Qantas; Virgin Australia New Zealand, 38\nSingapore, 39\nAlliance Airlines, 14\nVanuatu, 40\nannual report, 20, 22\nCommissioners, 6–9, 20, 21–2\nApia, 2\nmeetings, 2, 20, 21, 22, 23; attendance, 9\napplications, see determinations and decisions\noffice holders since 1992, 65–6\nappointments, 6–8, 22\nsee also Chairperson\nasset management, 23",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / service users",
      "source": "annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Citizen Services",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Single front door for life-event based services",
      "idea": "Bundle services around life events so citizens can complete related steps across agencies in one journey.",
      "quote": "[Page 79]\nINDEX\nA Chairperson, 6, 7–8, 22\nattendance at meetings, 9\naccountability and management, 21–3\nmessage accompanying service charter, 61\nadditional criteria, 6\noffice holders since 1992, 65\nadvertising and market research, 41\nyear in review, 1–2\nAERgO, 2, 14, 19, 38\ncode share services, 4, 5\nair freight services, see freight services France, 16, 34\nair services arrangements, 10–11 Indonesia, 35, 36\nAircalin, 37–8 Italy, 36\nKorea, 37\nairlines, 1, 10–11\nNew Caledonia, 37–8\nsee also determinations and decisions; Jetstar\nAirways; Qantas; Virgin Australia New Zealand, 38\nSingapore, 39\nAlliance Airlines, 14\nVanuatu, 40\nannual report, 20, 22\nCommissioners, 6–9, 20, 21–2\nApia, 2\nmeetings, 2, 20, 21, 22, 23; attendance, 9\napplications, see determinations and decisions\noffice holders since 1992, 65–6\nappointments, 6–8, 22\nsee also Chairperson\nasset management, 23",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / service users",
      "source": "annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Staff Productivity",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Reusable briefing and summary assistant for internal documents",
      "idea": "Create controlled templates for summarising reports, submissions, minutes, and ministerial briefs.",
      "quote": "[Page 58]\n(2) If the Commission does not receive submissions opposing the variation\nrequested in the application then, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(3) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of the Act,\nthe Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "APS staff / executives",
      "source": "annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Sensitive information leakage",
        "Inconsistent quality of generated drafts"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Staff Productivity",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Department-wide knowledge and briefing platform",
      "idea": "Build a secure knowledge platform that lets staff search, summarise, and cite approved departmental material.",
      "quote": "[Page 58]\n(2) If the Commission does not receive submissions opposing the variation\nrequested in the application then, in assessing whether the allocation, as so\nvaried, would be of benefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of\nthe Act, the Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) need not have regard to any other matter.\n(3) In all other cases, in assessing whether the allocation, as so varied, would be of\nbenefit to the public for the purpose of subsection 24(2) of the Act,\nthe Commission:\n(a) is to have regard to the reasonable capability criterion; and\n(b) may have regard to any of the additional criteria that it considers to\nbe relevant.",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "APS staff / executives",
      "source": "annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Sensitive information leakage",
        "Inconsistent quality of generated drafts"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Data & Performance",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "KPI evidence register with named owners",
      "idea": "Create a simple register mapping each KPI to source data, owner, frequency, target, and last result.",
      "quote": "[Page 84]\nR submissions see applications – submissions in\nresponse to\nreasonable capability criterion see determinations,\nsustainability see ecologically sustainable\ncriteria for\ndevelopment and environmental performance\nRegister of Available Capacity, 13, 71 reporting\nRemuneration Tribunal, 30 Sydney, 16, 17\nRemuneration Tribunal Act 1973, 30\nT\nreport on performance, 15–27\ncompliments and complaints, 21 Tasman Cargo Airlines, 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, 27, 33,\n34, 41, 72\ndecision times, 21–23\nEfficiency in use of financial resources Thailand, 2, 17, 26, 27, 37, 46,\n(performance measure), 27 Timor-Leste, 26\nperformance criteria, 15\nTonga, 26\nServing applicants and interested parties\ntransfer of capacity allocation, see code sharing\n(performance measure), 20–23\nServing the object of the IASC Act\nU\n(performance measure), 15–20\nvolume of activity, 16;",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Executives / Parliament / public",
      "source": "annual-reports/2024-25.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Data & Performance",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Outcome dashboard linking budget, delivery, and public impact",
      "idea": "Build a public-facing outcome dashboard showing spend, outputs, outcomes, and delivery confidence.",
      "quote": "[Page 84]\nR submissions see applications – submissions in\nresponse to\nreasonable capability criterion see determinations,\nsustainability see ecologically sustainable\ncriteria for\ndevelopment and environmental performance\nRegister of Available Capacity, 13, 71 reporting\nRemuneration Tribunal, 30 Sydney, 16, 17\nRemuneration Tribunal Act 1973, 30\nT\nreport on performance, 15–27\ncompliments and complaints, 21 Tasman Cargo Airlines, 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, 27, 33,\n34, 41, 72\ndecision times, 21–23\nEfficiency in use of financial resources Thailand, 2, 17, 26, 27, 37, 46,\n(performance measure), 27 Timor-Leste, 26\nperformance criteria, 15\nTonga, 26\nServing applicants and interested parties\ntransfer of capacity allocation, see code sharing\n(performance measure), 20–23\nServing the object of the IASC Act\nU\n(performance measure), 15–20\nvolume of activity, 16;",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Executives / Parliament / public",
      "source": "annual-reports/2024-25.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Case Processing",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Triage queue for stuck or ageing cases",
      "idea": "Use existing case data to flag ageing, duplicate, incomplete, or high-risk cases for earlier intervention.",
      "quote": "Upon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 25 June 2024,\nDecision [2024] IASC 114, deciding not to issue a determination allocating capacity to\nVirgin Australia.\n  \nJapan\nUpon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 16 November 2023,\nDecision [2023] IASC 212, varying Determination [2019] IASC 119 to permit Virgin\nAustralia to code share with Air Canada and Qatar Airways, subject to certain\nconditions.",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Applicants / case officers",
      "source": "annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Case Processing",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "End-to-end case processing redesign",
      "idea": "Redesign the case pathway around risk-based triage, reusable evidence, and automated eligibility checks.",
      "quote": "Upon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 25 June 2024,\nDecision [2024] IASC 114, deciding not to issue a determination allocating capacity to\nVirgin Australia.\n  \nJapan\nUpon the application of Virgin Australia, the Commission issued, on 16 November 2023,\nDecision [2023] IASC 212, varying Determination [2019] IASC 119 to permit Virgin\nAustralia to code share with Air Canada and Qatar Airways, subject to certain\nconditions.",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Applicants / case officers",
      "source": "annual-reports/2023-24.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Regulation & Policy",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Regulatory burden scan for forms, guidance, and reporting",
      "idea": "Identify the top 10 highest-friction reporting obligations and simplify guidance, forms, or evidence requirements.",
      "quote": "[Page 73]\nIndex\nA office holders since 1992, 59\nyear in review, 1–3\naccountability and management, 20, 21–3, 23,\n39–40 code share services, 1, 6, 7, 16, 33\nAct, see International Air Services Commission Commission procedures, 39-40\nAct 1992; legislation Commissioners, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 39, 43–4 meetings, 2, 20, 21, 23; attendance, 11\noffice holders since 1992, 59\nadvertising and market research, 36\nsee also Chairperson\nair freight services, 2, 27-28, 31, 33, 34\nremuneration, 22\nAir New Zealand, 1, 3\ncommunications with interested parties, 12, 17–18\nair services arrangements, 12–13\ncompetitive tendering, 23\nairlines, 1–3, 12–13 complaints handling, 58\nsee also determinations and decisions; Qantas;\nconflict of interest, 22\nVirgin Australia\nconsultants and contractors, 23\nall-cargo services, 2, 27-29, 31, 33, 34\ncontact details, 58\nannual report, 20, 22",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Regulated entities / policy teams",
      "source": "annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Regulatory capture",
        "Over-automation of judgement"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Regulation & Policy",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Adaptive regulation program with live feedback loops",
      "idea": "Create an adaptive regulation model using sandboxes, industry data, risk scoring, and regular rule updates.",
      "quote": "[Page 73]\nIndex\nA office holders since 1992, 59\nyear in review, 1–3\naccountability and management, 20, 21–3, 23,\n39–40 code share services, 1, 6, 7, 16, 33\nAct, see International Air Services Commission Commission procedures, 39-40\nAct 1992; legislation Commissioners, 3, 8–11, 20, 22\nadditional public benefit criteria, 8, 39, 43–4 meetings, 2, 20, 21, 23; attendance, 11\noffice holders since 1992, 59\nadvertising and market research, 36\nsee also Chairperson\nair freight services, 2, 27-28, 31, 33, 34\nremuneration, 22\nAir New Zealand, 1, 3\ncommunications with interested parties, 12, 17–18\nair services arrangements, 12–13\ncompetitive tendering, 23\nairlines, 1–3, 12–13 complaints handling, 58\nsee also determinations and decisions; Qantas;\nconflict of interest, 22\nVirgin Australia\nconsultants and contractors, 23\nall-cargo services, 2, 27-29, 31, 33, 34\ncontact details, 58\nannual report, 20, 22",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Regulated entities / policy teams",
      "source": "annual-reports/2020-21.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc-annual-report-2021.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Regulatory capture",
        "Over-automation of judgement"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Citizen Participation",
      "scale": "small",
      "title": "Consultation feedback summaries with response tracking",
      "idea": "Summarise consultation submissions by theme and publish what changed in response.",
      "quote": "[Page 80]\nD H\nDarwin, 14 Haneda, 16, 19\ndecision times, 19 hearings, 21\nDenpasar, 14, 35, 36\nHong Kong, 34, 37\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nhuman resources, see Secretariat\nDevelopment, Communications and the Arts, 9,\n10–11, 20, 22, 23, 41, 42 I\ndeterminations and decisions, 3–6, 13–17, 27–31\nIndonesia, 14, 19, 35–6\nCommission procedures, 45–6\nInformation Publication Scheme, 41\ndecision times, 19\nexternal scrutiny, 22 interest, conflict of, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\ninterested parties, 10, 17–18\nstakeholder feedback, 17–18\ninterim determinations, 4\nDili, 14\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992,\nDirector, 9, 22, 23\n3–6\nE corporate governance practices, 21–2\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\necologically sustainable development\nserving object performance target, 13–17\n(environmental performance reporting), 41",
      "impact": "High",
      "effort": "Low",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / stakeholders / policy teams",
      "source": "annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Pick one high-volume process or document family.",
        "Name an owner and baseline current volume, time, cost, and satisfaction.",
        "Run a 4-8 week pilot with clear before/after metrics.",
        "Publish lessons and decide whether to scale."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    },
    {
      "entity_id": "B-001955",
      "entity_name": "International Air Services Commission",
      "folder_name": "International-Air-Services-Commission",
      "category": "Citizen Participation",
      "scale": "large",
      "title": "Always-on policy participation platform",
      "idea": "Create a standing participation platform where citizens and stakeholders can propose, vote, and track ideas.",
      "quote": "[Page 80]\nD H\nDarwin, 14 Haneda, 16, 19\ndecision times, 19 hearings, 21\nDenpasar, 14, 35, 36\nHong Kong, 34, 37\nDepartment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional\nhuman resources, see Secretariat\nDevelopment, Communications and the Arts, 9,\n10–11, 20, 22, 23, 41, 42 I\ndeterminations and decisions, 3–6, 13–17, 27–31\nIndonesia, 14, 19, 35–6\nCommission procedures, 45–6\nInformation Publication Scheme, 41\ndecision times, 19\nexternal scrutiny, 22 interest, conflict of, 22\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\ninterested parties, 10, 17–18\nstakeholder feedback, 17–18\ninterim determinations, 4\nDili, 14\nInternational Air Services Commission Act 1992,\nDirector, 9, 22, 23\n3–6\nE corporate governance practices, 21–2\nRegister of Available Capacity, 10–11\necologically sustainable development\nserving object performance target, 13–17\n(environmental performance reporting), 41",
      "impact": "Very High",
      "effort": "High",
      "proof": "Evidence-backed",
      "beneficiaries": "Citizens / stakeholders / policy teams",
      "source": "annual-reports/2022-23.pdf (https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf)",
      "implementation": [
        "Create a senior responsible owner and cross-functional delivery team.",
        "Map legislation, data, privacy, procurement, cyber, and workforce constraints.",
        "Co-design with users and frontline staff before technology selection.",
        "Stage delivery through pilots, benefits tracking, and public reporting."
      ],
      "risks": [
        "Privacy and data quality",
        "Change fatigue",
        "Unclear accountability",
        "Digital exclusion",
        "Low public trust if feedback is not acted on"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "legislation_administered": [],
  "artifacts": [
    {
      "category": "annual-reports",
      "year": "2024-25",
      "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/iasc_annual-report_2024-25.pdf",
      "file": "annual-reports/2024-25.pdf",
      "bytes": 6045365,
      "link_text": "IASC annual report 2024-2025"
    },
    {
      "category": "annual-reports",
      "year": "2023-24",
      "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/infra6502_iasc_annual-report_2023-24_1oct24_acc.pdf",
      "file": "annual-reports/2023-24.pdf",
      "bytes": 5464462,
      "link_text": "IASC annual report 2023-2024"
    },
    {
      "category": "annual-reports",
      "year": "2022-23",
      "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/IASC_Annual%20Report_2022-23_Final_0.pdf",
      "file": "annual-reports/2022-23.pdf",
      "bytes": 2432909,
      "link_text": "IASC annual report 2022-2023"
    },
    {
      "category": "annual-reports",
      "year": "2021-22",
      "url": "https://www.iasc.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/INFRA5237_IASC_ANNUAL_REPORT_INTERNAL_0822_03_Acc.pdf",
      "file": "annual-reports/2021-22.pdf",
      "bytes": 7076645,
      "link_text": "IASC annual report 2021-2022"
    },
    {
      "category": "annual-reports",
      "year": "2020-21",
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