{ "entity_id": "B-004015", "folder": "Open-Government-Forum", "name": "Open Government Forum", "type": "Advisory Body", "jurisdiction": "Commonwealth", "portfolio": "Attorney-General's", "website": "https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/australias-open-government-partnership", "data_status": "partial", "completeness": { "has_strategy_brief": false, "has_strategy_structured": true, "has_vision": false, "has_kpi_targets": false, "has_kpi_results": false, "has_strategy_overview": true, "has_legislation_text": true, "has_legislation_structured": false, "has_global_initiatives_text": false, "has_ideas": true, "has_artifacts": true, "n_ideas": 12, "n_legislation": 0, "n_artifacts": 5, "n_kpi_targets": 0, "n_kpi_results": 0, "n_outcomes": 0, "verified_own_data": true }, "strategy_profile": { "status": "needs_review", "confidence": "medium", "summary": "", "official_site_url": "https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/australias-open-government-partnership", "source_documents": [], "purpose": null, "vision": null, "strategic_priorities": [], "values": [], "outcomes": [], "performance_measures": [], "document_alignment_terms": { "must_support": [], "watch_terms": [], "avoid_claiming_without_evidence": [] }, "review_note": "Structured strategy exists but is incomplete." }, "strategy_brief_md": null, "strategy_overview_evidence_md": null, "internal_strategy_evidence_md": "# Open Government Forum - Strategy, Performance, and Operating Profile\n\n**Generated at**: 2026-05-09T22:12:14.704863+00:00\n**Entity ID**: B-004015\n**Entity type**: Advisory Body\n**Jurisdiction**: Commonwealth\n**Portfolio**: Attorney-General's\n**Website**: https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/australias-open-government-partnership\n\n> Draft generated from scraped source material. Treat this as an evidence pack for editorial review, not a final judgement.\n\n## Source Coverage\n\n| Source type | Count |\n|---|---:|\n| other-pdfs | 4 |\n| pages | 16 |\n| reviews | 1 |\n\n## Executive Readout\n\n### Purpose\n\n- [Page 56]\nChapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system Volume 2\nactivity relates directly to NZ citizens and permanent residents, must be jointly\nissued by the Minister and a Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants.117\nThe Minister and Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants must consider the same\nstatutory criteria in issuing the warrant.118 Where the person is not a NZ citizen or\npermanent resident, the warrant requires only the approval of the Minister.119\nThe Netherlands\n18.81 The Netherlands introduced the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 to\nreplace the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, which was considered\noutdated and no longer fit for purpose.120 The Dutch Government requested a\nspecial state committee (the Dessens Committee) assess the existing laws and\nmake recommendations.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- 19.14 The Review has examined whether the warrants available to intelligence collection\nagencies are fulfilling their primary purpose of authorising, within limits, activities\nthat would otherwise be unlawful, in support of agency outcomes:\n electronic surveillance powers which can be exercised under the TIA Act,\nSD Act and ASIO Act are discussed in Chapter 28, and\n ASIO’s authority to undertake activities that would otherwise be unlawful\nunder a special intelligence operation authority are discussed in Chapter 24.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- Instead, they authorise ASIO to exercise its\nother warrant powers for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence inside\nAustralia.203 They cannot be used to collect foreign intelligence on Australians.204\n19.84 To issue a foreign intelligence collection warrant under the ASIO Act, the\nAttorney-General must be satisfied, on the basis of advice from the\nDefence Minister or Foreign Minister, that the collection of the foreign intelligence\nis in the interests of Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign relations or\nAustralia’s national economic well-being.205 ASIO can then access its search,\n202 Australian Chemical Refiners Pty Ltd v Bradwell (Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW Supreme Court,\n28 February 1986).\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [pages 96,97,98]\norise ASIO to exercise its\nother warrant powers for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence inside\nAustralia.203 They cannot be used to collect foreign intelligence on Australians.204\n19.84 To issue a foreign intelligence collection warrant under the ASIO Act, the\nAttorney-General must be satisfied, on the basis of advice from the\nDefence Minister or Foreign Minister, that the collection of the foreign intelligence\nis in the interests of Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign relations or\nAustralia’s national economic well-being.205 ASIO can then access its search,\n202 Australian Chemical Refiners Pty Ltd v Bradwell (Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW Supreme Court,\n28 February 1986).\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n\n### Role and Functions\n\n- Most significantly, amendments\nwere made:\n in 2005 to remove the limitation which only required ministerial authorisation\nfor activities conducted when an Australian person was overseas, in order to\n‘extend the protections that the legislation currently affords to Australians\noverseas to Australians in Australia’220\n in 2014 to allow the minister administering the ASIO Act to ‘specify classes of\nAustralian persons who are, or are likely to be, involved in an activity or\nactivities that are, or are likely to be, a threat to security,’221 and to require\nASIS to seek ministerial authorisation when it produced intelligence, or had a\ndirect effect, on one or more members of a class of Australian persons in the\ncourse of assisting the Australian Defence Force in the support of military\noperations,222 and\n in 2018 to require ASD to seek ministerial authorisation when undertaking\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 25]\nVolume 3 Chapter 33 Information sharing\nmanner, as are appropriate to those purposes’.3 The ASIO Act also includes a\nfunction of advising ‘Ministers and authorities of the Commonwealth in respect of\nmatters relating to security, in so far as those matters are relevant to their\nfunctions and responsibilities’.4 The communication of intelligence on behalf of\nASIO ‘shall be made only by the Director-General or by a person acting within the\nlimits of authority conferred on the person by the Director-General’.5\n33.9 In addition to statutory functions, the ASIO Act allows for the communication of\ninformation to other ASIO employees or affiliates or to the Director-General in the\ncourse of an employee’s duties, or in accordance with a contract, agreement or\narrangement6 as well as communications within the limits of authority conferred on\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- For example:\n in 2017, AGO’s functions were expanded to include a wider range of\nnon-intelligence hydrographic and meteorological functions, following a\nrecommendation of the 2016 Defence First Principles Review to consolidate\nall of Defence’s geospatial functions into AGO\n in 2018, ASD’s cyber security functions were extended to include providing\nassistance to private companies and individuals in Australia and overseas as\npart of the consolidation of responsibility for cyber security into the Australian\nCyber Security Centre, following the publication of the 2016 Cyber Security\nStrategy\n the Department of Immigration and Border Protection established an\nIntelligence Division in 2015 as part of the merger of the Department of\nImmigration and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and\nPage 99\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 101,102,103]\n17, AGO’s functions were expanded to include a wider range of\nnon-intelligence hydrographic and meteorological functions, following a\nrecommendation of the 2016 Defence First Principles Review to consolidate\nall of Defence’s geospatial functions into AGO\n in 2018, ASD’s cyber security functions were extended to include providing\nassistance to private companies and individuals in Australia and overseas as\npart of the consolidation of responsibility for cyber security into the Australian\nCyber Security Centre, following the publication of the 2016 Cyber Security\nStrategy\n the Department of Immigration and Border Protection established an\nIntelligence Division in 2015 as part of the merger of the Department of\nImmigration and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and\nPage 99\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- The Bill\nalso stated that ASIO’s role was to obtain ‘intelligence related to espionage,\nsabotage and subversion,’ and that it had no police function.91\nThe ALP called for a number of amendments to the ASIO Bill, including:\n greater ministerial responsibility and parliamentary oversight of ASIO\n a right of appeal for the public against adverse security findings, and\n a right of appeal for staff dismissed for misdemeanours.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 85]\nVolume 2 Chapter 19 Authorisations—Key principles, warrants and ministerial\nauthorisations\n19.27 The 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (2017 IIR) noted that differing warrant\nthresholds can cause uncertainty for agencies in the performance of their\nresponsibilities.173 Although the table above demonstrates that warrant thresholds\nin the ASIO Act do differ in a number of respects, the Review has not seen any\nevidence to support the claim that this has caused uncertainty for ASIO in the\nperformance of its functions.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n\n### Strategic Priorities\n\n- Intelligence Services Act\n33.12 The IS Act confers a broad function on ASIS, ASD and AGO to communicate\nforeign intelligence in accordance with the Government’s requirements.14 The\nIS Act also allows for the communication of ‘incidentally obtained intelligence’15 to\ndomestic and foreign government authorities where the intelligence relates to the\ninvolvement, or likely involvement, by a person in activities that present a\nsignificant risk to a person’s safety, are a threat to security, are undertaken for, or\non behalf of, a foreign power, are related to the proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction or the movement of goods, or involve the commission of a serious\ncrime.16\n33.13 The IS Act further enables communications of information by ASIS, ASD, AGO\nand DIO to other persons within their agency, or to the head of the agency, in the\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 127]\nVolume 4 Chapter 46 Implementation\nChapter 46 Implementation\n46.1 This chapter has been redacted in full as it provided advice to Government on\nimplementation of the Review’s 203 recommendations, including those we\nconsider to be immediate reforms to be progressed as a matter of priority, as\ndiscussed in Chapter 32.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 19]\nVolume 1 Acronyms and abbreviations\nTerm Meaning\nDIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation\nDIO Defence Intelligence Organisation\nDPR Delegation Parlementaire au Renseignement (France)\nDSD Defence Signals Division\nEFI Act National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)\nAct 2018 (Cth)\nEFI Bill National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)\nBill 2017\nFBI Federal Bureau of Investigation\nFISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (US)\nFlood Report Philip Flood AO, Report of the Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies\n(July 2004)\nFOI Freedom of information\nFOI Act Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)\nForeign Minister Minister for Foreign Affairs\nFTE Full time equivalent\nFTR Act Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)\nGCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 22]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 1\nTerm Meaning\nSD Act Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 22,23,24,25]\nes Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- Relative to\nlaw enforcement agencies, ASD is small—just over 1,700 people with an\nannual budget of $779,475,000, compared to the AFP with over 5,300 people\nwith annual expenditure of $1,342,649,000, and the NSW Police with just\nover 21,000 and annual expenditure of $3,770,640,000.\n It would be exceedingly difficult to limit ASD’s domestic law enforcement role\nto a single crime type—logic would drive it towards ‘serious and organised\ncrime’.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 95]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nand 2018 (11,408,100),23 while Australia’s population has less than\ndoubled24—this has at least three implications for intelligence and law\nenforcement agencies:\no more Australians and Australian interests are at potential risk overseas\no more Australians are coming to the attention of our intelligence and law\nenforcement agencies while overseas, and\no our foreign intelligence agencies, in particular, must take greater care to\nnot inadvertently intrude on the privacy of ordinary Australians travelling\nor working abroad\n in the 1970s, international telecommunications to and from Australia were\nhandled almost exclusively by the Government-owned\nOverseas Telecommunications Commission, and were expensive; today,\ninternet based communications platforms allow for seamless communication\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- For example:\n between January 1967 and September 1972, a series of bombings and arson\nattacks targeting Yugoslav Government interests in Australia were carried\nout, injuring at least 17 bystanders—these attacks were allegedly perpetrated\nby Croatian separatist groups, but ASIO and the then-Commonwealth Police\nForce suspected that at least some attacks were staged by the\nYugoslav Intelligence Services,34 and\n in September 1972, the Palestinian-linked terrorist organisation,\nBlack September, killed 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team and a\nWest German police officer in Munich; in that same month, ASIO intercepted\nfive letter bombs addressed to the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, and\nConsulate in Sydney; and in July 1973, ASIO disrupted planning by the\nPopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to undertake activities in\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- In 1975-76, ‘intelligence cost the\nAustralian taxpayers about $30m’ and employed 2,381 staff.46 By comparison,\nAIC agencies’ budgets quadrupled between 2000 and 2010, reaching a total of\n$1.07 billion.47 In 2018-19, the NIC’s staffing exceeded 10,000 and its overall\nexpenses exceeded $3 billion.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- 5.54 The intelligence relationship between the Commonwealth, states and territories\nhas deepened considerably over time, including as a result of:\n the establishment of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams in 2002—these are a\npartnership between the AFP, state and territory police forces and ASIO, in\nclose collaboration with other Australian and international partners, to identify\nand investigate terrorist activities (including terrorist financing) with an\nemphasis on prevention\n the establishment of the National Disruption Group in 2014—the group brings\ntogether the AFP, ACIC, Home Affairs, AUSTRAC, ASIO, state and territory\n49 2017 IIR, para 2.26.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n\n## KPIs, Targets, and Where They Are At\n\n- 5.54 The intelligence relationship between the Commonwealth, states and territories\nhas deepened considerably over time, including as a result of:\n the establishment of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams in 2002—these are a\npartnership between the AFP, state and territory police forces and ASIO, in\nclose collaboration with other Australian and international partners, to identify\nand investigate terrorist activities (including terrorist financing) with an\nemphasis on prevention\n the establishment of the National Disruption Group in 2014—the group brings\ntogether the AFP, ACIC, Home Affairs, AUSTRAC, ASIO, state and territory\n49 2017 IIR, para 2.26.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 103,104,105,106]\ns a result of:\n the establishment of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams in 2002—these are a\npartnership between the AFP, state and territory police forces and ASIO, in\nclose collaboration with other Australian and international partners, to identify\nand investigate terrorist activities (including terrorist financing) with an\nemphasis on prevention\n the establishment of the National Disruption Group in 2014—the group brings\ntogether the AFP, ACIC, Home Affairs, AUSTRAC, ASIO, state and territory\n49 2017 IIR, para 2.26.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- Throughout this time,\nASIO’s operations continued to target, among others, trade unionists and\nopponents of the Vietnam War.95 Concerns about the partisan nature of\n90 Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 October 1955 (Menzies) nil page ref. and Horner,\nThe Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949-1963, pg 88 – citing a draft letter from Spry to the\nAttorney-General, handed to the Attorney-General 20 July 1954, ASIO Records.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 45]\nVolume 2 Chapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system\n whether the conduct that would be authorised by the warrant is proportionate\nto what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.64\n18.35 A ‘double lock’ system also applies for the use of directed surveillance or\ncovert human intelligence sources by UK intelligence services.65 This requires\ninternal agency authorisation followed by judicial authorisation by a justice of the\npeace or sheriff.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- This does not mean\nmerely their names should not be revealed; the contents of an agent’s report could give a lead\nto his identity…It is important that ASIO protects the identities not only of agents, but of all\nconfidential human sources.252\n35.76 Justice Hope considered that ‘if an agent's identity is disclosed his access to the\ntarget organization or person is likely to be closed’.253 The agent may be further\n‘endangered and breach of his confidence with ASIO is likely to cause him to cut\nhis ties with ASIO even if he could be of further use to it’.254 Justice Hope noted\n251 ALRC, Secrecy Laws and Open Government, para 8.53 citing the Australian Intelligence Community\nSubmission No SR 77 (20 August 2009).\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 70]\nChapter 44 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation security Volume 4\nassessments\ninformation contained in the assessment, and agencies must proceed on the basis\nof those findings.182\n44.20 The ASIO Act contains two key prohibitions in relation to security assessments:\n it prohibits a Commonwealth agency from taking prescribed administrative\naction on the basis of any communication made by ASIO in relation to a\nperson which does not amount to a security assessment,183 and\n it prohibits ASIO from making any communication to a state, which it knows\nis intended or likely to be used by that state in considering prescribed\nadministrative action against a person, except in the form of a security\nassessment.184\n44.21 In other words, the ASIO Act does not prevent ASIO from communicating security\nadvice in situations where prescribed administrative action may result.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 115]\nVolume 2 Chapter 20 Class authorisations\n20.11 Warrants issued in relation to particular premises or things, albeit not focused on a\nparticular person, are still specific and targeted, in the sense that they target a\nparticular premises, computer or thing.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [pages 33,34,35]\ngiven the generally low level of understanding of\nwhat is permitted and in which circumstances.’\n33.44 In the context of law enforcement and criminal intelligence sharing, the Data to\nDecisions Cooperative Research Centre considered that complexity ‘is largely the\nresult of patchwork legislation across jurisdictions rather than policy differences\nbetween them’.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- In 2017-18 the NAA released over 98 per cent of the records requested under the\nArchives Act in whole.135 While agencies may experience administrative burden in\nconsidering requests and defending exemption claims, transparency is being\nachieved in a significant amount of cases.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- In the Security Division, there can be one or\nthree presidential members presiding over a hearing,140 whereas in other Divisions\na single member of any level can hear matters.141 Divisions other than the\nSecurity Division prescribe maximum rather than minimum requirements (for\nexample, a proceeding must have no more than three members and must not\nhave more than one member who is a judge).142 While similar protections can be\nachieved in the General Division, they require the approval of the\nGeneral Division143 and the Attorney-General.144 There is no guarantee that a\nmember of the General Division will agree to the protections (including closed\nhearings) for matters of national security.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 19]\nVolume 1 Acronyms and abbreviations\nTerm Meaning\nDIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation\nDIO Defence Intelligence Organisation\nDPR Delegation Parlementaire au Renseignement (France)\nDSD Defence Signals Division\nEFI Act National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)\nAct 2018 (Cth)\nEFI Bill National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)\nBill 2017\nFBI Federal Bureau of Investigation\nFISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (US)\nFlood Report Philip Flood AO, Report of the Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies\n(July 2004)\nFOI Freedom of information\nFOI Act Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)\nForeign Minister Minister for Foreign Affairs\nFTE Full time equivalent\nFTR Act Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)\nGCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 22]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 1\nTerm Meaning\nSD Act Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 22,23,24,25]\nes Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- Relative to\nlaw enforcement agencies, ASD is small—just over 1,700 people with an\nannual budget of $779,475,000, compared to the AFP with over 5,300 people\nwith annual expenditure of $1,342,649,000, and the NSW Police with just\nover 21,000 and annual expenditure of $3,770,640,000.\n It would be exceedingly difficult to limit ASD’s domestic law enforcement role\nto a single crime type—logic would drive it towards ‘serious and organised\ncrime’.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n\n## Key Metrics\n\n| Values found | Evidence | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| $30m, $1.07 billion, $3 billion, 2,381 staff, 1.07 billion, 3 billion | In 1975-76, ‘intelligence cost the\nAustralian taxpayers about $30m’ and employed 2,381 staff.46 By comparison,\nAIC agencies’ budgets quadrupled between 2000 and 2010, reaching a total of\n$1.07 billion.47 In 2018-19, the NIC’s staffing exceeded 10,000 and its overall\nexpenses exceeded $3 billion. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $18 million, 18 million | The Government allocated a budget of over $18 million\nand a full time secretariat of over 20 people worked on the Review for about\n18 months. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $779,475,000, , $1,342,649,000, , $3,770,640,000 | Relative to\nlaw enforcement agencies, ASD is small—just over 1,700 people with an\nannual budget of $779,475,000, compared to the AFP with over 5,300 people\nwith annual expenditure of $1,342,649,000, and the NSW Police with just\nover 21,000 and annual expenditure of $3,770,640,000.\n It would be exceedingly difficult to limit ASD’s domestic law enforcement role\nto a single crime type—logic would drive it towards ‘serious and organised\ncrime’. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $3 million, 3 million | [Page 26]\nChapter 43 Open government and transparency Volume 4\nprotection must be balanced with the interests of regulated entities in carrying out\ntheir functions or activities.28\n43.32 The Privacy Act contains 13 Australian Privacy Principles (APPs), which regulate\nthe handling of personal information by private sector organisations with an annual\nturnover of more than $3 million, certain kinds of smaller private sector\norganisations, and most | `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)` |\n| 9% | LI��3\u001e\u00134���\u0018�q��T��IBS/q\u000ed�n��YP\\|L}�f\u0002��SW�<�\u000b#p����\u001e�()\u0012���X�`ܖ�\u0019��1�$?lm�\u0011��e~A��sw\u0003\u0007X,��T�\u001a\\Ce��\u0003��Q}}����\u001cZܒ<�ɘ5\u001d�g�H\u0011.\u0010��͉��{qkӢ�f\u000e4����>ZY�����\u001d�\\|\u001fӼ%\u001b��vbO�h:�Z\u0002+E�\nH-�e\u001f@4x�����\u000eU��o�\u0002\u0017�]r�eAW�E��D_\u0018į2��nr\u0004\\|���*^G�rՑ岸�I�L�_�\u0005\\|�)X7<*Z\u0005�\u000e��2�uI7hF��ъ�󦎒R�\u0002�?M�*�\u0002��o\u0001��\u001fi��:@n�1�x\u001c8�e$�L\u0004\u001fU�]�%��\"��\u0019\"_`��_\u0003h_4�;}�H:e��@�{=\u001b\u0001\u0007o����ƣ�\u0012�����N���/�F�����ޜA\u0004Pܓ+�\u0003�~�m\u0006�\nV7u\\|\u001d�j�J��q�W\u0003s\u0001Cv�_i�\\|�F�_̯\n�\\|gK���� �2\u0006~DI�vȽ�\f�K�iC%c�wY\"\n�������F�!�:�C | `pages/announcements-index__04.html (https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-12/agd-building.png)` |\n| 98 per cent | In 2017-18 the NAA released over 98 per cent of the records requested under the\nArchives Act in whole.135 While agencies may experience administrative burden in\nconsidering requests and defending exemption claims, transparency is being\nachieved in a significant amount of cases. | `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)` |\n| $779,475,000, , $1,342,649,000, , $3,770,640,000 | Relative to\nlaw enforcement agencies, ASD is small—just over 1,700 people with an\nannual budget of $779,475,000, compared to the AFP with over 5,300 people\nwith annual expenditure of $1,342,649,000, and the NSW Police with just\nover 21,000 and annual expenditure of $3,770,640,000.\n It would be exceedingly difficult to limit ASD’s domestic law enforcement role\nto a single crime type—logic would drive it towards ‘serious and organised\ncrime’. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n| $30m, $1.07 billion, $3 billion, 2,381 staff, 1.07 billion, 3 billion | In 1975-76, ‘intelligence cost the\nAustralian taxpayers about $30m’ and employed 2,381 staff.46 By comparison,\nAIC agencies’ budgets quadrupled between 2000 and 2010, reaching a total of\n$1.07 billion.47 In 2018-19, the NIC’s staffing exceeded 10,000 and its overall\nexpenses exceeded $3 billion. | `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)` |\n\n## Key Achievements\n\n- [Page 22]\nChapter 43 Open government and transparency Volume 4\nand in contrast to the adherence to a more closed system of government in the UK…The\nlegislative reforms that eventually followed became known as the ‘new administrative law’, the\npurpose of which was to facilitate effective public administration while at the same time\nsafeguarding the civic rights of the individual citizen.14\n43.16 The ‘new administrative law’ was implemented initially through:\n the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act)\n the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), and\n the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- All three reviews arrived at different conclusions on the question of who\nshould authorise agencies’ intrusive activities.\n The Intelligence and Security Committee recommended that the most\nintrusive activities must always be authorised by a Secretary of State.90\n In contrast, Lord Anderson recommended that a scheme of judicial\nauthorisation be implemented, with the Secretary of State also certifying\nwarrants concerned with the defence and/or foreign policy of the UK.91\n The Royal United Services Institute recommended a composite approach,\nwith judicial authorisation for warrants sought for a purpose relating to the\ndetection or prevention of serious and organised crime, and ministerial\n88 The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is a statutory committee of Parliament which oversees the\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 89]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nauthority for the exercise of these functions should be the exclusive province\nof the executive arm of government’,15 and\n that placing ASIS onto a legislative basis would ‘add a significant new\ndimension to the accountability framework, bringing with it qualities of\ntransparency and legitimacy’ and serving to reassure the public that ASIS’\nactivities are properly authorised and controlled ‘in a way that statements by\nthe Minister or the Director-General cannot do’.16\n5.4 This Review is the first wholesale review of the legislative framework since the\nmajor reforms following the Hope Royal Commissions were implemented.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- This stemmed from amendments made to the\nIntelligence and Security Committee Act 1996 in 2013, requiring that a review be\nundertaken every five to seven years of the agencies, the legislation governing the\nagencies and their oversight legislation.112\n18.79 Their report—Intelligence and Security in a Free Society—recommended greater\nconsistency in the authorising framework across NZSIS and GCSB to provide a\ngreater level of accountability, improve agency cooperation and provide clarity to\nboth agencies and the public on the scope of agencies’ powers.113 In respect of the\nauthorisation process, Sir Cullen and Dame Reddy considered there was a\nbalance to be struck between placing sufficient safeguards on the agencies’\nintrusive activities, while providing the agencies with enough flexibility to perform\ntheir functions.114 They considered this balance best struck by requiring judicial\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- 19.51 In respect of search warrants, it is important to highlight that such a warrant can\nonly be executed once and only for as long as the grounds on which it was issued\ncontinue to exist.194 A search warrant with a duration of 90 days does not authorise\nASIO to enter and search a premises multiple times during that period—it only\n186 ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth), s 16.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- 43.184 The reforms also implemented major changes to the Archives Act by bringing the\n‘open access period’ progressively forward from 30 years to 20 years for\nCommonwealth records and from 50 years to 30 years for Cabinet notebooks.134\n43.185 The amendments to the Archives Act, which commenced in January 2011,\nincreased the number of records accessible by the public at an earlier point in\ntime.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 19]\nVolume 1 Acronyms and abbreviations\nTerm Meaning\nDIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation\nDIO Defence Intelligence Organisation\nDPR Delegation Parlementaire au Renseignement (France)\nDSD Defence Signals Division\nEFI Act National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)\nAct 2018 (Cth)\nEFI Bill National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)\nBill 2017\nFBI Federal Bureau of Investigation\nFISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (US)\nFlood Report Philip Flood AO, Report of the Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies\n(July 2004)\nFOI Freedom of information\nFOI Act Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)\nForeign Minister Minister for Foreign Affairs\nFTE Full time equivalent\nFTR Act Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)\nGCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 22]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 1\nTerm Meaning\nSD Act Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 22,23,24,25]\nes Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- Relative to\nlaw enforcement agencies, ASD is small—just over 1,700 people with an\nannual budget of $779,475,000, compared to the AFP with over 5,300 people\nwith annual expenditure of $1,342,649,000, and the NSW Police with just\nover 21,000 and annual expenditure of $3,770,640,000.\n It would be exceedingly difficult to limit ASD’s domestic law enforcement role\nto a single crime type—logic would drive it towards ‘serious and organised\ncrime’.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 95]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nand 2018 (11,408,100),23 while Australia’s population has less than\ndoubled24—this has at least three implications for intelligence and law\nenforcement agencies:\no more Australians and Australian interests are at potential risk overseas\no more Australians are coming to the attention of our intelligence and law\nenforcement agencies while overseas, and\no our foreign intelligence agencies, in particular, must take greater care to\nnot inadvertently intrude on the privacy of ordinary Australians travelling\nor working abroad\n in the 1970s, international telecommunications to and from Australia were\nhandled almost exclusively by the Government-owned\nOverseas Telecommunications Commission, and were expensive; today,\ninternet based communications platforms allow for seamless communication\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- For example:\n between January 1967 and September 1972, a series of bombings and arson\nattacks targeting Yugoslav Government interests in Australia were carried\nout, injuring at least 17 bystanders—these attacks were allegedly perpetrated\nby Croatian separatist groups, but ASIO and the then-Commonwealth Police\nForce suspected that at least some attacks were staged by the\nYugoslav Intelligence Services,34 and\n in September 1972, the Palestinian-linked terrorist organisation,\nBlack September, killed 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team and a\nWest German police officer in Munich; in that same month, ASIO intercepted\nfive letter bombs addressed to the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, and\nConsulate in Sydney; and in July 1973, ASIO disrupted planning by the\nPopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to undertake activities in\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n\n## Key Issues, Risks, and Recommendations\n\n- The Attorney-General could issue a warrant authorising\nASIO to intercept a telephone service if it was being or likely to be, either:\n used by a person engaged in, or reasonably suspected by the\nDirector-General of Security of being engaged in, or of being likely to engage\nin, activities prejudicial to the security of the Commonwealth, or\n used for purposes prejudicial to the security of the Commonwealth.14\n18.9 Each request for a warrant had to be documented in full and include reasons why\nthe subject was a security risk.15\n18.10 In 1960 the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was amended to introduce new offences of\nespionage, subversion and sabotage.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- In Dietrich, Justice\nGaudron stated that the fundamental requirement that a trial be fair is entrenched\nin the Constitution by Chapter III’s implicit requirement that judicial power be\nexercised in accordance with the judicial process.229 Every judge in every criminal\ntrial has all powers necessary or expedient to prevent unfairness in a trial.230\n45.10 The function of determining guilt and punishment for a criminal offence has been\nregarded as a core aspect of judicial power which can be ‘conclusively determined\nonly by a Chapter III court acting as such, that is to say, acting judicially’.231\nCommonwealth legislation that requires or authorises a court to entertain\nproceedings that would otherwise involve an abuse of process and/or\nfundamentally compromise a defendant’s right to receive a fair trial (for example,\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 30]\nRecommendation 97: A new electronic surveillance Act should accommodate the issuing of warrants\nto law enforcement agencies in emergencies as follows.\n An issuing authority must issue law enforcement warrants in writing wherever possible.\n An issuing authority may orally authorise a warrant, on application from an agency, if he or\nshe believes on reasonable grounds that the delay in making a written application would\nlikely defeat the purpose of obtaining the warrant.\n Source: `reviews/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-Na.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-National-Intelligence-Community_1.PDF)`\n- [Page 111]\nVolume 4 Chapter 45 Protection of national security information\n45.71 There is also a risk this proposal would raise similar issues to those raised in\nHogan v Hinch.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 22]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 1\nTerm Meaning\nSD Act Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [pages 22,23,24,25]\nes Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 95]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nand 2018 (11,408,100),23 while Australia’s population has less than\ndoubled24—this has at least three implications for intelligence and law\nenforcement agencies:\no more Australians and Australian interests are at potential risk overseas\no more Australians are coming to the attention of our intelligence and law\nenforcement agencies while overseas, and\no our foreign intelligence agencies, in particular, must take greater care to\nnot inadvertently intrude on the privacy of ordinary Australians travelling\nor working abroad\n in the 1970s, international telecommunications to and from Australia were\nhandled almost exclusively by the Government-owned\nOverseas Telecommunications Commission, and were expensive; today,\ninternet based communications platforms allow for seamless communication\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- For example:\n between January 1967 and September 1972, a series of bombings and arson\nattacks targeting Yugoslav Government interests in Australia were carried\nout, injuring at least 17 bystanders—these attacks were allegedly perpetrated\nby Croatian separatist groups, but ASIO and the then-Commonwealth Police\nForce suspected that at least some attacks were staged by the\nYugoslav Intelligence Services,34 and\n in September 1972, the Palestinian-linked terrorist organisation,\nBlack September, killed 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team and a\nWest German police officer in Munich; in that same month, ASIO intercepted\nfive letter bombs addressed to the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, and\nConsulate in Sydney; and in July 1973, ASIO disrupted planning by the\nPopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to undertake activities in\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 35]\nVolume 2 Acronyms and abbreviations\nTerm Meaning\nSD Act Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\nSIGINT Signals intelligence\nSIO Special intelligence operation\nSOCOMD Special Operations Command (ADF)\nTelecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)\nAct\nTempleton, RCIS, Dr Jacqueline Templeton, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976)\nSeventh Report (Seventh Report on Australian Intelligence / Security Services 1900-1950)\nTHRO Act Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 33\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 56]\nChapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double lock system Volume 2\nactivity relates directly to NZ citizens and permanent residents, must be jointly\nissued by the Minister and a Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants.117\nThe Minister and Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants must consider the same\nstatutory criteria in issuing the warrant.118 Where the person is not a NZ citizen or\npermanent resident, the warrant requires only the approval of the Minister.119\nThe Netherlands\n18.81 The Netherlands introduced the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 to\nreplace the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, which was considered\noutdated and no longer fit for purpose.120 The Dutch Government requested a\nspecial state committee (the Dessens Committee) assess the existing laws and\nmake recommendations.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 84]\nChapter 19 Authorisations—Key principles, warrants and ministerial authorisations Volume 2\n‘activities prejudicial’ ‘matter important in relation to security’\nIt can include intelligence that ‘falls far short of establishing that a person The ordinary meaning of the word ‘important’ is ‘of much significance or\nis a risk to security … a scrap of information which in itself may seem to consequence’.\nhave no bearing on security may when put together with other information\nWhealy J observed, in respect of the ‘matter important to security’ test,\nassume a vital significance … it may be relevant to security to establish\nthat ‘the very language suggests not merely the width of the section, and\nthat a particular person is not a security risk’.170\nthe importance and high standard of the test, but further that the security\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [pages 84,85,86]\nto security … a scrap of information which in itself may seem to consequence’.\nhave no bearing on security may when put together with other information\nWhealy J observed, in respect of the ‘matter important to security’ test,\nassume a vital significance … it may be relevant to security to establish\nthat ‘the very language suggests not merely the width of the section, and\nthat a particular person is not a security risk’.170\nthe importance and high standard of the test, but further that the security\nmatter itself may well be a matter, if revealed, that might pose a threat in\nrelation to security, within the broad meaning of section 4 of the\ndefinition’.172\n170 See Church of Scientology v Woodwards (1982) 154 CLR 25, 51 (Gibbs J).\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- In a\npaper prepared to assist the 2012 PJCIS’s Inquiry into Potential Reforms of\nAustralia’s national security legislation, the Attorney-General’s Department stated\nthat ‘sometimes the execution of a warrant takes place in unpredictable and\nvolatile environments and ASIO needs to be able to quickly expand the list of\nauthorised persons’.199\n19.61 ASIO submitted that the ability to authorise a class of persons to execute a\nwarrant could, in some circumstances, delay an operation’s commencement or\nrisk persons who are not validly authorised conducting activities under the warrant.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- Instead, they authorise ASIO to exercise its\nother warrant powers for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence inside\nAustralia.203 They cannot be used to collect foreign intelligence on Australians.204\n19.84 To issue a foreign intelligence collection warrant under the ASIO Act, the\nAttorney-General must be satisfied, on the basis of advice from the\nDefence Minister or Foreign Minister, that the collection of the foreign intelligence\nis in the interests of Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign relations or\nAustralia’s national economic well-being.205 ASIO can then access its search,\n202 Australian Chemical Refiners Pty Ltd v Bradwell (Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW Supreme Court,\n28 February 1986).\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n\n## Corporate Values and Operating Culture\n\n- 43.2 Open government is defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and\nDevelopment (OECD) as ‘a culture of governance that promotes the principles of\ntransparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of\ndemocracy and inclusive growth’.1 In Australia, the Second Open Government\nNational Action Plan 2018-2020 states that at its heart, the concept of open\ngovernment ‘respects the right of citizens to engage directly and scrutinise the\nbehaviour of government and the institutions of state.’2\n43.3 When making the Australian Government’s declaration of open government in\n2010, the then Minister for Finance and Deregulation, the Hon Lindsay Tanner\nMP, noted the following three key principles:\n informing: strengthening citizens’ rights of access to information, establishing\na pro-disclosure culture across Australian Government agencies including\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- [Page 20]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 1\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF)`\n- [Page 33]\nVolume 2 Acronyms and abbreviations\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- This stemmed from amendments made to the\nIntelligence and Security Committee Act 1996 in 2013, requiring that a review be\nundertaken every five to seven years of the agencies, the legislation governing the\nagencies and their oversight legislation.112\n18.79 Their report—Intelligence and Security in a Free Society—recommended greater\nconsistency in the authorising framework across NZSIS and GCSB to provide a\ngreater level of accountability, improve agency cooperation and provide clarity to\nboth agencies and the public on the scope of agencies’ powers.113 In respect of the\nauthorisation process, Sir Cullen and Dame Reddy considered there was a\nbalance to be struck between placing sufficient safeguards on the agencies’\nintrusive activities, while providing the agencies with enough flexibility to perform\ntheir functions.114 They considered this balance best struck by requiring judicial\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF)`\n- [Page 20]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 3\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 16]\nAcronyms and abbreviations Volume 4\nTerm Meaning\nLEIC Act Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (Cth)\nMigration Act Migration Act 1958 (Cth)\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nMTA Minor and technical amendments\nMutual Assistance Act Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)\nNAA National Archives of Australia\nNBN National Broadband Network\nNCA National Crime Authority\nNGO Non-government organisation\nNIC National Intelligence Community\nNPI National policing information\nNSA National Security Agency (US)\nNSC National Security Committee of Cabinet\nNSG National Security Group (NZ)\nNSI National security information\nNSI Act National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)\nNSIRA National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (Canada)\nNSS National Security Secretariat (UK)\nNSW New South Wales\nNZ New Zealand\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF)`\n- According to the classified ASIO manual the ‘primary\npurpose’ of this protection was ‘to preserve ASIO’s continuing access to the\ninformation or assistance which such persons can provide’.259 Of equal importance\nwas the protection of agents from ‘harm to their career and/or their personal or\nphysical well-being’ that might arise from the disclosure of their identity or\nconnection with ASIO.260\n35.79 This rationale is consistent with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act\nwhich provides that the purpose of the identity disclosure offence relating to\nemployees of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is ‘to ensure that the\nidentity of human sources is kept confidential in order to protect their life and\nsecurity and to encourage individuals to provide information to the Service’.261\n35.80 With respect to ASIS, Justice Hope also acknowledged that ‘intelligence sources\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n- [Page 124]\nChapter 35 Secrecy Volume 3\nImmunities for disclosures to oversight bodies\n35.152 In addition to the defences to general and specific secrecy offences, the IGIS Act\ncontains a statutory immunity for any person who voluntarily provides or makes\navailable information or documents to the Inspector-General for the purpose of the\nIGIS exercising a power, or performing a function or duty under the Act.311\nThis immunity applies to public interest disclosures by persons who are not\n‘public officials’ as well as disclosures of information which do not relate to\n‘disclosable conduct’ or are not made to an ‘authorised officer’ as required by the\nPID Act.312\n35.153 The Ombudsman Act contains a similar immunity with respect to information or\ndocuments provided to the Commonwealth Ombudsman in accordance with that\nAct.313\nPrinciples underpinning the current mechanisms\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf (https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF)`\n\n## Global Ideas and Case Study Inputs\n\n_No global-intelligence source text found yet. Run `CLAUDE/global-ideas-scraper.py ` to populate case-study sources._\n\n## Source Artifacts Used\n\n- `reviews/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-Na.pdf` - reviews - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-National-Intelligence-Community_1.PDF\n- `pages/about.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/about-us\n- `pages/announcements-index.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/copyright\n- `pages/announcements-index__04.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-12/agd-building.png\n- `pages/announcements-index__05.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/copyright\n- `pages/announcements-index__06.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/accessibility-statement\n- `pages/homepage.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/australias-open-government-partnership\n- `pages/ministers.html` - pages - https://ministers.ag.gov.au/\n- `pages/publications-index.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/families-and-marriage/publications\n- `pages/reviews-index.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/independent-reviewer-adverse-security-assessments\n- `pages/royal-commissions-index.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/review-confidentiality-protections-royal-commissions-act\n- `pages/strategies-index.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/comprehensive-review-legal-framework-national-intelligence-community\n- `pages/strategies-index__00.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/national-security/comprehensive-review-legal-framework-national-intelligence-community\n- `pages/strategies-index__01.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/commonwealth-integrity-strategy-strengthening-integrity-across-commonwealth-public-sector\n- `pages/strategies-index__02.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/node/5625\n- `pages/strategies-index__03.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/node/5624\n- `pages/structure.html` - pages - https://www.ag.gov.au/about-us/who-we-are/portfolio-agencies\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-control-coordination-and-cooperation.PDF\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.PDF\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.PDF\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pdf` - other-pdfs - https://www.ag.gov.au/system/files/2020-12/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.PDF\n\n## Gaps To Fix\n\n- No corporate plan text source found.\n- No annual report text source found.\n- No global comparison/case-study sources found.", "legislation_md": "# Open Government Forum - Acts and Legislation Discovery\n\n**Generated at**: 2026-05-09T21:05:07.187244+00:00\n**Entity ID**: B-004015\n**Jurisdiction**: Commonwealth\n**Portfolio**: Attorney-General's\n\n> This is an evidence-based discovery list from scraped department material. A mention does not always mean the department administers the legislation; high-confidence and official register links should be reviewed.\n\n## Summary\n\n- Source files scanned: 21\n- Unique legislation references found: 431\n\n| Type | Count |\n|---|---:|\n| Act | 423 |\n| Order | 1 |\n| Regulation | 6 |\n| Rules | 1 |\n\n## Legislation References\n\n### Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 40\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Australian+Security+Intelligence+Organisation+Act+1979\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n-  any specific proposals for reform, such as Recommendation 16(c) of the\nIndependent Intelligence Review.\nWithout limiting the legislation that the review may consider, the review will consider:\n core legislation relating to the six AIC agencies, such as the Australian\nSecurity Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, the Office of National\nAssessments Act 1977, including proposed legislation to give effect to the\ntransition to the Office of National Intelligence, and Intelligence Services Act\n2001, including amendments contained in the Intelligence Services\nAmendment (Es\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- .\n3.22 While not recommending a common legislative framework for the entire NIC, some\nareas of NIC legislation would benefit from simplification and modernisation. We\nrecommend the repeal of the TIA Act, Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (SD Act) and\nparts of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act), and\ntheir replacement with a single new Act governing the use of electronic\nsurveillance powers—telecommunications interception, covert access to stored\ncommunications, computers and telecommunications data, and the use of optical,\nlistening and t\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- e and money flows across national borders\npresent more opportunities for organised crime and extremist groups to\nconceal and launder their illicit funds,26 requiring Australian agencies to work\nin closer partnership with their international counterparts.\n5.26 The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) and IS Act\ncontain additional controls that apply when ASIO, ASIS, ASD and AGO seek to\nundertake particular activities in relation to Australian citizens and permanent\nresidents. At the time of the Hope Royal Commissions, Australia did not recognis\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ation from having alternate governments fully and\nresponsibly apprised of matters of such great national concern.’124\nImplementation\nThe Fraser Government implemented many of Justice Hope’s recommendations.\nThe 1956 ASIO Act was repealed and replaced with the Australian Security\nIntelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). The Government had concluded\nthat ‘the legislative reforms [were so]…fundamental and wide-ranging that a\ncompletely new [ASIO] Bill, rather than amendment’ was required.125 The reforms\nwere intended to remove any legal doubts about ministerial res\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- rity Review\nThe 1978 bombing of the Hilton Hotel in Sydney was described as Australia’s first\ninstance of domestic terrorism.136 Conspiracy theories, including that ASIO had\nplanted the bomb to justify its existence, circulated in the media.137 To quash these\nAustralian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, Division 3, Part IV. This Tribunal was later abolished\nand the review function went to the Security Division of the AAT.\n130 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 March 1979 (Peter Durack, Attorney-General) pg 649.\n131 Blaxland, The Protest Years: T\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 39\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Telecommunications+%28Interception+and+Access%29+Act+1979\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- detail. The Review sought and received additional\nsubmissions, case studies and written comments on discrete issues, and held over\nPJCIS will then complete its review of this Act, which must be completed by 30 September 2020 (s 187N of\nthe Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979).\n5 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Secret Intelligence Service,\nAustralian Signals Directorate, Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, Defence Intelligence\nOrganisation, Office of National Intelligence, Australian Federal\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- the Australian Federal Police Act 1979\nto the extent it relates to the performance of their intelligence functions as\npart of the NIC;\n legislation containing NIC agency investigative powers, such as the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004 and Telecommunications (Interception and\nAccess) Act 1979;\n the adequacy of national security information handling provisions under the\nNational Security Information Act 2004, including the protection of information\nrelating to counter terrorism and foreign interference prosecutions;\n oversight-related legislation\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- nce with them. The sheer volume of the laws agencies\nmust deal with on a daily basis can add to its complexity. The original number of\npages in the Acts named in our terms of reference was 729; today, it is 2,310.9 As\na single example, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979\n(TIA Act) comprised 19 pages when originally enacted; it now numbers 411.10\n3.9 The majority of the growth in the legislative framework has taken place following\nthe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Between that date and 1 August 2019,\nthe Parliament p\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- elligence Services Act\n2001 (Cth) (IS Act), National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (NSI Act),\nOffice of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth) (ONI Act), Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (SD Act) and\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act), plus relevant parts of the\nCrimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) and Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code).\n19 Michael L’Estrange and Stephen Merchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (June 2017) (2017 IIR)\npara 6.12.\nPage 87\n\n[page\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ramework an ‘ad hoc character’ is borne out.\n5.14 Moreover, there are aspects of the legislative framework that require major reform,\nnotwithstanding the efforts of successive governments and parliaments to maintain\nthem—in particular, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979\n(Cth) (TIA Act) and other laws governing electronic surveillance in Australia.\n5.15 Many of the amendments to the legislative framework for the NIC have increased\nthe powers of the intelligence services and law enforcement agencies, and\nengaged human rights a\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Intelligence and Security Act 2017\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 38\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Intelligence+and+Security+Act+2017\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- des its\nsecurity and intelligence agencies on a civilian and military basis. The General\nIntelligence and Security Service is responsible for both domestic security and the\ncollection of intelligence offshore,441 and the Military Intelligence and Security\n438 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), ss 7(1) and 8(1).\n439 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 9.\n440 Intelligence Law 2015 (France), art L811-3.\n441 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (The Netherlands), art 6.\nPage 184\n\n[page 187]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security in\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- litary basis. The General\nIntelligence and Security Service is responsible for both domestic security and the\ncollection of intelligence offshore,441 and the Military Intelligence and Security\n438 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), ss 7(1) and 8(1).\n439 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 9.\n440 Intelligence Law 2015 (France), art L811-3.\n441 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (The Netherlands), art 6.\nPage 184\n\n[page 187]\nVolume 1 Chapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence\nService is responsible for military security, and th\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 USC 1801.\n516 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion (John D. Bates) (Web page,\n3 October 2011) ,\npg 72 and 73.\n517 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 49.\n518 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 53, 58 and 59.\n519 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 54 and 60.\nPage 215\n\n[page 218]\nChapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Volume 1\n9.85 The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 also requires\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- .\n516 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion (John D. Bates) (Web page,\n3 October 2011) ,\npg 72 and 73.\n517 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 49.\n518 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 53, 58 and 59.\n519 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 54 and 60.\nPage 215\n\n[page 218]\nChapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Volume 1\n9.85 The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 also requires that the Minister of\nForeign Affairs be consulted\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ion (John D. Bates) (Web page,\n3 October 2011) ,\npg 72 and 73.\n517 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 49.\n518 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ), s 53, 58 and 59.\n519 Intelligence and Security Act 2017 (NZ) s 54 and 60.\nPage 215\n\n[page 218]\nChapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Volume 1\n9.85 The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 also requires that the Minister of\nForeign Affairs be consulted before an intelligence warrant is issued if the\nproposed acti\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Intelligence Services Act 2001\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 35\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Intelligence+Services+Act+2001\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n- `reviews/Government-response-to-the-Comprehensive-Review-of-the-Legal-Framework-of-the-Na.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ..... 121\nThe post-Hope Era ....................................................................................................... 126\nTransparency legislation .............................................................................................. 126\nThe Intelligence Services Act 2001 .............................................................................. 128\nThe counter-terrorism response ................................................................................... 130\nLegislation and the impact of technological change ......\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- hese reviews took the legislative framework—and the principles\nunderpinning that framework—as being largely settled. The Samuels and Codd\nInquiry in 1995 recommended that ASIS be placed onto a legislative basis (which\nultimately led to the introduction of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth)\n(IS Act)). Samuels and Codd based their recommendation on two principled\narguments:\n noting that ASIS’ operations were generally sensitive and potentially\ncontroversial, that it was ‘no longer appropriate that the formal conferral of\nPage 86\n\n[page 89]\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- sed counter-terrorism and national security\nlegislation, and conducted a number of statutory reviews of laws following their\n42 RCIS, Third Report, para 356.\n43 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 8.\n44 Following the passage of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth).\n45 Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth).\nPage 98\n\n[page 101]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nimplementation. The 2017 IIR made a number of recommendations to further\nexpand the role of the PJCIS, which are discussed in greater de\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- on Act and the Privacy Act—the open government reforms have,\nnonetheless, changed the public’s expectations of Australia’s security, intelligence\nand law enforcement agencies. ASIS, ASD and AGO now publish the rules they\napply to protect Australians’ privacy.\nThe Intelligence Services Act 2001\nIn his first Royal Commission, Justice Hope recommended that ASIS be publicly\nacknowledged and given a statutory footing.182 The 1983 Sheraton Hotel incident\nand the High Court’s subsequent decision in A v Hayden heightened this\nrecommendation’s significance.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Bill 2001, s 6(1)(e).\nPage 129\n\n[page 132]\nChapter 6 Intelligence legislation in Australia Volume 1\nASIS to its other listed legislative functions.189 The Bill expressly prohibited\nASIS’s involvement in paramilitary activities or violence against the person.\nThe Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (IS Act) passed with bipartisan support\nand received Royal Assent on 1 October 2001.190 Its enactment—100 years after\nFederation and Australia’s nascent intelligence collection endeavours—brought\nAustralia into line with its Five Eyes counterparts, all\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Investigatory Powers Act 2016\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 31\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Investigatory+Powers+Act+2016\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- terial and judicial authority. Foreign\nintelligence authorisations and cybersecurity authorisations by the Minister\nunder the Communications Security Establishment Act 2019 must also be\napproved by the Information Commissioner.\n In the UK, warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 require the\napproval of the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner from the\nUK Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. The Investigatory Powers\nPage 52\n\n[page 55]\nVolume 1 Chapter 3 Executive summary\nCommissioner’s Office also has an inspection ro\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Open Source Center (Web Page,\n8 November 2005) .\n612 Joint Intelligence Organisation, (Web Page), \n613 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 7.\n614 Mariel Soto Reyes, ‘Scandals and teen drop-off weren’t enough to stop Facebook’s growth’, Business\nInsider, (Web Page, 27 April 2019) .\nPage 250\n\n[page 253]\nVo\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- cularly those conducted by\nLord David Anderson QC, the Royal United Services Institute and the Intelligence\nand Security Committee of Parliament. The authorisation framework for the use of\nintrusive powers by the UK intelligence services is spread between the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,\nand the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The legislation is supplemented by codes\nof practice.58\n18.33 A major change included in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was the\nintroduction of a requirement for both\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- UK intelligence services is spread between the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,\nand the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The legislation is supplemented by codes\nof practice.58\n18.33 A major change included in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was the\nintroduction of a requirement for both the Secretary of State and a\nJudicial Commissioner to authorise the use of intrusive powers relating to intrusive\nsurveillance,59 interception,60 equipment interference,61 bulk data interception,62 and\nthe retent\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- Criminal Procedure (US), Rule 41.\n58 These codes of practice are listed online (as of 29 October 2019) at\nhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/investigatory-powers-act-2016-codes-of-practice.\n59 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), s 32.\n60 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 2 Chapter 1.\n61 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 5.\n62 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 6 Chapter 1.\n63 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK), Part 7.\nPage 42\n\n[page 45]\nVolume 2 Chapter 18 Authorisations: Introduction and a double loc\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Surveillance Devices Act 2004\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 16\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Surveillance+Devices+Act+2004\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ACIC, AUSTRAC and\nDepartment of Home Affairs, such as the Australian Federal Police Act 1979\nto the extent it relates to the performance of their intelligence functions as\npart of the NIC;\n legislation containing NIC agency investigative powers, such as the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004 and Telecommunications (Interception and\nAccess) Act 1979;\n the adequacy of national security information handling provisions under the\nNational Security Information Act 2004, including the protection of information\nrelating to counter terrorism and foreign\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- he ASIO Act in 1999.243 In 2014,\nASIO’s computer and data access powers were expanded and modernised,\nincluding to update the definition of ‘computer’, allow for access via third party\ncomputers and to align ASIO’s surveillance device powers with those in the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004.244 Parliament’s consideration of the Bill was\ninfluenced by its privacy implications, with concerns that the expanded powers\nwould enable ASIO to ‘implant spyware on the computers of innocent people’.245\nLater that year, to ‘prevent further degradation of th\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- n only be exercised for the purpose\nof obtaining evidence in relation to criminal offences, not for the purpose of\nproducing intelligence. For example, the AFP can only obtain search warrants\nunder the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), or surveillance warrants under the\nSurveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (SD Act), for the purpose of obtaining\nevidence (as opposed to intelligence) in relation to a criminal offence.\n702 ACC Act, s 31.\nPage 270\n\n[page 273]\nVolume 1 Chapter 12 Security intelligence and law enforcement\n12.50 The ACIC represents a hybrid mode\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ia’s ACIC, the UK has a National Crime Agency responsible for\nstrategic criminal intelligence and investigating some serious and organised crime\ntypes. The National Crime Agency can task UK police partners to assist it in the\nexercise of its functions.710\n703 Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (SD Act) s 14; Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act\n1979 (Cth) (TIA Act) ss 46, 46A, 116.\n704 ACC Act, Div 2 of Pt II (examinations), s 22 (search warrants). An ‘intelligence operation’ means an\noperation that is primarily directed towards t\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- CC Act),143 allow warrants to be obtained for intelligence purposes\n(for example, the collection of security, foreign or criminal intelligence). These\nwarrants can be contrasted with warrants in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)\n(Crimes Act), and some warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\n143 For example, search warrants in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) may be\nissued for the purposes of an intelligence operation (amongst other criteria), and ASIO warrants in the\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 15\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Inspector-General+of+Intelligence+and+Security+Act+1986\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- cy of national security information handling provisions under the\nNational Security Information Act 2004, including the protection of information\nrelating to counter terrorism and foreign interference prosecutions;\n oversight-related legislation, such as the Inspector-General of Intelligence\nand Security Act 1986 and Independent National Security Legislation Monitor\nAct 2010.\nThe review team will have full access to all material applicable to its examination. Relevant\ndepartments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the review and provide any\nrequested assistance.\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- rk under the Criminal Code. In recent years, the PJCIS has, as a\nmatter of practice, reviewed proposed counter-terrorism and national security\nlegislation, and conducted a number of statutory reviews of laws following their\n42 RCIS, Third Report, para 356.\n43 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth) s 8.\n44 Following the passage of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth).\n45 Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth).\nPage 98\n\n[page 101]\nVolume 1 Chapter 5 Why a Review?\nimplementation. The 2017 IIR made a number of recommendations\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- protections to carry out their functions.\nInspector-General of Intelligence and Security\nThe Hawke Government welcomed Justice Hope’s recommendation to establish\nan Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), implemented through the\npassage of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. The\nIGIS’s functions included overseeing agencies’ compliance with the law, ensuring\nthat agencies conducted their activities with legality and propriety, and reviewing\nthe effectiveness and appropriateness of certain procedures and measures\nrelating to empl\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ing legal advice, or for the purpose of legal\nproceedings, or where information has been published\npreviously.\n488 See, eg, Crimes Act ss 15HM, 15HN, 15HO, 15HR, 15HS, 15HT, 15HU, 15HV, 15HW, 15HX, 15HY.\n489 Crimes Act, s 15HO.\n490 ASIO Act, s 35Q. See, also, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth), s 8.\n491 Crimes Act, s 15HK.\n492 ASIO Act, s 35P.\nPage 205\n\n[page 208]\nChapter 24 Immunities Volume 2\nSupporting principles\n24.99 Controlled and special intelligence operations share common features.\nFor example, both adopt an application-based authori\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- conduct was in the public interest.198\nOverview of specific secrecy offences\n35.32 In addition to the general secrecy offences in the Criminal Code, NIC agencies are\nsubject to a number of specific secrecy offences. Core NIC agency legislation\n(including the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth)\n(IGIS Act)) contains at least 53 specific secrecy offences.199\n35.33 There are further specific secrecy offences in NIC-related legislation, such as the\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act), the\nSurveillance Devices Act\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Office of National Intelligence Act 2018\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 15\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Office+of+National+Intelligence+Act+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- r instance, in the recently\nestablished taskforce to combat foreign interference, where agencies with\ncomplementary functions, powers and skills have been brought together for a\ncommon purpose.\nCoordination and cooperation\nOffice of National Intelligence\n3.47 The Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (ONI Act) has established a solid\nfoundation for ONI’s leadership and coordination of the NIC. As it is newly\nestablished, we do not recommend changes, although aspects of the coordination\nmachinery will need to be closely monitored, such as the relationship\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ity legislation [had been] used for matters unrelated to\ncounter-terrorism or national security’.293\nThe NIC: Establishment and coordination\nBetween 2017 and 2018, legislative and machinery of government changes further\ntransformed the intelligence community. The Office of National Intelligence\nAct 2018 gave effect to Justice Hope’s recommendation that a single agency\nshould ‘assume responsibilities for the leadership and coordination of the\nAustralian intelligence community as a whole’.294 The establishment of\nthe Home Affairs portfolio, and the transfer of\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- ordinated and\nintegrated national intelligence community.306 The 2017 IIR recommended new\nlegislation for ONA to achieve an ‘even higher level of collective performance\nthrough strengthening integration across Australia’s national intelligence\nenterprise’.307\nThe Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 was passed in November 2018 with\nbipartisan support. The Act continued ONA as the Office of National Intelligence in\nthe Prime Minister’s portfolio, and it committed ONI to ‘leading the [national\nintelligence community’s] integration, strategic planning and c\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- 307 2017 IIR, Executive Summary, pg 5.\n308 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 June 2018 (Christian Porter,\nAttorney-General) pg 6741.\n309 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 14 a-g.\n310 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 15.\n311 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), ss 17 and 18.\n312 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 15.\n313 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 19.\nPage 150\n\n[page 153]\nVolume 1 Chapte\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 June 2018 (Christian Porter,\nAttorney-General) pg 6741.\n309 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 14 a-g.\n310 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 15.\n311 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), ss 17 and 18.\n312 Explanatory Memorandum, Office of National Intelligence Bill 2017, pg 4, para 15.\n313 Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth), s 19.\nPage 150\n\n[page 153]\nVolume 1 Chapter 6 Intelligence legislation in Australia\neach of its Five\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Australian Crime Commission Act 2002\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 14\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Australian+Crime+Commission+Act+2002\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- elf-incrimination. However, there are protections associated with these\npowers including:\n they can only be used for special operations or special investigations, which\nmust be approved by the Board679\n673 National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) ss 7, 8.\n674 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) s 7B.\n675 Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Crime Commission Amendment (National Policing Information) Bill\n2015, pg 2.\n676 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Annual Report (2018-19) pg 4.\n677 ACC Act, ss 7A(a), (b).\n678 Senate Stan\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- provisions are articulated in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel’s Drafting Direction\nNo. 3.6 Commonwealth bodies (May 2019), pg 35.\n778 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (IS Act) ss 23, 27H; Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth)\n(ONI Act) s 31; Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) s 44.\nPage 283\n\n[page 286]\nChapter 13 Statutory authorities and the National Intelligence Community Volume 1\nconsiders that, in assessing whether an agency should be established as a\nstatutory authority, the following factors must be considere\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- mple, the collection of security, foreign or criminal intelligence). These\nwarrants can be contrasted with warrants in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)\n(Crimes Act), and some warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)\n143 For example, search warrants in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act) may be\nissued for the purposes of an intelligence operation (amongst other criteria), and ASIO warrants in the\nTelecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act) are issued in relation to the\ncollection of intelligence (amon\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- ies are not inconsistent with this principle.\n21.3 As with our discussion of warrant thresholds and durations in Chapter 19, warrants\nand ministerial authorisations, we have not considered the application of these\nprinciples to authorisation provisions in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002\n(Cth) or Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Although both are within the Review’s Terms of\nReference, we recognise their considerably broader application in the\nlaw enforcement context. Public submissions have not raised any concerns in\nrelation to these provisions, and\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- 001 (Cth)\n(IS Act), ss 6(1)(b), (d), (da), 6B(1)(d), (f), 7(1)(b), (f), 11(2AA), 39(1)(c), (2)-(3), 39A(1)(c), (2)-(3), 40(1)(c),\n(2)-(3), 40B(1)(c), (2)-(3); Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 (Cth) (ONI Act), ss 7(1)(e)-(g), 38, 39,\n42(1)(c), (2)-(3); Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (ACC Act), ss 7A(a), (fa), 51(2), (4),\n59AA-59AC; Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act), ss\n121(3), 125-133C; Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) (AFP Act), ss 8(bf)-(bh), 60A(2)(c)-(f), (2A)-(2D);\nAustr\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Criminal Code Act 1995\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 14\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Criminal+Code+Act+1995\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- ty (NIC) agencies (apart from the activities of IS Act\nagencies) is undertaken in cooperation with foreign partners.\n19.10 The only qualification arises where Australian laws have extraterritorial application,\nsuch as the computer offences in Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)\n(Criminal Code). An Australian warrant can provide authority for an Australian\nagency to engage in such conduct. However, it remains the case that the\nAustralian warrant cannot authorise a contravention of a foreign law.\nMinisterial authorisations\n19.11\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- f. These include:\n structuring the elements of criminal offences to exclude the activities\nengaged in by executive agencies\n providing positive legal authority for certain activities\n providing broad defences, such as the defence of lawful authority in the\nCriminal Code Act 1995 (Cth),386 which applies where an officer’s conduct is\nauthorised by a law of the Commonwealth, and\n creating offence-specific defences in relation to activities in the proper\nperformance of an officer’s duties and functions.\n24.12 In considering issues of po\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- unities.\n24.14 The Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) (IS Act) provides staff members or\nagents of ASIS, ASD and AGO with a broad immunity from Australian criminal and\n384 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, pg 580.\n385 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, pg 591.\n386 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) s 10.5.\nPage 180\n\n[page 183]\nVolume 2 Chapter 24 Immunities\ncivil liability for activities done outside Australia in the proper performance of the\nagency’s functions.387 The immunity only extends to liability arising under\nAustralian law\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- s with\nthe protection of communications held by the telecommunications industry, and\nPart 14 addresses ‘national interest matters’ including obligations on the\ntelecommunications industry to assist with investigations.\n26.9 Finally, Parts 10.6 and 10.7 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code)\ncontain a range of offences relating to unauthorised interference with\ntelecommunications services and unauthorised access to computers.\n26.10 These powers are valuable investigative tools and are used by NIC agencies in\nalmost all of th\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- rivacy Act), which governs the collection, use\nand disclosure of personal information\n the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (PID Act), which governs the\ndisclosure of information in relation to wrongdoing in the Commonwealth\npublic sector, and\n the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code), which contains general\nsecrecy provisions prohibiting the disclosure of Commonwealth information in\ncertain circumstances.\n33.7 Information sharing arrangements in the TIA Act and SD Act are discussed in\nChapter 30, the disclosure of na\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n\n### Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018\n\n**Type**: Act\n**Confidence**: high\n**Mentions**: 13\n**Register search**: https://www.legislation.gov.au/search?query=Other+Legislation+Amendment+%28Assistance+and+Access%29+Act+2018\n\n**Sources**:\n- `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-2-authorisations-immunities-and-electronic-surveillance.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-3-information-technology-powers-and-oversight.pages.jsonl`\n- `other-pdfs/volume-4-accountability-and-transparency-annexes.pages.jsonl`\n\n**Evidence contexts**:\n- sm (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)\nTI Telecommunications interception\nTI Act Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)\nTOLA Act Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and\nAccess) Act 2018 (Cth)\nTSPV Top Secret Positive Vetting\nUK United Kingdom\nUS United States\nVPN Virtual private network\nWA Western Australia\nPage 20\n\n[page 23]\nVolume 1 Chapter 1 Foreword\nChapter 1 Foreword\nThis is a long report—over 1,300 pages across four volumes. The terms\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- of issues that were the\nsubject of recent or ongoing parliamentary or other inquiries, including freedom of\nthe press,1 ASIO’s questioning and detention powers,2 the mandatory data\nretention regime3 and the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment\n(Assistance and Access) Act 2018.4\n1 As at December 2019, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is conducting an\ninquiry into the impact of the exercise of law enforcement and intelligence powers on the freedom of the\npress, referred on 4 July 2019, and the Senate St\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- mittee on Intelligence and Security is conducting a\nreview of the mandatory data retention regime, referred on 2 April 2019.\n4 The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor is currently reviewing the Telecommunications and\nOther Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 and is due to report by 1 March 2020. The\nPage 23\n\n[page 26]\nChapter 2 Methodology Volume 1\nGovernment consultation\nIn July 2018, we met with and wrote to heads of the NIC agencies5 and portfolio\ndepartments,6 the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Securit\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- to their networks,248\nclosing a gap that had made it impossible for agencies to progress many online\ninvestigations.249\nIn 2018, to contend with the challenges of ubiquitous encryption, Parliament\npassed the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance\nand Access) Act 2018 (Cth) (TOLA Act). The Act enabled industry to provide\nvoluntary technical assistance to intelligence, security and law enforcement\nagencies to decrypt communications between individuals.250\n243 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendme\n Source: `other-pdfs/volume-1-recommendations-and-executive-summary-foundations-and-principles-contro.pages.jsonl`\n- endation 14, para 2.15.\n254 PJCIS, ‘Intelligence Community to Review Important National Security Legislation’, Parliament of\nAustralia, PJCIS, (Media Release 1, PJCIS, 4 April 2019).\n255 INSLM Review into the Telecommunication and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access)\nAct 2018, (Web Page), .\n256 Parliamentary Library Cyber and Digital Research Group, ‘Cybersecurity, cybercrime and cybersafety: a\nquick guide to key internet links’, (Web page), 1 April 2019,\n